People v. Canister

Decision Date18 April 2005
Docket NumberNo. 03SA170.,03SA170.
Citation110 P.3d 380
PartiesPlaintiff-Appellant: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, v. Defendant-Appellee: Randy CANISTER,
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Carol A. Chambers, District Attorney, Eighteenth Judicial District, Paul R. Wolff, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Centennial, for Petitioners.

Law Office of Michael G. Root, Michael G. Root, Samler & Whitson, P.C., Hollis A. Whitson, Denver, Lindy Frolich, The Law Office of Lindy Frolich, LLC, Denver, for Respondent.

Justice COATS dissents, and Justice KOURLIS joins in the dissent. MULLARKEY, Chief Justice.

I. Introduction

In this case, we review the constitutionality of section 18-1.4-102(1)(e), 6 C.R.S. (2002), which established a sentencing procedure for certain death penalty cases that were pending when Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), was decided. We conclude that the statutory provision is special legislation in violation of article V, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution. Accordingly, the prosecution may not seek the death penalty against Randy Deon Canister under that section, or the capital sentencing scheme in place at the time of his conviction. We therefore uphold the order of the trial court, and remand the case for imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole on Canister.

II. Facts and Procedural History

Canister was arrested and charged with 1) three counts of felony murder,1 2) three counts of first degree murder after deliberation,2 3) criminal attempt to commit first degree murder after deliberation,3 4) conspiracy to commit murder after deliberation,4 5) first degree sexual assault,5 6) second degree kidnapping,6 7) four counts of aggravated robbery,7 and 8) accessory to a crime.8 His trial commenced on June 21, 2002.

Prior to trial, the prosecution announced its intention to seek the death penalty. At the time, Colorado's capital sentencing procedures were set forth in section 16-11-103, 6 C.R.S. (2001). If a defendant was convicted of a crime eligible for the death penalty, the procedures provided for a panel of three judges to determine, based on findings of the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating factors, whether a defendant should receive a sentence of death or life imprisonment. The General Assembly enacted the three-judge capital sentencing statute in 1995 in reliance on Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), which had approved of an Arizona statute allowing a judge, sitting without a jury, to make such determinations.

Three days into Canister's trial, on June 24, 2002, the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in Ring. The Court in Ring ruled that the Arizona capital sentencing statute, which provided for sentencing procedures similar to Colorado's statute, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Based on its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the Court held that capital defendants are entitled to a jury determination of the aggravating factors necessary for the imposition of the death penalty. In so doing, the Court overruled its earlier decision in Walton, and effectively declared Colorado's capital sentencing statute unconstitutional.

In response to Ring, the Governor called a special legislative session on July 1, 2002, to consider legislation "concerning the implementation of a capital punishment sentencing structure that comports with the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court." Proclamation Call for the Third Extraordinary Session of the Sixty-Third General Assembly, reprinted in 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws, 3rd Extraordinary Sess. vii, viii. The General Assembly convened on Monday, July 8, 2002, and adjourned sine die on Thursday, July 11, 2002. 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws, 3rd Extraordinary Sess.

During the session, the legislature passed a bill abolishing the three judge panel and returning responsibility for the capital sentencing determination to the jury that heard the guilt phase. § 18-1.4-102, C.R.S. (2004). As part of the bill, the legislature enacted section 18-1.4-102(1)(e), which provides:

If, as of July 12, 2002, the prosecution has announced it will be seeking the death sentence as the punishment for a conviction of a class 1 felony and a defendant has been convicted at trial of a class 1 felony or has pled guilty to a class 1 felony, but a sentencing hearing to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment has not yet been held, a jury shall be impaneled to determine the sentence at the sentencing hearing pursuant to the procedures set forth in this section or, if the defendant pled guilty or waived the right to a jury sentencing, the sentence shall be determined by the trial judge.

The bill was approved by the Governor on July 12, 2002, and became effective that same day. Canister and Abraham Hagos, the defendant in the companion case also decided today, were and are the only two people to whom the provisions of this section could ever apply.

