Miller v. Monrean

• Decision Date: 16 March 1973
• Docket Number: No. 1490,1490
• Citation: 507 P.2d 771
• Parties: James D. MILLER, Jr., Appellant, v. Mernsey MONREAN et al., Appellees.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Page 771

507 P.2d 771

James D. MILLER, Jr., Appellant, v. Mernsey MONREAN et al., Appellees.

No. 1490.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

March 16, 1973.

William H. Timme, Alaska Legal Services Corp., Ketchikan, for appellant.

Edward G. King, of Ziegler, Ziegler & Cloudy, Ketchikan, for appellees.

Before RABINOWITZ, C. J., and CONNOR, ERWIN, and BOOCHEVER, JJ.

OPINION

RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice.

This appeal raises two first impression questions regarding Alaska's income exemption statute AS 09.35.080(1).

Pursuant to a valid judgment, appellees Mernsey and Mable Monrean obtained a writ of execution and on November 17, 1970, Miller received a check for $325.56 account. At the time of this levy, Miller's checking account had a balance of $260.68, all of which was seized. During the times pertinent to this litigation, Miller was employed by the State of Alaska's Marine Highway system as a seaman on the ferry MATANUSKA. Miller was paid twice each month; each paycheck represented net wages for work performed during a two-week period ending 15 days before the date of payment. On October 30, 1970, Miller received a check for $325.56 for work performed between October 1 and October 15. On November 13, 1970, he received a check for $423.21, earned during the period of October 15 through October 31. On November 30, 1970, he received $320.14 for work performed between November 1 and November 15, 1970.

On November 13, 1970, Miller's wife deposited his paycheck in the amount of $423.21 in their joint checking account at the First National Bank of Ketchikan. Between November 13, 1970 and the date of the levy of execution, the Millers used a portion of these funds for paying bills incurred for living expenses, leaving a balance on November 17, 1970, of $260.68. Thereafter, Miller filed a Notice and Claim of Exemption on December 1, 1970, and an Affidavit Claiming Exemptions under AS 09.35.080(1). Miller asserted that he was entitled to an exemption of $350 from the $423.21 deposited. Since only $73.21 would thus be subject to the levy, he asked that the balance of the $260.68 seized from the bank account, being the sum of $187.47, be returned to him.

Following a hearing, the district court found that the relevant income for purposes of determining the allowable exemption under AS 09.35.080(1) was $744.21. While incorrectly computed, this figure apparently represents the total of the November 13 check for $423.21 and the $320.14 in income which had accrued to Miller but had not been paid to him for the period from November 1 through November 15. Subtracting the $350 exemption from $744.21, the court found that $394.21 was subject to execution on November 17, 1970, and denied the claim for exemption. This denial was upheld on appeal to the superior court and this appeal followed.

Turning to the first issue in this appeal, the parties' agreed statement of the case states that the district judge held that 'the income deposited in (appellant's) checking account was not exempt from execution.' In his specifications of error, Miller claims that the superior court initially erred in affirming the district court's denial of the Claim of Exemption 'in that funds exempt by AS 09.35.080(1) do not lose their exempt status upon being deposited in a judgment debtor's checking account.'

AS 09.35.080(1), the statute in question, provides that:

The following property is exempt from execution, except as otherwise specifically provided when selected and reserved by the judgment debtor or his agent at the time of the levy, or as soon after levy and before sale as the existence of the levy becomes known to him:

