Miguel v. State
Decision Date | 08 June 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 2000-163-C.A.,2000-163-C.A. |
Citation | 774 A.2d 19 |
Parties | John MIGUEL v. STATE of Rhode Island. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.
Avran Cohen and John Miguel, for Plaintiff.
Aaron Weisman, Providence, for Defendant.
This case came before the Court for oral argument on May 9, 2001, pursuant to an order that directed both parties to appear in order to show cause why the issues raised by this appeal should not be summarily decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the issues raised by this appeal should be decided at this time. The facts insofar as pertinent to this appeal are as follows.
On September 15, 1990, Catherine Miguel was stabbed to death. On January 16, 1992, her husband, John Miguel (Miguel or applicant), pled guilty to murder in the second degree. Attorney Michael DiLauro (DiLauro), an assistant public defender, represented applicant at that time. The trial was in progress when Miguel chose to enter his plea. Before Miguel made that decision, DiLauro had planned to present evidence and argument to support a diminished capacity defense as a result of intoxication. In fact, DiLauro had applicant examined by a psychiatrist, had several discussions withapplicant, and had corresponded with applicant by mail several times on the topic, in anticipation of presenting such a defense. A diminished capacity defense, if believed by a jury, negates the specific intent necessary to convict a defendant of first-degree murder. See G.L.1956 § 11-23-1 ( ); see also State v. Amazeen, 526 A.2d 1268, 1272 (R.I.1987)
(. ) After notifying the court of his intent to plead guilty, applicant testified that, at the time of the murder, he had not intended to kill his wife; rather he was intoxicated when he stabbed her. However, to avoid causing any further pain to his family, he had decided to plead guilty. The trial justice accepted Miguel's plea, commended DiLauro for his work on a difficult case, and sentenced applicant to life imprisonment at the Adult Correctional Institutions. The applicant did not file a direct appeal.
On November 19, 1999, Miguel filed an application for post-conviction relief, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1(a)(1). The application was heard on March 3, 2000. At that hearing, Miguel alleged that he had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because DiLauro failed to inform him of the defense of diminished capacity. Following the hearing, the hearing justice dismissed the application.1 The defendant came before this Court to contest the dismissal of hisapplication, pursuant to § 10-9.1-9, which provides that "[a] final judgment entered in a proceeding brought under this chapter shall be appealable to the Supreme Court."
The findings made by a hearing justice, pursuant to a hearing for post-conviction relief, "`are entitled to stand undisturbed on appeal in the absence of clear error or a showing that material evidence was overlooked or misconceived.'" Simpson v. State, 769 A.2d 1257, 1265 (R.I.2001) (quoting Heath v. Vose, 747 A.2d 475, 477 (R.I.2000)). "However, `the ultimate determination concerning whether [a defendant's] constitutional rights have been infringed must be reviewed de novo.'" Simpson, 769 A.2d at 1265 (quoting Powers v. State, 734 A.2d 508, 514 (R.I.1999) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1661-62, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 919 (1996); Broccoli v. Moran, 698 A.2d 720, 725 (R.I.1997); Mastracchio v. Moran, 698 A.2d 706, 710 (R.I.1997))).
The applicant's sole complaint in his application for post-conviction relief was that DiLauro had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal to this Court, he also argued that the trial justice erred by failing to investigate whether evidence existed to support a diminished capacity defense, before accepting Miguel's plea. "It is axiomatic that `this [C]ourt will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal that was not properly presented before the trial court.'" State v. Breen, 767 A.2d 50, 57 (R.I.2001) (quoting State v. Saluter, 715 A.2d 1250, 1258 (R.I.1998)). This rule applies to issues not raised in applications for post-conviction relief. See State v. Feng, 421 A.2d 1258, 1272 (R.I. 1980)
(citing DaRosa v. Carol Cable Co., 121 R.I. 194, 397 A.2d 506 (1979)). Accordingly, we will refrain from engaging in a discussion of the panoply of exercises that a trial justice must undertake before accepting a guilty plea. We do note, however, that it is apparent to us from the record from the proceedings below that the trial justice fully advised Miguel of his constitutional rights and of the direct consequences of his plea. See State v. Williams, 122 R.I. 32, 40, 404 A.2d 814, 819 (1979) (). Thus, we now turn to the Sixth Amendment issue.
The sole focus of an application for post-conviction relief filed by an applicant who has pled guilty is State v. Dufresne, 436 A.2d 720, 722 (R.I.1981) (citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)). In support of our holding in Dufresne, we agreed with the United States Supreme Court that:
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