Miller v. Carroll
| Decision Date | 17 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:21-cv-14-VLB,3:21-cv-14-VLB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Josephine Smalls Miller Plaintiff, v. Honorable Patrick Carroll, III, Defendant. |
Josephine Miller ("Miller"), an attorney suspended from the practice of law in the state of Connecticut, brings this lawsuit against Judge Patrick Carroll, III ("Judge Carroll"), the Chief Court Administrator for the State of Connecticut Judicial Branch. Miller generally alleges that Judge Carroll violated her right to be free of racially discriminatory treatment, her right to procedural due process, and her right to be free of retaliatory treatment. [Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), Dkt. 17]. The allegations in the SAC focus primarily on Miller's application for reinstatement to the practice of law in the state of Connecticut and the delays in the processing of that application. Miller claims that the processing delay is a product of racial discrimination and a product of retaliation against her for her civil rights practice and speaking on issues of discrimination in the Connecticut Judicial Branch. The only defendant in this case is Judge Carroll. The SAC seeks two primary forms of relief: (1) an injunction directing Judge Carroll to immediately cease and desist (a) from refusing to re-admit Miller to the practice of law and (b) from all actions intended to impose discriminatory or retaliatory conditions upon her reinstatement and (2) monetary damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Before the Court is Judge Carroll's motion to dismiss the SAC in which he argues (1) the SAC should be dismissed pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine, (2) any official capacity claims are barred under the Eleventh Amendment, (3) he is entitled to qualified immunity for any individual capacity claims, and (4) the SAC fails to state a claim against him in his individual capacity. [Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 19]. Plaintiff objects. [Opp., Dkt. 22]. The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss because (1) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims for injunctive relief and (2) the claims for monetary damages fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Judge Carroll seeks dismissal pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(1) allows a party to assert by motion a defense that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to assert by motion a defense that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) have similar legal standards. See Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds recognized by Am. Psych. Ass'n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 821 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2016). There are recognized differences when factual disputes exist, when determining whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice, and in which party bears the burden of proof. See United States ex rel. Daugherty v. Tiversa Holding Corp., 342 F. Supp. 3d 418, 425 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the "court must take all uncontroverted facts in the complaint (or petition) as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction." Fountain v. Karim, 838 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2016). When facts are disputed, the court may refer "to evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits and if necessary, hold an evidentiary hearing." Id. "A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists." Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). "If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be dismissed." Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000).
"To survive [a Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss [for failure to state a claim], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Not all allegations in a complaint are entitled to the presumption of truth. Id. Conclusory allegations that are no more than "legal conclusions" or "[t]hreadbare recitals of elements of a cause of action" are not entitled to the presumption of truth. Id. If after considering the well-pled factual allegations the court finds that the complaint does not raise a plausible claim for relief, the court should dismiss the case. Id. at 679. The plausibility standard is more than mere possibility of misconduct. Id. Further, "[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken."Rivera v. Westchester Cty., 488 F. Supp. 3d 70, 75-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) ). The defendant bears the burden of proof on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Sobel v. Prudenti, 25 F. Supp. 3d 340, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
The Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal elucidates the meaning of conclusory allegations of discriminatory policymaking and policy enforcement. 556 U.S. 662. In Iqbal, the respondent (a Muslim citizen of Pakistan) sued the petitioners (numerous federal officials including Ashcroft, former Attorney General of the United States and Mueller, the then-Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations) alleging the petitioners adopted unconstitutional policy that subjects the respondent to harsh conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national origin. 556 U.S. at 666. The Court held that several of the allegations made by the respondent in his complaint were conclusory and thus not entitled to the presumption of truth. Id. at 680-81. These allegations included "that petitioners 'knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him,]' to harsh conditions of confinement 'as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest' . . . Ashcroft was the 'principal architect' of this invidious policy . . . and that Mueller was 'instrumental' in adopt[ing] and executing it . . . ." Id. These accusations were deemed 'conclusory' and not entitled to the presumption of truth. Id. at 681. The Court ultimately concluded that the complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination againstthe petitioners and remanded to the circuit court for a determination of whether remand to the district court was necessary. Id. at 687.
Miller is self-represented (pro se) in these proceedings. Ordinarily, courts liberally construe a complaint filed by a pro se party to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See e.g., McCray v. Lee, 963 F.3d 110, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2020). "This policy of liberally construing pro se submissions is driven by the understanding that '[i]mplicit in the right of self-representation is an obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training.'" Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006). Miller is not entitled to liberal construction because she has been a member of the bar since June 2004 and litigated many cases in both state and federal court for many years prior to her suspension. See Harbulack v. Suffolk County, 654 F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 1981) (). With that said, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure counsel courts to construe pleadings "so as to do justice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Thus, the Court will address the claims and arguments raised by Miller "so as to do justice."
Judge Carroll is the only defendant in this case and he is being sued in both his official capacity as Chief Court Administrator and in his individual capacity for conduct relating to his role as Chief Court Administrator. Connecticut statutes create the office and duties of the Chief Court Administrator. Conn. Gen. Stat. §51-5a. The Chief Court Administrator is appointed by the Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court and, in general terms, is the chief administrative officer of the Connecticut Judicial Department. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 51-1b(b), 51-5a. The Office of the Chief Court Administrator, which operates under the supervision and direction of the Chief Court Administrator, conducts activities such as auditing bills, maintaining account records, preparing and submitting a budget, acting as a secretary at any meetings for the judicial department, and more administrative acts. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-9.
Though Judge Carroll is the only defendant, the SAC includes allegations of wrongdoing at the hands of various disciplinary authorities involved in the processing of Miller's application for reinstatement. First, the SAC raises claims relating to the Hartford County standing committee on recommendations for admission ("SCRA"). There is an SCRA in each of the eight Connecticut counties. Conn. Prac. Bk. § 2-12. Each SCRA is made up of at least 3, but not more than 7, members of the bar of the county in which it sits. Id. The members of the SCRA are appointed by the judges of the Superior Court. Id. Second is the Statewide Grievance Counsel ("SGC"), which is a group of twenty-one attorneys and laypersons all appointed by the Judges of the Superior Court. Conn. Prac. Bk. § 2-33. Last is the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel ("OCDC"), headed by an attorney also appointed by the...
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