Michelle M., In re
| Decision Date | 22 July 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. A054678,A054678 |
| Citation | 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 64,8 Cal.App.4th 326 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re MICHELLE M., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SOLANO COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MITCHELL J., Defendant and Appellant. |
Carole Greeley, Fairfield, for defendant and appellant.
Thomas H. Gordinier, County Counsel, Vicki Sieber-Benson, Asst. County Counsel, Kathleen M. Keeshen, Deputy County Counsel, Fairfield, for plaintiff and respondent.
Mitchell J. appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders finding his daughter Michelle M. a dependent child of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 300.) 1
On December 21, 1990, the Solano County Welfare Department (the Department) filed a petition alleging that Timothy M. 2 (born in September 1984) and his half sister Michelle M. (born in August 1987) had been sexually abused by Michelle's father (appellant) and that these two children and their half brother Michael F. (born in October 1989) were at risk of future abuse. (§ 300, subds. (a), (d), (j).) A contested jurisdictional hearing took place over four days in June 1990.
At the end of the hearing, the court dismissed the petition as to Michael F. and found the remaining allegations of the petition true. At the dispositional hearing, the court found the minors to be dependent children of the juvenile court and placed them in the custody of their mother under the supervision of the Department. The court ordered no contact between appellant and the minors except in a therapeutic setting if deemed appropriate by the minors' therapist in consultation with the social worker.
On January 13, 1992, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over the minors. Appellant did not appeal from the order terminating the juvenile court's jurisdiction, and thus, it became final. At the same time, the juvenile court properly transferred its custody and visitation order to the superior court under the authority of section 362.4. 3 That section provides that when the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a dependent child and no action is pending relating to custody of the minor, the juvenile court order may be used as the sole basis for opening a file in the superior court. Thereafter, the parties may seek relief or modification of that order in the superior court based on a showing of "the best interest of the child." (Civ.Code, §§ 4600, 4608.)
The Department asserts this appeal has thus been rendered moot. Appellant disagrees and posits five reasons why this appeal is not moot and should be considered: (1) dependency proceedings are ongoing, (2) the issues raised are of public interest, (3) he has been stigmatized, (4) the orders can serve as building blocks, and (5) the orders have collateral consequences, i.e., custody.
The cases cited by the parties are distinguishable because they do not involve a similar termination of jurisdiction. The case of In re Lisa M. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 915, 225 Cal.Rptr. 7, is most on point. In that case no appeal had been taken from the dependency proceedings or orders. A subsequent order terminating parental rights on a Civil Code section 232 petition was not appealed. The appellant-mother was mentally retarded and, while represented by counsel, did not have a guardian ad litem to represent her interests. The court held an appeal from an interim placement order moot because there was no jurisdiction remaining upon which to act. The mother could not confer upon the court jurisdiction to affect appealable orders from which no appeal was taken. (Id., at p. 920, 225 Cal.Rptr. 7.) The same is true of the case herein; we find that we have no jurisdiction to act upon any order. There is no ongoing dependency proceeding, as in the case of In re Melissa S. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1046, 225 Cal.Rptr. 195. It has been terminated.
Appellant contends that the issues raised are of public interest, as in In re Jeanette H. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 25, 275 Cal.Rptr. 9. There, the parents admitted the allegations of the dependency petition, but that did not moot the question of an appeal on the issue of the juvenile court's discovery policy which could affect future proceedings not only in other cases but between the parties themselves. (Id., at p. 30, 275 Cal.Rptr. 9.) Again, there was an ongoing dependency case for jurisdiction. Appellant has not demonstrated any issue of public interest which this court should address in order to resolve ongoing disputed issues between the parties. (See ibid.)
Appellant cites In re Dana J. (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 768, 103 Cal.Rptr. 21, for the proposition that he will be stigmatized by the fact his child has been declared a ward of the court. But such is not the case here. Traditionally, "wards" are those children who are within the jurisdiction of the court by reason of delinquent behavior. In re Dana J., supra, relates directly to the issue of whether an appeal of a delinquency petition may be moot, and not the termination of dependency jurisdiction.
Appellant relies on In re Linda P. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 99, 240 Cal.Rptr. 474, for the proposition that dependency orders serve as building blocks for later orders. However, Linda P. stands for the proposition that finality of a judgment pursuant to Civil Code section 232, terminating parental custody, does not render moot an order in the prior dependency proceeding's permanency planning hearing. (At pp. 101, 106, 240 Cal.Rptr. 474.) Again, the appeal was taken while the court had jurisdiction and held that a finding of error might affect the later termination proceedings. (In re Linda P., supra, at pp. 105-106, 240 Cal.Rptr. 474.) In the case at bar, this is not an appeal from an interim order which might affect further and subsequent orders of the juvenile court. There is no longer any jurisdiction over the children by the juvenile court.
Finally, appellant argues that findings in an earlier unreviewed order may have collateral consequences in related matters, such as custody orders or proceedings to terminate parental rights. Appellant relies on In re Kristin B. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 596, 232 Cal.Rptr. 36, for this proposition. However, the holding of In re Kristin B., supra, is that where a judgment terminating parental rights is challenged on appeal, an earlier appeal out of the juvenile court's dependency proceeding is not moot if the purported error is of such a magnitude as to infect the outcome of the ensuing termination action, or where the alleged defect undermines the juvenile court's initial jurisdictional finding. (Id., at p. 605, 232 Cal.Rptr. 36.) Again, we distinguish the case at bar by the fact that dependency jurisdiction has been...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. L. A. Cnty. Dep't of Children v. J.C. (In re S.G.)
- L. A. Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. T.P. (In re D.P.)
- L. A. Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. T.P. (In re D.P.)
- Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency v. A.A. (In re N.S.)