Miller v. Turner, 81-5107

• Decision Date: 05 October 1981
• Docket Number: No. 81-5107,81-5107
• Citation: 658 F.2d 348
• Parties: George MILLER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. R. V. TURNER and The Attorney General of the State of Florida, Respondents-Appellees. Summary Calendar. . Unit B *
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 348

658 F.2d 348

George MILLER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. R. V. TURNER and The Attorney General of the State of

Florida, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 81-5107

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Unit B ^*

Oct. 5, 1981.

George Miller, pro se.

Laura R. Morrison, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, Fla., for respondents-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, FRANK M. JOHNSON, Jr. and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

R. LANIER ANDERSON, III, Circuit Judge:

George Miller, a prisoner in the Glades Correctional Institution, Belle Glade, Florida, appeals from the denial of his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Miller raises three claims in this appeal. Two of these claims were exhausted in the Florida courts, and the district court below denied these claims on the merits without an evidentiary hearing. The third claim is raised for the first time on appeal. We affirm the order of the district court denying the petition and dismiss without prejudice the claim raised for the first time on appeal.

FACTS

Miller was indicted by a Palm Beach County, Florida, grand jury on two counts of first degree murder. These charges related to the slayings of Miller's wife Amy and her alleged paramour, Willie Van Wesley. According to the description of the factual episode advanced by the assistant state attorney at the plea hearing and agreed to by Miller through his attorney, Miller discovered his wife and Mr. Van Wesley in an automobile in the early morning hours of April 4, 1979. Brandishing a sawed-off shotgun, Miller shot his wife twice as she alighted from the automobile. Then Miller fired into the car, striking Mr. Van Wesley with two shots. Both Amy Miller and Willie Van Wesley died from these gunshot wounds. (R. 46-48). Miller pled guilty to two counts of second degree murder and was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences with a mandatory minimum sentence of three years on each count, during which Miller would not be eligible for parole. The court retained jurisdiction over Miller as authorized by Fla.Stat.Ann. § 947.16(3) for one-third of each life sentence for the purpose of reviewing any recommendations for parole.

Miller filed a motion for post conviction relief pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850. The Florida Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit denied that motion and a subsequent petition for rehearing. The Florida District Court of Appeals, Fourth District, affirmed without opinion. Miller v. State, 383 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).

In his petition to the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, Miller raised two claims for relief. First, he argued that his conviction and sentence are illegal since they were entered in violation of the single transaction rule. Second, he claimed that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary since he was not made aware of the law pertaining to the case and the consequences of his plea by either the trial judge or his attorney. The district court held that these claims had been exhausted and denied the petition after reviewing the merits of the claims. On appeal, Miller again urges both of these arguments, and also raises for the first time an additional claim challenging the constitutionality of the statute under which the trial court retained jurisdiction over him, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 947.16(3).

CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FLA.STAT.ANN. § 947.16(3)

We first address Miller's argument that Fla.Stat.Ann. § 947.16(3), which authorizes a sentencing judge to retain jurisdiction over a defendant to review parole commission release orders, is unconstitutional, both under the Florida Constitution and the United States Constitution. Miller failed to present this claim either to the Florida courts or to the district court below, but raises it for the first time in this appeal. Where an issue raised on appeal has not been advanced in the district court, it is not properly before the court of appeals. Mayberry v. Davis, 608 F.2d 1070, 1072 (5th Cir. 1979); Messelt v. Alabama, 595 F.2d 247, 250 (5th Cir. 1979); Tifford v. Wainwright, 592 F.2d 233, 234 (5th Cir. 1979). ¹ Hence, we will not consider Miller's newly injected claim. The claims properly before this court are the same as those argued in the district court, namely, two wholly exhausted claims. Therefore, we now turn a review to the merits of those claims.

SINGLE TRANSACTION THEORY

The substance of Miller's "same transaction" argument is that because the two murders for which he was charged occurred during the same criminal episode, his conviction and sentencing on two counts of murder violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. This argument is frivolous.

The record clearly indicates that Miller killed two people with two separate criminal acts. These acts constituted two distinct violations of the Florida murder statute, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 782.04. Thus, the prohibition established by the Double Jeopardy Clause against multiple punishments for the

same offense has no application here, since Miller received consecutive sentences for two different offenses of murder. ²

KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY PLEA

Miller next argues that his convictions and sentences should be vacated since the trial judge and his attorney did not ensure that he understood the law relating to his case and the consequences of his pleas prior to his entry of the guilty pleas. This argument is without merit.

Under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), in order to pass constitutional muster, a guilty plea must be voluntary, intelligent and uncoerced. The defendant must enter his guilty plea with "sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). See also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1446, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Hill v. Estelle, 653 F.2d 202, at 205 (5th Cir. 1981).

In the case at bar, it is clear that Miller made a knowing, voluntary and uncoerced plea of guilty to both counts. A review of the transcript of the plea hearing indicates that the trial judge questioned Miller closely to determine if Miller understood the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of the plea and if Miller was making the plea freely and without coercion. (R. 49-54, 58-9). Miller's claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was not advised that as a matter of law he could not receive multiple sentences is patently erroneous, as shown by our discussion of his "single transaction" claim above. Also frivolous is Miller's argument that he was unaware of the consequences of his plea because the trial judge failed properly to advise him that he would be required to serve three years without opportunity for parole under Fla.Stat.Ann. § 775.087(2). The transcript of the plea hearing squarely refutes this argument; appellant was expressly and clearly advised in this regard.

Miller also claims...