Miles v. State

• Decision Date: 20 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 120,Sept. Term,2007.,120
• Citation: 28 A.3d 667,421 Md. 596
• Parties: Jody Lee MILESv.STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

421 Md. 596

28 A.3d 667

Jody Lee MILES

v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 120

Sept. Term

2007.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 20, 2011.

Robert W. Biddle (C. Justin Brown of Nathans & Biddle, LLP, Baltimore, MD; Ranak K. Jasani, Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, LLP, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellant.Erika Alsid Short (Chason, Rosner, Leary & Marshall, LLC, Towson, MD), on brief, for Appellant.James E. William, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellee.Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, IRMA S. RAKER (Retired, Specially Assigned), and DALE R. CATHELL (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.MURPHY, J.

In the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County, a jury convicted Jody Lee Miles, appellant, of first-degree felony murder and related offenses, including robbery with a deadly weapon and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. That jury thereafter sentenced appellant to death. In Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 781 A.2d 787 (2001), this Court affirmed appellant's convictions and the sentence of death. On February 25, 2002, the United States Supreme Court denied appellant's petition for writ of certiorari. Miles v. Maryland, 534 U.S. 1163, 122 S.Ct. 1175, 152 L.Ed.2d 118 (2002).

Appellant now argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing on the ground that the jury should have been instructed that a death sentence cannot be imposed unless every juror is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances—in appellant's case, that he committed the murder while committing or attempting to commit the crime of robbery with a deadly weapon—outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The Circuit Court rejected that argument. For the reasons that follow, so do we. We shall therefore affirm the denial of appellant's motion to correct an illegal sentence.¹

I.

Appellant concedes that nothing about Maryland's capital sentencing procedure violates the Eighth Amendment. That concession is required as a result of Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006), in which the United States Supreme Court held that “Kansas' death penalty statute, consistent with the Constitution, may direct imposition of the death penalty when the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that mitigators do not outweigh aggravators, including where the aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise.” Id. at 173, 126 S.Ct. at 2524. According to appellant, however, his sentence became “illegal” when the United States Supreme Court decided Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007). Appellant argues that (1) Cunningham rendered invalid—on Sixth Amendment grounds—every state capital sentencing procedure that does not require the jury (or trial judge, if the defendant has waived his or her right to a jury) to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and (2) the new standard established in Cunningham must be applied retroactively.

Cunningham presented only the question of “whether [California's determinate sentencing law] DSL, by placing sentence-elevating factfinding within the judge's province, violates a defendant's right to a trial by jury safeguarded by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. 274, 127 S.Ct. at 860. Cunningham, however, did not establish the rule that the Sixth Amendment requires that “any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime ... be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” The United States Supreme Court first established this rule on March 24, 1999 in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 1224, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). On June 26, 2000, the United States Supreme Court held that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in [a] case involving a state statute.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2355, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This rule was made applicable to capital cases in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), which was decided on June 24, 2002.

The State argues that, because (1) Ring—not Cunningham—extended the requirements of Apprendi to capital sentencing proceedings, and (2) Ring does not apply retroactively,² Cunningham does not entitle appellant—who was sentenced by a jury on March 19, 1998, and whose conviction became “final” on February 25, 2002—to a new sentencing proceeding. In Evans v. State, 389 Md. 456, 886 A.2d 562 (2005), this Court stated:

We acknowledge the State's argument, based on Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) and Hughes v. State, 901 So.2d 837 (Fla.2005), that Ring is not to be applied retroactively. We need not address that issue in this case, as we shall conclude that, even if Ring were applicable, it would provide no relief to Evans. As to Evans's complaint about the evidentiary standard used at the sentencing hearing, it is true, as the State contends, that Evans never raised that issue in the Circuit Court and has therefore failed to preserve it. In order to forestall the inevitable claim that his eminently competent and diligent attorneys rendered Constitutionally deficient performance in not raising that issue, however, we shall address it.Id. at 472, 886 A.2d at 571. As was the situation in Evans, we need not determine in the case at bar whether—under Maryland's rule of retroactivity— Cunningham and Ring apply retroactively to appellant's sentencing proceeding.

II.

A majority of this Court remains persuaded that, even if Cunningham and Ring do apply retroactively, appellant is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing. Judge Harrell's majority opinion in Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105 (2003) includes a thorough analysis of the United States Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence, which compel the following conclusions:

As is readily apparent from the opinion of the Court, Ring only addresses the eligibility phase of the sentencing process. Those aggravating factors which narrow the class of death-eligible defendants for Eighth Amendment purposes must be found by a proper sentencing authority beyond a reasonable doubt in order to comply with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. Contrary to the present assertions of Oken, Ring holds no implications for the selection phase of Maryland's sentencing process. This is emphasized in the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, noting that:

[t]oday's judgment has nothing to do with jury sentencing. What today's decision says is that the jury must find the existence of the fact that an aggravating factor existed. Those States that leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge may continue to do so—by requiring a prior jury finding of aggravating factor in the sentencing phase or, more simply, by placing the aggravating-factor determination (where it logically belongs anyway) in the guilt phase.

Ring, 536 U.S. at 612–13, 122 S.Ct. at 2445, 153 L.Ed.2d at 579. That Ring is inapplicable to Maryland's death penalty statute is further highlighted by the dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connor, observing that the Majority Opinion effectively identified Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana as the affected States.

* * *

Because the Maryland statute already requires that the finding of the existence of an aggravating circumstance must be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the Maryland statute is unaffected by the Ring holding.

Id. at 251–53, 835 A.2d at 1147–48.

Judge Harrell then addressed the argument “that the plain language of the Maryland statute requires that we view the weighing process as a ‘fact finding,’ and, thus, subject to Apprendi.” Id. at 260, 835 A.2d at 1152. Noting that this argument had been made by the “dissenters” in Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 786 A.2d 631 (2001), Judge Harrell stated:

The dissent in Borchardt cited no legislative history or other authority to support its conclusory insights as to legislative intent. That is explained by the fact that no such support exists. A review of the relevant legislative history indicates that neither the Legislature nor the Governor intended the meaning ascribed to the words of the statute by the Borchardt dissent.

Id. at 261–62, 835 A.2d at 1153. After setting forth a thorough review of the relevant legislative history, Judge Harrell concluded:

Far from supporting the contentions of the Borchardt dissent that weighing was intended to be “a factual finding within the meaning of Apprendi,” this history reveals exactly the opposite intent. .... As for weighing, the legislative history makes clear that the intention behind supplying a standard at all was an attempt to insure that the statute would be applied in a consistent manner between the various county circuit courts of the State, thus frustrating inconsistencies in application which would violate the post- Furman requirements and result in successful Eighth Amendment attacks on the statute.

* * *

We also conclude that the Maryland death penalty statute cannot be read to be implicated by Ring under any theory of legislative interpretation. The legislative history indicates that the weighing process never was intended to be a component of a “fact finding” process required to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. Rather, the history shows that the Legislature and Governor understood that the finding of an aggravating circumstance alone performed that Furman requirement. Far from being designed to further refine the class of death-eligible defendants, the assignment of a standard to the weighing process was intended to protect the statute from Constitutional attack by such defendants.

Id. at 268–70, 835 A.2d at 1157–58.

Oken was cited and quoted with...