Miller v. Kansas City Station Corp.
| Decision Date | 20 July 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
| Parties | Tamela MILLER, Appellant, v. KANSAS CITY STATION CORPORATION, and Division of Employment Security, Respondents. 56047. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Nancy Wilson, Kansas City, for appellant.
Sharon A. Willis, Kansas City, for respondent.
Before SMART, P.J.; HANNA and LAURA DENVIR STITH, JJ.
Tamela Miller appeals a decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("Commission") disqualifying her from the receipt of seven weeks of unemployment benefits in connection with her discharge from employment by Kansas City Station Corporation ("Station"). The Commission disqualified Ms. Miller from seven weeks of benefits because it concluded that she engaged in misconduct connected with her work. Ms. Miller appeals. While we agree that Ms. Miller's off-duty conduct was irresponsible, we find no principle of law warranting the conclusion that her actions amounted to misconduct connected with her work within the meaning of Section 288.050.2. The judgment of the Commission is reversed and remanded for reinstatement of Ms. Miller's benefits.
Tamela Miller was employed by Station from September 23, 1996 until January 8, 1998 as a room service manager. On about December 26, 1997, she began to experience substantial bleeding associated with her pregnancy. The bleeding continued. On December 30, 1997, a day she was not scheduled to work, her physician advised her to stay away from work from Wednesday, December 31, 1997 through January 6, 1998, because of the bleeding. She followed this advice, timely reported her need for sick leave, used sick leave for the absence in compliance with Station's sick leave policy, and returned to work on January 7, 1998. Station terminated Ms. Miller's employment when she returned to work, partially for performance reasons and partially because Station believed Ms. Miller had not conducted herself with the level of loyalty and integrity appropriate to a managerial employee. Station believed that Ms. Miller, although on a doctor's restriction due to an apparently unstable pregnancy, could have worked December 31, a big night for the casino, if she had chosen to do so. Station based its decision on the fact that on the night of December 30, Ms. Miller was observed spending at least five or six hours at another casino, Sam's Town, sitting and watching her husband at the gaming tables. Station suggests that, rather than spending a lengthy time on the night of the 30 th at Sam's Town, Ms. Miller should have been resting at home in bed, because, Station argues, such would have been more in keeping with her physician's recommendation to limit her activities.
Ms. Miller applied for unemployment benefits and Station challenged her claim, alleging that she had engaged in misconduct connected with her work. The deputy disqualified Ms. Miller from benefits for seven weeks. The appeals referee upheld the deputy's decision, finding as follows:
The claimant had been advised by her physician to stay off work. If that advice was necessary, the claimant must have realized that she would be jeopardizing her health, and thus her ability to get to work in the future, by spending hours at a casino when she was supposed to be resting. If the claimant was restricted only from excessive walking and lifting, she should have been able to work on December 31, 1997, since the employer could have accommodated those restrictions, and she returned to work with those restrictions on January 7, 1998. Under those restrictions, the claimant deliberately put herself in a position where she was likely to be too ill to work the next day by going to a casino on December 30, 1997. The claimant cannot have it both ways. She cannot be too sick to work, but not too sick to play.
The claimant's actions do not show mere poor judgment. At the very least, her actions show an intentional and substantial disregard for her employer's interest in having her at work to do the job she was hired to do, as well as a lack of concern for her own obligation to be at work whenever physically possible and to conduct her private life so that it did not interfere with her ability to work. Therefore, the Appeals Tribunal concludes that the claimant was discharged on January 8, 1998, for misconduct connected with work. Since claimant acted with such extreme disregard for the consequences to her employer, the seven-week disqualification imposed by the deputy is appropriate.
Ms. Miller appealed to the Commission, which affirmed the decision of the Appeals Tribunal by a vote of two to one, with Commissioner O'Neill dissenting. Ms. Miller now appeal to this court.
Article 5, § 18 of the Missouri Constitution grants courts the power to review the decisions of administrative bodies, including a determination of whether a decision is "authorized by law." Section 288.210, RSMo Supp.1998, provides that the court, on appeal, may review issues of law and "may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the decision of the [C]ommission" on grounds that:
(1) That the [C]ommission acted without or in excess of its powers;
(2) That the decision was procured by fraud;
(3) That the facts found by the [C]ommission do not support the award; or
(4) That there was no sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award.
This court is not bound by the Commission's conclusions of law or the Commission's application of law to the facts. Division of Employment Sec. v. Taney County Dist. R-III, 922 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Mo. banc 1996). Where the Commission's decision involves a question of law, we review the issue independently. George-Brewer v. Penn Mar Southwest, 980 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Mo.App.1998). Whether or not the Commission's findings support the conclusion that an employee was guilty of misconduct is a question of law. Pemiscot County Mem'l Hosp. v. Missouri Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 897 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Mo.App.1995).
Section 288.020.2, RSMo 1994, directs that unemployment security law be liberally construed so as to further the public policy of Missouri in setting aside unemployment reserves to benefit persons unemployed through no fault of their own. Sokol v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 946 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Mo.App.1997). In keeping with this policy, disqualifying provisions in the law are strictly construed against the disallowance of benefits. Missouri Div. of Employment Sec. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 651 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Mo. banc 1983); Anchor Sales & Serv. Co. v. Division of Employment Sec., 945 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo.App.1997).
In her sole point on appeal, Ms. Miller contends that the Commission erred in denying her claim for unemployment benefits because the Commission concluded that she was guilty of misconduct associated with work. Ms. Miller maintains that in making this assumption, the Commission relied upon inferences unsupported by the record. Specifically, she argues that there was no evidence that being at Sam's Town on the 30 th placed any strain on her pregnancy, and no evidence that if she had stayed home on the 30 th, she would have worked the 31 st. She reminds us that the disqualifying provisions of the statute must be strictly construed. She suggests that because there was no evidence that her casino visit on the night of the 30 th caused her to miss work on the 31 st, her off-duty activities are not properly the basis of her disqualification. She also contends that her physician's recommendation that she stay off work until at least January 6 makes it legally improper to deny her benefits in connection with her discharge for being absent while on sick leave.
Section 288.050.2 allows for the disqualification of a claimant where there is misconduct connected with the claimant's work. That section provides:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this law, if a deputy finds that a claimant has been discharged for misconduct connected with the claimant's work, such claimant, depending upon the seriousness of the misconduct as determined by the deputy according to the circumstances in each case, shall be disqualified for waiting week credit or benefits for not less than four nor more than sixteen weeks for which the claimant claims benefits and is otherwise eligible. In addition to the disqualification for benefits pursuant to this provision the division may in the more aggravated cases of misconduct, cancel all or any part of the individual's wage credits, which were established through the individual's employment by the employer who discharged such individual, according to the seriousness of the misconduct. A disqualification provided for pursuant to this subsection shall not apply to any week which occurs after the claimant has earned wages for work insured pursuant to the unemployment compensation laws of any state in an amount equal to eight times the claimant's weekly benefit amount.
Station discharged Ms. Miller, according to remarks made at the hearing by its human resources director, because of a "culmination of performance issues, and decisions that ... we feel very strongly are not becoming of someone in the leadership role of our company." Station suggested that Ms. Miller lied about being ill and unable to work on December 31, 1997. Lying to one's employer has been held to be grounds for finding the employee barred from receiving benefits due to misconduct associated with work. See Flanigan v. City of Kansas City, 926 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Mo.App.1996).
Although the appeals referee did not find that Ms. Miller lied, and there was no evidence that she lied, the referee found that she exhibited an intentional and substantial disregard for her employer's interest in accompanying her husband to Sam's Town when she had been advised by her physician not to work. Ms. Miller's...
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