Miller v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 08 January 1886
• Citation: 9 P. 632,8 Colo. 528
• Parties: MILLER v. EDWARDS.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

9 P. 632

8 Colo. 528

MILLER v. EDWARDS.

Supreme Court of Colorado

January 8, 1886

Original application for mandamus.

W J. Sharman, for petitioner.

T H. Thomas, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition in this case recites that petitioner, as clerk of the supreme court, purchased certain articles of furniture and procured certain labor to be performed for the court which articles and labor were essential to the appropriate discharge of its duties; that in so doing debts amounting to $209.75 were necessarily incurred; that, prior to acting in the premises as aforesaid, he repeatedly represented to respondent, who is secretary of state, the necessity for procuring said articles and having such labor done, and requested that the latter attend to the matters suggested but that respondent persistently refused to recognize the request or procure the articles and labor mentioned; that since the incurring of such debts as aforesaid the bills therefor were found to be correct, duly audited, and allowed by the auditor; that the same were then presented to respondent for the proper certificate authorizing payment thereof out of the contingent fund thereunto appropriated which certificate respondent declined and refused, and still declines and refuses, to give. We are now asked to grant a writ of mandamus compelling respondent to perform the act last above mentioned.

But a single question is here presented for adjudication, viz.: Did the clerk of the supreme court, acting for the court, have authority in law to incur debts in behalf of that tribunal for necessary articles and labor? In support of his demurrer to the alternative writ or petition in this case respondent relies upon section 1343 of the General Statutes. By this provision it is made the duty of the secretary of state 'to procure suitable apartments for the supreme court, * * * and to have the same supplied with such furniture and other articles as may be required.' This statute, coupled with other provisions, unquestionably makes the secretary of state the general purchasing agent for the judicial department, so far as the supreme court is concerned; and we incline to the view that it excludes the authority of any other officer, excepting, possibly, upon some extreme emergency such as did not here exist, to act in that capacity. Should he decline to comply with his statutory duty in a proper case, mandamus lies to compel the...