Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Torbert
| Decision Date | 03 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 3D10-2339,Lower Tribunal No. 09-156AP,3D10-2339 |
| Parties | Miami-Dade County, Petitioner, v. Thomas and Michelle Torbert, Respondents. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
A Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Appellate Division, Amy Steele Donner, Victoria S. Sigler, and Israel Reyes, Judges.
R.A. Cuevas, Jr., County Attorney, and Dennis A. Kerbel, Assistant County Attorney, for petitioner.
Aldo M. Leiva, for respondents.
Before RAMIREZ, SUAREZ, and LAGOA, JJ.
Miami-Dade County petitions for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court, Appellate Division, to quash an opinion overruling a Miami-Dade County Commission resolution that approved a Miami-Dade County zoning determinationthat the respondents' property be developed only in accordance with current GU zoning regulations. We have second-tier certiorari jurisdiction. See Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 35 Fla. L. Weekly S640 (Fla. Nov. 4, 2010); Dusseau v. Metro. Dade Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 794 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 2001). We grant the petition for certiorari and quash the opinion below as the Appellate Division applied incorrect principles of law.
On February 8, 2006, Thomas and Michelle Torbert ("the Torberts") requested a determination from the Miami-Dade Department of Planning and Zoning to confirm that they could develop one-acre residences on a sixty-five-acre parcel that was being used to grow agricultural crops. The sixty-five-acre parcel was zoned GU (Interim Zoning District), which requires a minimum lot size of five acres per homesite. The sixty-five-acre parcel was platted and recorded in 1926, as a subdivision of a larger plat known as Florida City Pines. According to the plat, each homesite was one-eighth of an acre. The Torberts' request for a zoning determination relied on a Miami-Dade County resolution, section 33-196, 1 whichstated that parcels purchased prior to April 12, 1974, "under a contract for deed, or deeded" and meeting the one-acre-per home site requirement of EU-1 District,2 shall be qualified for uses permitted in the EU-1 District. The Department of Planning and Zoning issued a letter declining to approve the use of the Torberts' parcel for one-acre home sites, determining that the 1926 plat was invalid andcould not be relied upon to change the zoning of the GU Interim District. The Department determined that the plat was invalid and now could not be relied upon because, even though it had been recorded in 1926, it had not been referred to or relied upon in subsequent deeds for sale and purchase thereby invalidating the plat. On April 16, 2007, the Torberts appealed the Department of Planning and Zoning's determination to the Miami-Dade Board of County Commissioners. In Resolution Z-1-109, the Board of County Commissioners affirmed the Department's determination. The Torberts appealed County Resolution Z-1-109 to the circuit court. The Circuit Court Appellate Division reversed the Board of County Commissioners in a per curiam decision. The County's petition for writ of certiorari that followed was quashed by this Court for reissuance of a written opinion. See Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Torbert, 39 So. 3d 482 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). The circuit court then issued a written opinion on motion for clarification quashing Resolution Z-1-109. The circuit court first concluded that the Board of County Commissioners applied incorrect law—holding that the correct law was that the plat was valid as it was recorded in 1926 and had never been revoked. Second, the circuit court concluded that the Board did not base its decision on competent substantial evidence. Last, the circuit court concluded that, based upon the language of section 33-280, defining agricultural district lots (AU District) to contain a minimum of five acres, the Florida City Pines plat constituted anexception to the five-acre-rule, that only one home is permitted on five acres of land.
Miami-Dade County now brings this second-tier petition for writ of certiorari before this Court seeking to reverse the opinion of the circuit court. We grant the petition and issue a writ of certiorari to the circuit court quashing the opinion below on grounds that the circuit court applied incorrect principles of law which resulted in a miscarriage of justice. In doing so, we are mindful of the district court's limited review on second-tier certiorari. As illustrated by the facts in Dusseau v. Metropolitan Dade County Board of County Commissioners, 794 So. 2d at 1270, the Board of County Commissioners conducted a lengthy hearing on the Torberts' application for zoning determination. Unlike Dusseau, the Board disapproved the Torberts' application for a zoning change. Like Dusseau, at the circuit court level, the court reviewed the record evidence on both sides and reversed the Board's decision. As Dusseau points out:
Although the circuit court phrased its reversal in terms of 'competent substantial evidence,' the plain language of its [opinion] shows that the court in fact reweighed the evidence at length. Instead of simply reviewing the Commission's decision to determine whether it was supported by competent substantial evidence, the circuit court also reviewed the decision to determine whether it was opposed by competent substantial evidence. The circuit court then substituted its judgment for that of the Commission as to the relative weight of the conflicting evidence. The circuit court thus usurped the fact finding authority of the agency.
The circuit court applied incorrect principles of law when it failed to properly determine the issue of the validity of the plat under established Florida law set forth in Supreme Court cases such as Wahrendorff v. Moore, 93 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1957) and McCorquodale v. Keyton, 63 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1953). These cases hold that, when an owner of land subdivides it, according to platted lots and blocks, providing for streets, parks or public ways, upon deeding one or more lots with reference to the plat, any platted restrictions or representations made are binding on the grantees. Accord Sunshine Vistas Homeowners Ass'n v. Caruana, 623 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1993); Peninsular Point, Inc. v. S. Ga. Dairy Co-op, 251 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971). Even more instructive is the case of Tallahassee Investments Corp. v. Andrews, 185 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966), which holds that where a deed of conveyance contains no reference or reservation of an easement for streets, a beach or public areas, as embodied in a recorded plat, the titleholder is estopped from relying on the plat and from maintaining a position inconsistent with the deed.
Although the facts before us involve the question of the validity of the plat and do not involve an easement or restrictive covenant in a plat, the principles oflaw in these cited cases apply here—that reservations encompassed in a plat must be referenced in deeds of conveyance in order for the reservations to pass along with title and to be validated. The Florida Supreme Court has long held that a landowner is not required to plat his land incident to selling it. Kass v. Lewin, 104 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1958). Even though a recorded plat exists, a landowner "may sell [his land] by the inch, the foot, or the yard, and describe it by metes and bounds." Garvin v. Baker, 59 So. 2d 360, 365 (Fla. 1952). If a landowner plats or subdivides his land into lots or blocks, lays off streets and other public ways, designates portions of the land to be parks, playgrounds, and similar facilities and then conveys lots with reference to the plat, he is bound by the plat and representations he has made. McCorquodale, 63 So. 2d at 910 (...
To continue reading
Request your trial