Mills v. County of Trinity

• Decision Date: 28 July 1980
• Citation: 108 Cal.App.3d 656,166 Cal.Rptr. 674
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Albert MILLS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF TRINITY et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 18866.

Page 674

166 Cal.Rptr. 674

108 Cal.App.3d 656

Albert MILLS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF TRINITY et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 18866.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

July 28, 1980.

Hearing Denied September 24, 1980.

Ronald Barbatoe, Dist. Atty. (Trinity), for defendants and appellants.

David R. Hammer, Weaverville, for plaintiff and respondent.

PUGLIA, Presiding Justice.

Following enactment of article XIII A of the California Constitution (Prop. 13 on the June 6, 1978, ballot, commonly known as the Jarvis-Gann Initiative), the Trinity County Board of Supervisors adopted resolution No. 73-78 providing both increased and new fees for county services in processing subdivision, zoning, and other land-use applications. Plaintiff Mills then brought this action in the superior court against the county and its board challenging the constitutionality of the resolution and seeking to bar its enforcement through mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court sustained plaintiff's claim that as a matter of law the new and increased fees under resolution No. 73-78 constitute a "special tax" within the meaning of article XIII A and thus cannot be imposed without a two-thirds affirmative vote of the electors of Trinity County. Since the board of supervisors had adopted the resolution without submitting it to the county electorate for approval, the court ordered summary judgment in plaintiff's favor and issued a peremptory writ of mandate. The writ ordered defendants to "desist and refrain from enforcing the provisions of Resolution Number 73-78" and further directed defendants to refund any and all monies received pursuant to the provisions of the resolution which exceeded amounts in effect under prior fee schedules.

Defendants appealed and filed an accompanying petition for a writ of supersedeas. We issued the writ, restraining enforcement of the judgment pending disposition of this appeal. (Mills v. County of Trinity (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 859, 159 Cal.Rptr. 679.)

Although in its generality, article XIII A is not fatally vague, "in a number of particulars (it) is imprecise and ambiguous" (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281) "and over a period of time will require judicial, legislative and administrative construction" (id., at p. 244, 149 Cal.Rptr. at p. 257, 583 P.2d at p. 1298). We are now called upon in this appeal to determine whether the new and increased fees exacted by resolution No. 73-78 constitute a "special tax" within the meaning of section 4 of article XIII A. That provision states: "Cities, Counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of such district, may impose special taxes on such district, except ad valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale of real property within such City, County or special district."

Utilizing the established rules of construction applicable to the interpretation of constitutional provisions (see Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 245-246, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281), we conclude that the "special tax" referred to in section 4 of article XIII A does not embrace fees charged in connection with regulatory activities which fees do not exceed the reasonable cost of providing services necessary to the activity for which the fee is charged and which are not levied for unrelated revenue purposes. Accordingly, we shall reverse and remand for a factual determination of whether the fees in question are reasonably compensatory for the costs occasioned by the regulated activities.

"Tax" is a term without fixed definition. The word may be construed narrowly or broadly depending on its particular context and the purpose for which the definition is to be used. See Crawford v. Herringer (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 544, 548-551, 149 Cal.Rptr. 578; City of Glendale v. Trondsen (1957) 48 Cal.2d 93, 99-100, 308 P.2d 1.) In its broadest sense, a tax includes all charges upon persons or property for the support of government or for public purposes. (City of Madera v. Black (1919) 181 Cal. 306, 310-311, 184 P. 397; Webster's New Internat. Dict. (3d ed.1971) p. 2345.) In narrower contexts, the word has been construed to exclude charges to particular individuals which do not exceed the value of the governmental benefit conferred upon or the service rendered to the individuals (County of Fresno v. Malmstrom (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 974, 984, 156 Cal.Rptr. 777; Crawford v. Herringer, supra 85 Cal.App.3d at p. 550, 149 Cal.Rptr. 578), and to exclude charges against particular individuals for governmental regulatory activities where the fees involved do not exceed the reasonable expense of the regulatory activities (United Business Com. v. City of San Diego (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 156, 165, 154 Cal.Rptr. 263).

Initiative measures as well as other general constitutional provisions should be interpreted liberally to give full effect to the framers' objective and the growing needs of the people. Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 244-245, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281.) Animated by the foregoing principle, the trial court construed "tax" in its broadest meaning holding that, as used in section 4 of article XIII A, it "includes all charges, however labeled, which are to exact money for the support of government or for public purposes." However, were we to accept the trial court's road definition, the initiative measure as so construed would prohibit any increase in fees for governmental activities conferring a direct benefit on the specific individual who is charged for such benefit without the prior approval of two-thirds of the electors. In other words, a county would be powerless to raise charges for proprietary functions such as hospital services, public transportation, and garbage collection without the two-thirds stamp of approval. We do not believe the state electors intended to put local government in such a fiscal straitjacket.

Conceding that such a draconian result was probably never intended by the electorate, plaintiff asserts the interpretation adopted by the trial court would exclude from the meaning of "special tax" fees charged for governmental activities primarily for the benefit of individuals and only incidentally for the benefit of the public. The minor premise of plaintiff's argument is that land-use charges imposed on the developer pursuant to the government's police power are primarily for the benefit of the public at large. Plaintiff thus concludes that such charges constitute taxes within the meaning of section 4 of article XIII A. Defendants, while not disputing the applicability of the "primary purpose" test, contend that it is the developer who is the primary beneficiary of an approval for land subdivision since the value of the land increases; the public, defendants assert, is merely the indirect beneficiary.

We eschew the public versus individual primary purpose test as a solvent of the instant litigation. The trial court also recognized the difficulty of embarking on such "spongy terrain" since all governmental activities by definition serve a public purpose. Under such a test, every charge imposed in connection with land-use activities as well as all other regulatory activities undertaken pursuant to the police power might well be categorized as a "special tax" since the police power is constitutional only if adopted to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the public as a whole. (Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926) 272 U.S. 365, 387, 47 S.Ct. 114, 118, 71 L.Ed. 303, 310; Associated Homebuilders etc. Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 604, 135 Cal.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473.)

We rely instead on statutory and judicial precedent (see County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 850, 59 Cal.Rptr. 609, 428 P.2d 593) and contemporaneous legislative construction (Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 245, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281) in determining that the state electorate did not intend to include within the meaning of "special tax" reasonable costs for processing land-use permits and applications.

Traditionally, courts have determined whether a local governmental charge denominated a regulatory fee is an exercise of the police power or the power to raise...