Miller v. Farr

• Decision Date: 10 December 1963
• Docket Number: No. 18138,18138
• Citation: 133 S.E.2d 838,243 S.C. 342
• Parties: C. F. MILLER, Appellant, v. Harry B. FARR, Ex-Officio Chairman and Superintendent of Education et al., Respondents.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 838

133 S.E.2d 838

243 S.C. 342

C. F. MILLER, Appellant, v. Harry B. FARR, Ex-Officio Chairman and Superintendent of

Education et al., Respondents.

No. 18138.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 10, 1963.

Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons, Charleston, for appellant.

James W. Workman, Union, for respondents.

MOSS, Justice.

This action is one under the 'Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act', Sections 10-2001 et seq., 1962 Code of Laws. It was instituted by C. F. Miller, a resident taxpayer and qualified elector of Union Township, which said Township is located within a former school district of Union County, known as Union School District No. 11. The purpose of the action is to determine the constitutionality of an authorization granted to the County Board of Education of Union County to issue Two Hundred Thousand Dollars of General Obligation Bonds of the School District of Union County pursuant to Act No. 667, 53 Stat. 1497, of the Acts of the General Assembly for the year 1963. This statute does not require that the question of issuing the bonds be submitted to the qualified electors of the said school district, and the appellant contends that the failure of the Act to require the submission of the question renders it violative of the provisions of an amendment to Section 5(50) of Article X of the 1895 Constitution of South Carolina, which is applicable to Union School District No. 11, such district being a part of what is now the School District of Union County.

The challenged legislation authorizes those respondents who constitute the County Board of Education of Union County, as the agency responsible for planning and constructing new facilities for the School District of Union County, to issue and sell Two Hundred Thousands Dollars of bonds of the School District of Union County for the purpose of raising moneys to construct, equip and repair public school facilities for the school district. This Act does not require that the question of the issuance of the bonds be submitted to the qualified electors and, as authorized, the respondent County Board adopted a resolution directing the issuance and sale of the bonds permitted by the said Act.

It is not disputed that as a general rule there is no constitutional provision requiring that bonds issued by School Districts in South Carolina receive voter approval prior to their issuance. Lillard v. Melton, 103 S.C. 10, 87 S.E. 421; Powell v. Hargrove, 136 S.C. 345, 134 S.E. 380. Nor is it disputed that special legislative enactments are appropriate vehicles by which the General Assembly may authorize School Districts in South Carolina to issue bonds. State ex rel. Milford v. Brock, 66 S.C. 357, 44 S.E. 931; Burris v. Brock, 95 S.C. 104, 79 S.E. 193; Brownlee v. Brock, 107 S.C. 230, 92 S.E. 477.

Contending, however, that the question was controlled by the provisions of an amendment to Section 5(50) of Article X ratified as of February 19, 1947, this action was instituted for the purpose of having a declaratory judgment rendered declaring Act No. 667, 53 Stats. 1497, unconstitutional. The amendment, whose interpretation is required in the disposition of this appeal, reads as follows:

'Provided, that the limitations imposed by this Section shall not apply to Union School District No. 11, Union County, South Carolina, such school district being hereby expressly authorized to issue bonds to an amount not to exceed twenty (20) per centum of the value of all taxable property in the territory embraced in said school district, as valued or assessed for taxation by the state, the proceeds of such bonds to be applied solely to the erection, equipment and maintenance of schools and school buildings in said district, and the purchase of grounds, under such restrictions and limitations as the General Assembly may prescribe, and where the question of incurring such indebtedness is to be submitted to the qualified electors of said school district, as provided in the Constitution, upon the question of bonded indebtedness.'

Prior to the enactment by the General Assembly of Act No. 854 in 1952, 47 Stats. 2104, now codified with amendments as Sections 21-4151 et seq., Code of 1962, Union County had been divided into a number of school districts, one of which was known as Union School District No. 11. By the aforesaid Act of 1952, all of the then existing school districts of Union County were consolidated into a single school district. By amendment the territorial unit resulting from the consolidation of the then existing school districts has now been designated as 'The School District of Union County' and is a single school district which purports to have the right to exercise the authorization set forth in Act No. 667, heretofore referred to, without regard to the restrictive provisions imposed upon the former school district known as Union School District No. 11, by the above amendment to Section 5(50) of Article X of the Constitution.

The appellant contends that notwithstanding the termination of the corporate existence of Union School District No. 11, those residing in the area formerly constituting such district are, by reason of the special amendment relating to that school district, entitled to a special constitutional privilege which prevents any public agency of whatever nature operating the public school system within such geographical area from incurring bonded debt without the favorable result of an election duly called and properly held. Thus, the appellant argues that the Act, by which all former school districts in Union County were consolidated into a single school district, was subject to the constitutional limitation or condition that it might not incur bonded debt unless the question of such debt was duly submitted and favorably voted upon.

It does not appear that the particular amendment with which we are concerned has been subjected to interpretation by this Court; however, its language is by no means unusual, and in fact it is merely one of many amendments which have been ratified as amendments to Section 5 of Article X. Many of these have been before this Court for consideration, as will be noted by the decisions of this Court in the cases of McColl v. Marlboro Graded School District, 143 S.C. 120, 141 S.E. 265; Smith v. Littlejohn, 151 S.C. 137, 148 S.E. 719; and Middleton v. Littlejohn, 179 S.C. 88, 183 S.E. 593. These cases hold that insofar as old Union School District No. 11 was concerned, it had been given by this special amendment a new and special debt limitation under which no bonds might be issued unless they were voted upon favorably.

The question for decision here is basically a question of legislative intent. Constitutional amendments originate in the form of resolutions of the General Assembly, which proposes specific changes in the constitution. They are sponsored by members of the General Assembly and become effective through legislative processes. Hence, when construing constitutional amendments, the Court applies rules similar to those relating to the construction of statutes, in its effort to determine the intent of its framers and of the people who adopted it. Reese v. Talbert, 237 S.C. 356, 117 S.E.2d 375; Knight v. Hollings, 242 S.C. 1, 129 S.E.2d 746. Thus we must ascertain if it was intended by the amendment that its limitations should continue following the destruction of the entity for which it was adopted and to which it applied. If such was the intent, then the appellant must prevail. If not, affirmance is required.

Examination of the subject constitutional amendment indicates that it sought to accomplish two purposes, to wit: increasing the debt limitation from eight per cent to twenty per cent and imposing the condition that all bonded debt to be incurred by Union School District No. 11 receive voter approval. The amendment does not attempt to impose these...