Michel v. Rocket Engineering Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 February 2001
• Citation: 45 S.W.3d 658
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001) TRACI MICHEL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DON MICHEL, JR., AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF SYDNEY MICHEL, DON MICHEL, SR., AND ADA MICHEL, APPELLANTS v. ROCKET ENGINEERING CORP., AND STC/MOONEY LIMITED APPELLEES NO. 2-00-112-CV
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 658

45 S.W.3d 658 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001)

TRACI MICHEL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DON MICHEL, JR., AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF SYDNEY MICHEL, DON MICHEL, SR., AND ADA MICHEL, APPELLANTS v. ROCKET ENGINEERING CORP., AND STC/MOONEY LIMITED APPELLEES

NO. 2-00-112-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

February 15, 2001

FROM THE 211TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

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PANEL B: DAY, LIVINGSTON and GARDNER, JJ.

OPINION

GARDNER, JUSTICE

I. INTRODUCTION

The question presented is whether a Texas court may exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants consistent with due process, where the claims asserted are for wrongful death of a California resident resulting from a crash of an aircraft in California that was allegedly caused by defective modification of the aircraft in Washington. Appellants, the surviving widow and minor children of Don Michel ("Decedent"), are also residents of California. Appellants filed suit in Denton County, Texas, naming four defendants.

This appeal is from an order sustaining special appearances of two of the defendants, Appellees Rocket Engineering Corporation ("Rocket") and STC/Mooney Limited ("STC"), both Washington corporations. In one issue, Appellants complain that the order sustaining the special appearances is not supported by factually sufficient evidence. We overrule Appellants' issue and affirm.

II. JURISDICTIONAL FACTS

Decedent purchased a Mooney M20K aircraft from a business associate in California in 1997. The aircraft had been manufactured in 1979 by Mooney Aircraft Corporation ("Mooney"). Shortly after purchasing the Mooney aircraft, Decedent contracted with Rocket to have it converted to a "305 Rocket." Rocket was formed in 1990 as a Washington corporation with its principal place of business in Spokane, Washington. Rocket's business is primarily the conversion of Mooney aircraft by installation of Continental Teledyne TSIO-520-NB engines onto Mooney M20K airframes. Teledyne engines, manufactured by Teledyne Continental Motors ("Teledyne") are more powerful than the original engines installed by Mooney.

Teledyne, also a defendant in this case, has its principal place of business in Alabama. Teledyne is a division of Teledyne, Inc., a California corporation with its principal place of business in Los Angeles, California. Mooney is a Texas Corporation with its principal place of business in Kerrville, Texas.

Rocket's president is Darwin Conrad. Conrad had been an electrical contractor, a corporate pilot, and a designated engineering representative, and had worked at several companies engaged in modifying aircraft in the Washington area before forming Rocket as his own business. Conrad had flown Mooney aircraft and aircraft with the Teledyne 520NB engines and developed the idea that combining the two would produce a superior aircraft.

Rocket applied for a "supplemental type certificate" from the FAA in 1991 for its proposed modification of Mooney aircraft by installation of Teledyne 520NB engines. The certificate was issued to Rocket in 1992, authorizing the modification. In May 1994, ownership of the certificate was transferred to STC, a company formed by other individuals to fund the certification process. Rocket obtained a license to use the certificate from STC and began assembling conversions. In 1995, the FAA issued Rocket a second supplemental type certificate authorizing the increased weight of the aircraft that resulted from the installation of a Teledyne engine. An aircraft modified or converted by Rocket pursuant to the two certificates is known as a "305 Rocket."

The contract between Decedent and Rocket for the conversion of Decedent's aircraft to a 305 Rocket was entered into in 1997 in Spokane, Washington, and Rocket also performed the conversion process there. When the conversion was completed, the aircraft was delivered to Decedent in Idaho. On May 5, 1998, following conversion of his Mooney aircraft to a 305 Rocket, Decedent's plane crashed in California while on a flight to Santa Monica, California, from Sacramento.