(1) the income of the judgment debtor, regardless of when it became payable, for work performed during he preceding 30 days, or otherwise earned or inured to his benefit within the 30-day period; the 30-day period shall be reckoned back from the date of the levy, but the exemption may not exceed $350 if he is the head of a family, and the amount of $200 if he is not the head of a family; the amount of the exemption shall be computed after deductions and payments, required by law or court order, so as to assure the judgment debtor the receipt of the first $350 per month if he is the head of a family or $200 if he is not the head of a family, when it appears by the debtor's affidavit or otherwise that the income is necessary for his use or for the use of his family which is supported in whole or in part by his income Appellees argue that AS 09.35.080(1), like 46 U.S.C. section 601 ¹ and 15 U.S.C. Sections 1671-1677, contains no language that would permit application of the exemption to income after the debtor has received and deposited it in a checking account. As to 46 U.S.C. Section 601, appellant Miller counters that this federal statute is different from AS 09.35.080(1) in that the federal seaman's exemption was designed to protect the seaman's wages only until such time as he arrives at his home port. ² Miller further argues that 15 U.S.C. Sections 1671-1677 were enacted by Congress to protect the debtor from the particularly onerous burdens on the debtor resulting from the garnishment of wages still held by his employer. In this regard, 15 U.S.C. Section 1673 provides that a creditor may garnish no more than 25 percent of an individual's disposable earnings ³ for any work week, or the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed 30 times the federal minimum hourly wage, whichever is less. 'Garnishment' is defined in 15 U.S.C. Section 1672(c) as 'any legal or equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of any debt.' (Emphasis supplied.) Section 1674, 15 U.S.C., prohibits an employer from discharging any employee because his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness. ⁴ Thus, Congress' purpose was not so much to protect the earnings of the debtor for his and his family's maintenance and support as to make wage garnishment proceedings a less attractive means for a creditor to satisfy his claims. ⁵

AS 09.35.080(1), on the other hand, specifically states that a $350 exemption shall be granted to the head of a family 'when it appears by the debtor's affidavit or otherwise that the income is necessary for his use or for the use of his family which is supported in whole or in part by his income.' Thus, AS 09.35.080(1) reflects a broader purpose than the federal statutes discussed above. And we think it reasonable to assume that the Alaska legislature, in effecting that purpose, intended to protect the debtor's income after it is received by him. We therefore hold that the income exemption provided for by AS 09.35.080(1) applies to income after the debtor has received it.

Several courts have similarly construed wage or income exemption statutes as extending the scope of their protection beyond the payment of wages to the debtor. ⁶ Staton v. Vernon, 209 Iowa 1123, 229 N.W. 763 (1930), is nearly identical to the case at bar. The applicable statute provided:

The earnings of a debtor, who is a resident of the state and the head of a family, for his personal services, or those of his family, at any time within ninety days next preceding the levy, are exempt from liability for debt. Iowa Code § 11763.

The judgment debtor had deposited his earnings in a bank account. The creditor claimed that the funds lost their exempt status upon deposit in the bank. The court held that earnings retain their exempt status after they had been paid to the debtor and are still in his possession in their original form at the time of the levy. It further held that depositing the earnings in a bank 'does not so change the character of the earnings as to deprive them of their exempt character.' 229 N.W. at 764.

In Rutter v. Shumway, 16 Colo. 95, 26 P. 321 (1891), the creditor argued that the applicable statute provided protection of the earnings of the judgment debtor only so long as they remain in the hands of the employer. ⁷ The court, in Rutter, stated that the construction of the statute urged by the creditor

would not only deprive (the debtor) of the privilege of depositing his earnings with any bank or other depositary (sic) for safe-keeping, but would subject his wages to supplemental proceedings even in his own pocket; for, if earnings once received immediately lose their character as wages, then it is evident that the laborer could never retain his earnings for a single hour without exposing them to the very perils which the statute was designed to avert. Such a construction would practically frustrate the beneficent objects of the statute. 26 P. at 322.

One additional aspect of appellees' argument on this point should be discussed. The Monreans argue that there is nothing in the text of AS 09.35.080(1) which permits extension of the income exemption to income after it is received. They argue that AS 09.35.080(1) in fact specifically dictates that income loses its exempt status after receipt by the debtor, pointing to the following statutory language: '. . . so as to assure the judgment debtor the receipt of the first $350 per month if he is the head of a family . . ..' Under this construction the income exemption provided by AS 09.35.080(1) would be limited to garnishments against the debtor's employer. We think the language relied upon by appellees does not require this construction. Considering the statute as a whole, with a view to its underlying purpose, ⁸ we believe it reasonable to construe the phrase 'to assure . . . receipt' in this context to mean 'to assure . . . use' by the judgment debtor. The primary purpose of AS 09.35.080(1) is to allow the judgment debtor to retain a portion of his income to meet his family needs. In light of this purpose, it would be anomalous to limit the protection of AS 09.35.080(1) to income in the hands of the employer.

This brings us to the difficult question of whether the district court erred by...