Meyerstein v. Aspen
| Decision Date | 17 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 09CA1651,Pitkin County District Court No. 08CV56 |
| Parties | Arnold Meyerstein, in his capacity as trustee of the Meyerstein Trust, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. City of Aspen, a home rule municipality; Aspen/Pitkin County Housing Authority, a multi-jurisdictional housing authority; and Music Associates of Aspen, d/b/a Aspen Music Festival and School, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Opinion by JUDGE GABRIEL
Opinion Modified and
Petition for Rehearing of Plaintiff-Appellant DENIED
OPINION is modified as follows:
Page 33, lines 11-20 currently read:
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Meyerstein asserts that even if the term "may," as used in the MAA provision, gave MAA the option to rent the rooms, the provision constitutes special legislation, in violation of article V, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution. Meyerstein, however, did not raise this issue before the Authority, nor did he assert such a claim in his declaratory judgment complaint. Accordingly, we decline to address it. See Robinson v. Colorado State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998, 1008 (Colo. 2008) ().
Opinion now reads:
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Meyerstein asserts that even if the term "may," as used in the MAA provision, gave MAA the option to rent the rooms, the provision and the board resolution approving the PUD (Resolution) that authorized that provision constitute special legislation, in violation of article V, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution (). We are not persuaded.
We review the district court's assessment of the constitutionality of legislation de novo. See E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 91 P.3d 1038, 1041 (Colo. 2004). Courts presume the constitutionality of a board resolution like that at issue here, and this presumption "casts the heavy burden upon one who seeks a declaration of invalidity of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the resolution is unconstitutional." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Thompson, 177 Colo. 277, 283, 493 P.2d 1358, 1361 (1972).
As an initial matter, we note that Meyerstein did not raise this issue before the Authority, and both sides have represented to us that the issue was not raised in Meyerstein's pleadings. On our own extensive review of the record, however, we have discovered that the issue was, indeed, raised in the pleadings, namely, in Meyerstein's counterclaim against MAA. Specifically, Meyerstein sought a declaratory judgment that the MAA provision and the Resolution violated the special legislation provision of the constitution (inexplicably, Meyerstein never asserted the same claim against the Authority, which adopted the Resolution).
The parties are reminded that they have a duty to advise us of where, precisely, in the record an issue was raised and ruled on.See C.A.R. 28(k). The purpose of C.A.R. 28(k) is "to relieve courts from the burden of having to search records to determine whether (and, if so, how) issues have been raised and resolved in the trial courts." O'Quinn v. Baca,_P.3d_,_(Colo. App. No.
09CA0388, Jan. 7, 2010). We are under no obligation to search the record to determine whether an issue was raised and resolved, and the parties should not have placed the burden on us to do so here. Id.
Because the special legislation issue was raised in Meyerstein's declaratory judgment complaint against MAA and was addressed in Meyerstein's and MAA's summary judgment briefs in the district court, and because that court ruled on the issue, we may properly address it. We, however, reject Meyerstein's argument.
As pertinent here, the special legislation clause precludes local or special laws "granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever." Colo. Const. art. V, § 25. The MAA provision about which Meyerstein complains is a contract term of the agreement between the Authority and one of Meyerstein's predecessors ininterest. Meyerstein cites no case, however, nor are we aware of one, in which a Colorado appellate court has held that a contract term between a private individual and a governmental agency constitutes special legislation. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Meyerstein has failed as a matter of law to establish that the MAA provision violates the special legislation clause.
With respect to the Resolution, we note that, in substance, it approved the request by Meyerstein's predecessors in interest for the right to develop the property. In particular, the Resolution approved, among other things, the developers' requests for rezoning and their proposed PUD, subject to certain conditions.
Meyerstein cites no applicable authority, and we have seen none, in which the special legislation clause has been applied to invalidate such a resolution. Moreover, were we to apply Meyerstein's interpretation of the special legislation clause here, it would call into question not only the validity of the MAA provision, but also the approval of the initial development itself, and perhaps other development approvals like it. This is because such resolutions arguably grant individual developers special or exclusiveprivileges and would subject all PUD resolutions to challenge for that reason alone. We decline to adopt an interpretation of the special legislation clause that would produce such an absurd result. See Patterson Recall Comm., Inc. v. Patterson, 209 P.3d 1210, 1215 (Colo. App. 2009) ().
In addition, Meyerstein has failed to persuade us that the Resolution was "legislation" for purposes of the special legislation clause. Our supreme court has described a PUD plan as "a form of rezoning," see, e.g., South Creek Assocs. v. Bixby & Assocs., Inc., 781 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Colo. 1989), and Meyerstein cites several cases providing that, in certain contexts, a PUD plan or a rezoning is viewed as legislative in nature, see, e.g., id. at 1032-34 (); Margolis v. Dist. Court, 638 P.2d 297, 304 (Colo. 1981) (). Meyerstein, however, ignores other case law, including that cited bythe Authority, concluding that rezoning is, in other contexts, quasi-judicial in nature. See Margolis, 638 P.2d at 305. And Meyerstein cites no authority and makes no substantive argument as to how we should construe the Resolution at issue here in the context of the special legislation clause, or why it is necessarily legislative in nature in this context.
In light of the foregoing, and given the limited briefing and record before us on this issue, we conclude that Meyerstein has failed to carry his "heavy burden" of establishing the Resolution's unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sundance Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 188 Colo. 321, 329, 534 P.2d 1212, 1216-17 (1975) (); Thompson, 177 Colo. at 283, 493 P.2d at 1361 (); see also People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380, 383(Colo. 2005) ().
Accordingly, we agree with the district court, albeit for different reasons, that Meyerstein's claim that the Resolution violated the special legislation clause fails as a matter of law.
Plaintiff, Arnold Meyerstein, as trustee of the Meyerstein Trust, appeals the district court's summary judgment for defendants, City of Aspen (City), Aspen/Pitkin County Housing Authority (Authority), and Music Associates of Aspen (MAA), on his claims for declaratory relief and for review pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). Meyerstein also appeals the district court's dismissal on statute of limitations grounds of both his takings and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. We conclude that the need for further factual development precludes summary judgment on Meyerstein's claim that the deed restriction at issue contains an illegal rent control provision. We further conclude that the district court partially erred in holding, as a matter of law, that Meyerstein's cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was time barred. Accordingly, we reverse the portions of the district court's judgments relating to those claims and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the judgments in all other respects.
In 1997, Meyerstein's predecessor in interest applied to Pitkin County for approval of a planned unit development (PUD) called Aspen Highlands Village (the property). As part of the PUD approval process, deed restrictions were...
To continue reading
Request your trial