Rocket has never maintained a registered agent in Texas, has not paid taxes in Texas, nor has it qualified to do business in Texas. Rocket has never maintained an office, warehouse, address, telephone listing, answering service, or other business location in Texas. Rocket has never had any subsidiaries, divisions, or employees in Texas; has no property or bank accounts in Texas; and has never conducted a corporate meeting in Texas.

STC is likewise a Washington corporation with its principal place of business in Spokane, Washington. STC has never maintained a registered agent in Texas, conducted any business in Texas, or qualified to do business in Texas. STC has not had any subsidiaries, divisions, employees, or other business in this state. STC had no contacts with Decedent or Appellants. STC does not sell anything; it merely holds the supplemental type certificates used by Rocket to authorize it to make the conversions of Mooney airframes to 305 Rockets.

Appellants filed suit in Denton County, Texas in April of 1999, naming Mooney, Teledyne, Rocket, and STC as defendants. Appellants alleged that the defendants negligently designed, manufactured, tested, and marketed the aircraft and also alleged strict tort liability. Rocket and STC filed special appearances challenging personal jurisdiction in Texas. Appellants asserted both specific and general jurisdiction over Rocket and STC.

After substantial pretrial discovery by the parties limited to the jurisdictional issues, the trial court conducted a hearing and sustained the special appearances, signing an order dismissing Appellants' claims as to Rocket and STC with prejudice to refiling in Texas.¹ No findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by the trial court.²

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from an order sustaining a special appearance, we review all evidence in the record to determine whether the non-resident defendant has carried its burden of negating all possible grounds of jurisdiction. Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 203 (Tex. 1985); James v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 965 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.); Fish v. Tandy Corp., 948 S.W.2d 886, 891 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1997, writ denied). Existence of personal jurisdiction is a question of law, but that determination may be dependent upon resolution of underlying factual disputes. James, 965 S.W.2d at 596; Conner v. Conticarriers & Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 411 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).

We will affirm if we can uphold the trial court's order on any legal theory finding support in the evidence. Happy Indus. Corp. v. American Specialties, Inc., 983 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1998, pet. dism'd w.o.j.); see also Cartlidge v. Hernandez, 9 S.W.3d 341, 345 (Tex. App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); In re Estate of Judd, 8 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1999, no pet.); Fish, 948 S.W.2d at 892.

We review all questions of law de novo. Hotel Partners v. Craig, 993 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1994, writ denied). Underlying fact issues are reviewed under a factual sufficiency standard. Fish, 948 S.W.2d at 892; Conner, 944 S.W.2d at 411; Nikolai v. Strate, 922 S.W.2d 229, 236 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1996, writ denied); Hotel Partners v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 847 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1993, writ denied).³ Where, as here, a reporter's record is available on appeal, the parties may challenge these implied findings by factual sufficiency and legal sufficiency points in the same way they could challenge jury findings or a trial court's findings of fact. Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989). Where sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the standard of review on appeal is the same as that applied in review of jury findings or a trial court's findings of fact. Id.; see also Kyle, 28 S.W.3d at 101.

Where, as in this case, the trial court has not made findings of fact and conclusions of law, we presume that all factual disputes were found in support of the judgment. American Type Culture Collection, Inc., 26 S.W.3d 37, 40 (Tex. App.-- Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.); Fish, 948 S.W.2d at 892. We must consider all the evidence that was before the trial court, including pleadings, any stipulations, affidavits, exhibits, the results of discovery, and any oral testimony. Conner, 944 S.W.2d at 411; McCulley Fine Arts Gallery, Inc. v. "X" Partners, 860 S.W.2d 473, 480 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1993, no writ). We may reverse only if the trial court's implied findings and resulting judgment are so against the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong. Fish, 948 S.W.2d at 892.

IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

A Texas court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if the requirements of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and of the Texas long-arm statute are satisfied. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 17.042 (Vernon 1997); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1871-72 (1984); CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996). The long-arm statute allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant doing business in Texas. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 17.042. The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted this broad statutory language "to reach as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will allow." CSR Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at 594.

The federal constitutional test of due process consists of two parts: (1) whether the non-resident defendant has...