Miller v. Labor Relations Com'n

• Decision Date: 14 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-P-1536,90-P-1536
• Citation: 33 Mass.App.Ct. 404,600 N.E.2d 605
• Parties: , 77 Ed. Law Rep. 920 David B. MILLER v. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 605

600 N.E.2d 605

33 Mass.App.Ct. 404, 77 Ed. Law Rep. 920

David B. MILLER v. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.

No. 90-P-1536.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 20, 1992.

Decided Oct. 14, 1992.

Jean Strauton Driscoll, Boston, for Labor Relations Com'n.

Paul Peter Nicolai, Feeding Hills, for David B. Miller, submitted a brief.

Before ARMSTRONG, PERRETTA and GREENBERG, JJ.

GREENBERG, Justice.

The plaintiff's nine-year campaign contesting his denial of tenure by the Board of Regents of Higher Education (board), illustrates the wisdom of the Labor Relations Commission's deadline for filing prohibited practice charges. The rule is contained in 456 Code of Mass.Regs. § 15.03 (1986), and provides: "Except for good cause shown, no charge shall be entertained by the [c]ommission based upon any prohibited practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of a charge with the [c]ommission." ¹

In 1986, the plaintiff sought to vacate an adverse 1983 arbitration award by bringing an action in the Superior Court against the board, and later amending it to include his bargaining representative, the Massachusetts Teachers Association (MTA). The arbitrator concluded that there was no arbitrable dispute, because of the plaintiff's failure to follow the appropriate grievance procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. The MTA notified the plaintiff that it would not appeal the arbitrator's decision.

That case resulted in Miller v. Board of Regents of Higher Educ., 405 Mass. 475, 541 N.E.2d 989 (1989), in which the Supreme Judicial Court held that because the plaintiff was not a "party" to the collective bargaining agreement, he lacked standing under G.L. c. 150E, § 11, to seek to vacate the award. In the closing paragraph of the opinion, the court noted, "If [the plaintiff] was dissatisfied with the MTA's refusal to seek judicial review of the arbitrator's award, he was entitled to present a claim to the Labor Relations Commission under G.L. c. 150E, § 11 (1988 ed.), that the MTA violated its duty to represent him fairly." Id. at 480, 541 N.E.2d 989.

Prompted by this reproof, the plaintiff then filed a charge with the commission in November of 1989, alleging that the MTA wronged him by not filing a grievance on his behalf in June of 1983. He also claimed that the MTA's attorney improperly counseled him not to seek judicial review of the arbitrator's award because of the adverse effect it might have on his contemplated wrongful termination claim.

Reasoning that the plaintiff failed to file his charge within six months of the date he knew or should have known of the MTA's stance in his arbitration case, the commission declined to issue a complaint. Its order, in pertinent part, stated:

"Since the investigation clearly demonstrated that all of the events which form the basis of the [plaintiff's] allegation that the Union breached its statutory duty occurred more than six months before he filed this charge, the charge must be dismissed as untimely filed under the Commission's Rule. In so concluding, we find no good cause excusing the late filing of the charge [emphasis added]. The fact that the [plaintiff] may not have been aware of his right to seek redress against the Union under G.L. c. 150E at the Commission, and instead chose to institute court litigation directly against the Employer, is not sufficient cause for untimely filing. Nor does the Commission read the [Supreme Judicial Court's] decision in the [plaintiff's] case to intimate that [he] is presently entitled to present a claim against the Union at the Commission under G.L. c. 150E, despite his failure to have initiated that claim within the time limits imposed by the Commission's rules. In view of this determination, we need not evaluate the substantive merits of the charge against the Union in this case."

From this "precomplaint dismissal" by the commission, the plaintiff has appealed. See G.L. c. 150E, § 11; Quincy City Hosp. v. Labor Relations Commn., 400 Mass. 745, 747, 511 N.E.2d 582 (1987) (prehearing dismissal by commission is a "final order" reviewable under G.L. c. 150E, § 11).

This appeal raises the question whether the commission exceeded its authority when it adopted the regulation which timebarred the plaintiff's claim against the union for violating its duty of fair representation. Cf. Reilly v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy., 32 Mass.App.Ct. 410, 415-417, 590 N.E.2d 196 (1992), and cases cited. That an agency of the State may by regulation establish timetables and procedures to achieve its statutory goals is well settled. Scofield v. Berman & Sons, Inc., 393 Mass. 95, 101, 469 N.E.2d 805 (1984). Regulations "are treated by the court with the same deference as a statutory enactment." Commonwealth v. B & W Transp., Inc., 388 Mass. 799, 803, 448 N.E.2d 728 (1983). Massachusetts' State Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Rate Setting Commn., 387 Mass. 122, 127, 438 N.E.2d 1072 (1982), citing Greenleaf Fin. Co. v. Small Loans Regulatory Bd., 377 Mass. 282, 293-294, 385 N.E.2d 1364 (1979). Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 380 Mass. 762, 768, 407 N.E.2d 297 (1980).

The first sentence of G.L. c. 23, § 9R, as appearing in St.1973, c. 1078, enables the commission to "make, amend and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of ... G.L. c. 150E." The plaintiff has a heavy burden to meet in attacking the validity of properly promulgated regulations, for he must show that the regulation has no rational relationship to the goals or policies of the agency's enabling statute. Morris v. Commonwealth, 412 Mass. 861, 864, 593 N.E.2d 241 (1992), and cases cited. The plaintiff contends that the commission exceeded its authority when it established a six-month deadline to file prohibited practice charges.

The central purpose of a statute of limitations is to bar all claims asserted after a certain period of time has elapsed from the date the right accrued. Melnick v. Perwak, 295 Mass. 512, 514, 4 N.E.2d 329 (1936). Greeley v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Framingham, 350 Mass. 549, 551-552, 215 N.E.2d 791 (1966). See also Black's Law Dictionary 927 (6th ed. 1990). Statutes of limitation operate mechanically, in a manner completely unrelated to the merits of a case. 1 Corman, Limitation of Actions § 1.1 (1991).

The contested regulation contains an exception; it allows charges to be filed after the six-month deadline when good cause is shown. Thus, this regulation is neither purely mechanical nor does it bar all claims after the deadline. Instead, the rule is somewhat elastic. It allows consideration of whether there is a valid reason for the party's tardiness in filing charges. ²

The Supreme Judicial Court has stated that § 15.03 "is not expressed precisely in the form of a statute of limitations.... [Rather] [i]t is phrased somewhat in the nature of a jurisdictional test." Boston Police Superior Officers Fedn. v. Labor Relations Commn., 410 Mass. 890, 891 n. 1, 575 N.E.2d 1131 (1991). ³

As a State agency adjudicating a large number of employment disputes, the commission is entitled to promulgate regulations which insure prompt preliminary determinations. "Regulations ... within the ambit of the enabling statute ... will be considered valid." Commonwealth v. Racine, 372 Mass. 631, 635, 363 N.E.2d 500 (1977), citing Commonwealth v. Diaz, 326 Mass....