Miles v. Layton

• Decision Date: 21 January 1937
• Citation: 38 Del. 411,193 A. 567
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
• Parties: HARRY P. MILES v. DANIEL J. LAYTON, Chief Justice of the State of Delaware, and WILLIAM WATSON HARRINGTON, Associate Judge of the State of Delaware, constituting the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Sussex County

193 A. 567

38 Del. 411

HARRY P. MILES v. DANIEL J. LAYTON, Chief Justice of the State of Delaware, and WILLIAM WATSON HARRINGTON, Associate Judge of the State of Delaware, constituting the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Sussex County

Supreme Court of Delaware

January 21, 1937

Supreme Court, January Term, 1937. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

This is an application for a Writ of Prohibition. It is desired by the Writ to prohibit the Judges sitting in the Superior Court in and for Sussex County, Delaware, from taking any further proceedings in an application to open a judgment of said Court, because of a removal, or attempted removal of such proceedings to the United States Court for the District of Delaware. The matter involves the following facts: Three separate judgments were entered in the Superior Court for Sussex County on May 29, 1936, in favor of Harry P. Miles and against W. B. Chandler and Stella E. Chandler, each judgment being for the sum of $ 5,000.00, with varying credits. Each judgment was entered by virtue of a warrant of attorney attached to the obligation. The judgments were severally Nos. 114, 115 and 116, as of the April Term, 1936. There are before us three separate proceedings, but as the legal questions are entirely similar, we shall consider only one.

At the next term succeeding the entry of the judgments (June Term, 1936), to-wit, on July 6, 1936, one of the defendants, Stella E. Chandler, filed petitions to open each of said judgments, to determine what amount, if any, was due upon such judgments. In these petitions it was alleged by Stella E. Chandler, under oath, that none of the notes had been signed by her, nor by any person with her knowledge and consent, and that there was no amount due from her to Harry P. Miles, the plaintiff. The petitioner, Stella E. Chandler, in each petition prayed for a rule on Harry P. Miles to show cause why the judgments "should not be opened and the petitioner let into a trial to ascertain if the said judgment is a bona fide judgment against Stella E. Chandler, one of the defendants, and to determine what amount, if any, is due and unpaid upon the said judgment."

The service of these rules was accepted by the attorney of record for Miles, the plaintiff, on July 7, 1936, and the rules were returnable on July 13, 1936. From this point the record is incomplete. The record does not show any direct action on the rule to show cause, although the subsequent proceedings indicate such action.

At the October Term, 1936, the controversy appeared upon the printed jury list as an "issue" to be tried by jury. Prior to the date set for the hearing before the jury, the plaintiff in the judgments, Miles, removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. The Superior Court for Sussex County having determined that the matter was not a proper cause for removal, and having indicated its intention to continue with the trial, application was made to this Court for a Writ of Prohibition against the Judges then sitting in the Superior Court for Sussex County to prohibit the further action in that Court.

The foregoing are all of the material facts except that after the entry of the foregoing judgments, and before the filing of the petitions to open the same, several Writs of Attachment were issued on each of said judgments, and answers had been filed by a number of insurance companies, as garnishees, showing in their hands very substantial sums due to Stella E. Chandler.

Petition for the Writ of Prohibition denied.

William S. Potter (of Ward and Gray) for Petitioner.

Tunnell and Tunnell for Respondents.

WOLCOTT Chancellor, RICHARDS, RODNEY and SPEAKMAN, J. J., sitting.

OPINION

RODNEY, J., delivering the opinion of the Court:

It seems to be hardly questionable that when a matter properly removable to a Federal Court is in fact so removed, then further proceedings in such matter should await the action in the Federal Court.

The mere fact of removal, however, neither deprives nor excuses a State Court from the duty of determining the legal propriety of the removal, as shown by the petition, and as distinguished from factual considerations outside of the petition. Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U.S. 430, 6 S.Ct. 799, 29 L.Ed. 962.

