Miller v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 10 August 1951
• Citation: 54 So.2d 60
• Parties: MILLER et al. v. RYAN et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 60

54 So.2d 60

MILLER et al. v. RYAN et al.

Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.

Aug. 10, 1951.

Horn & Ossinsky, Daytona Beach, for appellants.

Chas. W. Luther, Daytona Beach, for appellees.

TERRELL, Justice.

The legislature of 1949 enacted Chapter 26294, Laws of Florida, Special Acts, establishing advertising tax districts in Volusia County, authorizing the board of county commissioners to levy and collect annually a special tax on all taxable property therein for the purpose of advertising the advantages, facilities and products in said taxing districts and providing for the expenditure of the proceeds of said tax under the direction and supervision of the board of county commissioners. The said act further provided that it take effect only upon ratification at a referendum election as provided therein.

There was a taxpayers' suit brought to restrain the holding of the referendum election, but in the light of subsequent circumstances it became unimportant and is not discussed. The board of county commissioner brought this suit for declaratory decree, praying that it be determined (1) whether or not said referendum election be called and held countywide or in each of said advertising tax districts as the board of county commissioners may determine, (2) whether or not said referendum election be called in compliance with Section 21, Article 3 of the Constitution, F.S.A., or some other requirement of the law, (3) whether or not those participating in said referendum election should be limited to freeholders, and (4) whether or not Chapter 26294, Special Acts of 1949, is constitutional. A motion to dismiss was overruled and on final hearing, the chancellor held (1) that Chapter 26294, Special Acts of 1949, is constitutional, (2) that said referendum election should be held in compliance with Section 21, Article 3 of the Constitution, (3) that said referendum election should not be limited to freeholders, but that all electors should be permitted to participate therein, and (4) that said referendum election should be called and held in all the taxing districts at the same time. This appeal is from the decree so entered.

It is first contended that Chapter 26294, Special Acts of 1949 is invalid in that it delegates governmental power to a person or group of persons not appointed by the governor or elected by the people.

Appellants contend that this question requires an affirmative answer and rely on Ketchie v. Hedrick, 186 N.C. 392, 119 S.E. 767, 31 A.L.R. 491, to support their contention. The real point decided in that case was that any tax imposed in the State of North Carolina for advertising purposes must be approved by a majority vote of the registered voters, otherwise it would be invalid. Contrary to the holding in the last cited case, this court has repeatedly held that an advertising tax for state, county or municipal purposes may be lawfully imposed. City of Jacksonville v. Oldham, 112 Fla. 502, 150 So. 619; City of DeLand v. Moorhead, 96 Fla. 737, 119 So. 117; Earle v. Dade County, 92 Fla. 432, 109 So. 331; C. V. Floyd Fruit Company v. Florida Citrus Commission, 128 Fla. 565, 174 So. 248, 112 A.L.R. 562; Stewart v. Thursby, 103 Fla. 990, 138 So. 742; State ex rel. Barnett Nat. Bank of DeLand v. Thursby, 112 Fla. 257, 150 So. 252.

These cases would seem to remove any question as to the constitutional validity of Chapter 26294 or the charge that governmental power is delegated to those not appointed by the governor or elected by the people. There is in fact no delegation of governmental powers attempted by said act. The board of county commissioners is shown to have acted at all times within the power delegated to it and the chambers of commerce contemplated by the act are nothing more than agents of the board of county commissioners who may approve...