The legislature's stated purpose behind the statute was to ensure "that there [was] no hiatus in the imposition of the death penalty" as a result of Ring. § 18-1.4-101(1), C.R.S. (2004). The jury found Canister guilty of all charges on July 9, 2002, while the legislature was meeting in its four-day special session. Canister was awaiting sentencing when the new law became effective.

In a post-trial motion, Canister alleged that the state was precluded from seeking the death penalty against him under section 18-1.4-102(1)(e) because that section was unconstitutional. Before the trial court ruled on Canister's motion, we announced Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 259 (Colo.2003), declaring Colorado's three judge capital sentencing statute "to be unconstitutional on its face under Ring." The trial court in Canister's case found that section 18-1.4-102(1)(e) violated constitutional prohibitions against special legislation, bills of attainder and, in light of Woldt, ex post facto laws. Additionally, the court ruled that section 18-1.4-102(1)(e) deprived Canister of due process "because there is no written scheme for a new jury to consider the circumstances of the offense of which he was convicted." The trial court concluded that because "the defendant could not have been constitutionally sentenced to death as of the last day of his trial, and since this court finds that the current sentencing scheme is also unconstitutional," the prosecution could not seek the death penalty.

The prosecution appealed the trial court's ruling to this court pursuant to section 16-12-102(1), C.R.S. (2004). We now uphold the court's ruling that section 18-1.4-102(1)(e) is unconstitutional, on the grounds that it contravenes the Colorado Constitution's prohibition on special legislation.

III. Analysis

Article V, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution decrees:

the general assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, . . . , regulating the practice in the courts of justice; . . . summoning or impaneling grand or petit juries; . . . In all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.

This provision, which has been part of the Colorado Constitution since its adoption in 1876, has no counterpart in the United States Constitution. The prohibition against special legislation was enacted, in part, "for the purpose of preventing class legislation — that is, legislation that applies to some classes but not to others without a reasonable basis for distinguishing between them." City of Montrose v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of the State of Colorado, 732 P.2d 1181, 1190 (Colo.1987). Prior to our announcement in Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194, 613 P.2d 884, 886 n. 3 (1980), that article II, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution implicitly guarantees equal protection, many discrimination claims were brought under article V, section 25. Dale A. Oesterle & Richard B. Collins, The Colorado State Constitution: A Reference Guide 132 (2002). Despite the concern with class composition, article V, section 25 is "more than a redundant equal protection clause." In re Interrogatory Propounded by Governor Roy Romer on House Bill 91S-1005, 814 P.2d 875, 886 (Colo.1991)(hereinafter "Interrogatory"). The ban on special legislation was also intended to curb favoritism on the part of the General Assembly, prevent the state government from interfering with local affairs, and preclude the legislature from passing unnecessary laws to fit limited circumstances. See Oesterle & Collins, supra, at 132; Citizen's Assembly on the State Constitution, The Colorado Constitution: is it Adequate for the Next Century? 14 (1976). The provision creates a strong preference for the enactment of general legislation. Most importantly, the provision acts as a limitation on the power of the legislature. See In re Senate Bill No. 95 of the Forty-Third General Assembly of the State of Colorado, 146 Colo. 233, 239-40, 361 P.2d 350, 354 (1961) ("The limitations upon the power entrusted to those in positions of authority cannot be brushed aside as having no application to projects or enterprises considered by those in official positions, as desirable or necessary to serve a special and local purpose.") (hereinafter "Senate Bill No. 95").

Since the adoption of the state constitution, we have only rarely held that a statute violated article V, section 25. See People v. Sprengel, 176 Colo. 277, 279, 490 P.2d 65, 67 (1971); Senate Bill No. 95, 146 Colo. at 238, 361 P.2d at 353; In re Senate Bill No. 9, 26 Colo. 136, 139, 56 P. 173, 174 (1899). Section 18-1.4-102(1)(e) bears the characteristics of those unusual statutes we have held to be special legislation.

Modern approaches to the analysis of whether a statute amounts to special legislation differ depending on whether one of the express prohibitions...

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