Since the Judges then constituting the Superior Court for Sussex County have indicated that in their opinion the matter before them, in the form and condition it then was, was not a proper case for removal, and since their action, or proposed action, is sought to be restrained by a Writ of Prohibition from this Court, so it becomes material for this Court to consider the nature of the judgment and the subsequent steps taken in connection with it. This case is not primarily concerned with principles of the Law of Prohibition nor, except incidentally, with those of Removability of Causes.

It may be assumed, for the present discussion, that where a controversy concerns citizens of different States and involves a jurisdictional amount, such suit or controversy may be removable by the defendant to the Federal Court, if such suit or controversy was within the original jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States.

It may also be conceded, for the purposes of this case, that the removability of subsequent proceedings on these judgments depends upon the character and effect of such subsequent proceedings. If such subsequent proceedings are merely supplementary or auxiliary to the former proceedings, then the subsequent action does not become removable; if, however, the subsequent proceedings become a separate and distinct proceeding, or tantamount to a bill in equity whereby the former plaintiff becomes a new defendant, then such subsequent proceedings may become removable. This was substantially the holding of Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80, 25 L.Ed. 407, and Simon v. So. Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 35 S.Ct. 255, 59 L.Ed. 492.

We are thus immediately confronted with the original judgments and the nature of the subsequent proceedings. We see that Miles, a resident of Maryland, came into Delaware, selected his own forum, inaugurated proceedings against two residents of Delaware, and there, at the April Term, 1936, entered three several obligations upon Warrants of Attorney, and thus became plaintiff in three several judgments. The petitions to open the judgments were presented at the next ensuing or June Term, 1936. So first we must inquire if the application to open the judgments was in time.

Now it is a general rule of the widest acceptation that the power or control of Courts over their judgments does not extend beyond the term of Court at which they were rendered, unless proceedings to affect such judgments were taken during the term. This rule, however, like many general rules, is most misleading because of its generality. To the rule itself there are many exceptions, some of which are statutory. Of course, one chief principle back of the rule is that where a Court has taken jurisdiction of a matter, heard and determined it, and rendered judgment thereon, public policy demands a finality to the proceedings in the term of court where the final judgment was rendered. This reasoning does not apply to a judgment entered by confession on a Warrant of Attorney, and such judgments constitute exceptions to the general rule, although in most respects such judgments resemble other judgments. Wyman v. Yeomans, 84 Ill. 403.

In a judgment by confession on Warrant of Attorney there is, of course, an appearance for the defendant. This is true as a matter of form and yet, as a fact, that appearance for the defendant was procured by the plaintiff himself and for his own advantage, and, usually, without the actual knowledge of the defendant. That is one reason that such judgments are distinguished from other judgments and even from those judgments by confession in adversary suits where the defendant is in court after due service of process. Banning v. Taylor, 24 Pa. 289, 293.

In a judgment obtained on an alleged or purported Warrant of Attorney the defendant is not served with any process, nor does the Court actually know of the rendition of any judgment. The entry of the judgment is a formal matter transacted in the office of the Prothonotary, and not in the presence of the Court. No rising of a Court at the end of the term should give definite finality to a judgment entered on a Warrant of Attorney, perhaps but a few minutes before such adjournment, where neither the defendant nor the Court itself knew of the existence of such judgment. The holding that a Court in Delaware does not lose control over a judgment entered upon Warrant of Attorney, by the adjournment or ending of a term, is strengthened by the fact that upon the adjournment of a term and during the ensuing recess or vacation, judgments on Warrants of Attorney are still entered as of the term just passed, and this continues until the actual opening of the Court at the next term. The three judgments entered in the present case, on May 29, 1936, although appearing as judgments of the April Term, were entered after that term had adjourned.

The court in Tweed v. Lockton, 5 W. W. Harr. (35 Del.) 474, 167 A. 703, was not concerned with a judgment entered on Warrant of Attorney, and, therefore, did not discuss any principles affecting such a judgment. Since the judgments before us were entered upon Warrants of Attorney, our discussion will be confined to judgments of that character.

In King v. Brooks, 72 Pa. 363, Judge Sharswood in speaking of the power of a Court to open judgments, says:

"In the case of judgments by confession or default there is no limit of time to the exercise of this power, but in the case of judgments entered...