Mills County v. Lampasas County
Decision Date | 15 April 1897 |
Citation | 40 S.W. 403 |
Parties | MILLS COUNTY v. LAMPASAS COUNTY. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
J. L. Lewis, G. N. Harrison, and E. B. Anderson, for appellant. Matthews & Browning, for appellee.
This is a certified question from the court of civil appeals for the Third supreme judicial district. The certificate shows that Mills county was a new county created and organized in 1887, and that its territory was taken from Lampasas, Brown, Hamilton, and Comanche counties that the suit was brought by Lampasas county to recover from Mills county its proportionate part of the debt of the plaintiff county which existed when the defendant county was created; and that the claim was not first presented to the commissioners' court of the latter county for allowance. The question is certified as follows: "The case is now pending on appeal in the court of civil appeals for the Third supreme judicial district, and one of the material questions for decision is whether or not the cause of action sued on is such a claim as the statute required to be presented to the commissioners' court of Mills county before suit could be brought thereon; and that question the court of civil appeals desires to, and hereby does, certify to the supreme court of the state for decision." The question in this case has evidently arisen from the generality of the provision contained in article 677 of the Revised Statutes of 1879 ( ), and the fact that no reference is made to that provision in the act of 1893, which authorized a county, a portion of the territory of which had been incorporated in a new county, to sue the latter for a proportionate part of its existing indebtedness. Article 790 provides, in effect, that no suit shall be brought against a county unless the claim is first presented to and rejected by the commissioners' court of the county. The act of 1893, in so far as it bears upon the question under consideration, is as follows: ...
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