Miles v. Davis

• Decision Date: 17 December 2021
• Docket Number: 3:18-CV-909-WHA-CSC [WO]
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
• Parties: ALJAWON DAWAYNE MILES, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER DAVIS, et al., Defendants.

ALJAWON DAWAYNE MILES, Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER DAVIS, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:18-CV-909-WHA-CSC [WO]

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division

December 17, 2021

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

CHARLES S. COODY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

I. INTRODUCTION^[1]

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is before the Court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action filed by Aljawon Miles [“Miles”], a federal inmate at the time relevant to the Complaint. Miles challenges Defendants' failure to release him from the Russell County Jail after he posted bond on state charges in June of 2017. Doc. 1 at 3-4. He names as defendants Officer Meaghan Davis, Corporal Felton Brown, and Lt. Loetta Holland, officers at the Russell County Jail, and Rachel Lewis, a probation and parole officer with the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles.^[2] Miles seeks a declaratory judgment and monetary damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Doc. 1 at 4-5.

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Defendants filed Answers, Written Reports, and relevant evidentiary materials addressing the claims presented by Miles. Docs. 14, 19. In these filings, Defendants deny violating Miles' constitutional rights as asserted in the Complaint. Docs. 14, 19. The Court issued an Order directing Miles to file a response, supported by affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and other evidentiary materials, to the arguments set forth by Defendants in their reports. Doc. 20 at 3. The Order specifically cautioned the parties that “unless within fifteen (15) days from the date of this order a party files a response in opposition which presents sufficient legal cause why such action should not be undertaken . . . the court may at any time [after expiration of the time for the plaintiff filing a response to the order] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special reports and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment, and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on such dispositive motion in accordance with the law.” Doc. 20 at 3-4 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

Miles filed a response, including a supporting sworn statement and document, on February 11, 2019 (Docs. 24, 24-1, & 24-2), but his response does not demonstrate there is any genuine dispute of material fact. The Court deems it appropriate to treat Defendants' reports as motions for summary judgment and concludes the motions are due to be resolved in favor of Defendants.

II. STANDARD OR REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

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genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing the non-moving party has failed to present evidence to support some element on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

When Defendants meet their evidentiary burden, as they have, the burden shifts to Miles to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact [by citing to materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials], the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to it . . . .”); see also Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that the court should consider facts pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint

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when considering summary judgment). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. The evidence must be admissible at trial, and if the nonmoving party's evidence “is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). “A mere ‘scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice . . . .” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Only disputes involving material facts are relevant, materiality is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005).

To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. At the summary judgment stage, this Court should accept as true “statements in [Plaintiff's] verified complaint, [any] sworn response to the [Defendants'] motion for summary judgment, and sworn affidavit attached to that response[.]” Sears v. Roberts, 2019 WL 1785355, *3 (11th Cir. April 24, 2019); see also

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United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a plaintiff's self-serving and uncorroborated, but not conclusory, statements in an affidavit or deposition may create an issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment); Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (“To be sure, [plaintiff's] sworn statements are self-serving, but that alone does not permit us to disregard them at the summary judgment stage. . . . ‘Courts routinely and properly deny summary judgment on the basis of a party's sworn testimony even though it is self-serving.'”). However, general, blatantly contradicted and merely “[c]onclusory, uncorroborated allegations by a plaintiff in [his verified complaint or] an affidavit or deposition will not create an issue of fact for trial sufficient to defeat a well-supported summary judgment motion.” Solliday v. Fed. Officers, 413 Fed.Appx. 206, 207 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990)); see also Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the Court, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of sufficiently establishing a genuine dispute of material fact. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525 (2006); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, a plaintiff's pro se status alone does not mandate this Court disregard elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. Here, Miles fails to demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact to preclude summary judgment on his claims against Defendants. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

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III. IMMUNITY DEFEENSES

A. Sovereign Immunity

To the extent Miles seeks monetary damages from Defendants in their official capacities, the jail defendants maintain that in operating the Russell County Jail they are state actors entitled to sovereign immunity. Doc. 14 at 9-10, citing Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1527 (1th Cir. 1990) (“hold[ing] that the sheriff's eleventh amendment immunity . . . extends to deputy sheriffs because of their traditional function under Alabama law as the sheriff's alter ego.”); Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1430-31 (11th Cir 1997) (holding that county jailers, like sheriffs and deputies, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for official capacity claims); Turquitt v. Jefferson County, Ala., 137 F.3d 1285, 1288-89 11th Cir 1998)(holding that a sheriff and his deputies act as officers of the State when supervising inmates and otherwise operating county jails for purposes of imposing liability under § 1983). Defendant Lewis also alleges that as an employee of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles she is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity Doc. 19 at 8.

Official capacity lawsuits are “in all respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). As the Eleventh Circuit has held,

the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining suits by private parties against States and their agencies

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