Mills v. South Carolina Unemployment Comp. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 03 January 1944
• Docket Number: No. 15603.,15603.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: MILLS. v. SOUTH CAROLINA UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al.

28 S.E.2d 535

MILLS.

v.SOUTH CAROLINA UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al.

No. 15603.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Jan. 3, 1944.

Appeal from Common Pleas Court, of Greenville County; G. Dewey Oxner, Judge.

Action by Judson Mills against the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Commission and another in the nature of an appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Commission awardingunemployment compensation benefits to Pauline Moss Gaines. From an adverse decree, defendants appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

The order of Judge Oxner follows:

This action was instituted by the claimant under Section 6(i) of the South Carolina Unemployment Act, Code 1942, § 7035-86(i), and is in the nature of an appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Commission.

The facts, as found by the commission, are undisputed. It appears that the claimant, Pauline Moss Gaines, was employed by Judson Mills during the spring of 1942, as a quiller tender on the third shift. The claimant, the mother of four children, ranging in age from nine to two years, had never worked prior to this employment. Prior to November 7, 1942, a relative of the claimant had looked after her children while she was working. On November 7, 1942, this relative left, and claimant being unable to find anyone else to care for her children, was compelled to give up her work and remain at home and care for them. She has been offered work on the third shift at Judson on several occasions since quitting but has refused each time, stating that she was only available for work on the first or second shifts.

The claimant made application for unemployment benefits on January 11, 1943. The claim was disallowed by a deputy's decision upon the ground that she was unavailable for work. The claimant appealed from this adverse decision to a special appeals referee constituting an appeal tribunal, who on February 19, 1943, filed a decision affirming the decision of the deputy and holding that the claimant was not available for work from January 11th to February 16th:

Within due time the claimant appealed to the full commission, which on March 31, 1943, reversed the decision of the appeal tribunal, holding that the claimant voluntarily quit her work for good cause, and was genuinely unavailable for the third shift since it was necessary for her to be with her children at that time, but that since she was able and available for work on the first and second shifts, she was able and available for work within the purview of the act. Within due time plaintiff filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas for the purpose of having the decision of the Commission reviewed.

Counsel for the commission first take the position that the commission's finding that the claimant was available for work within the purview of the act constitutes a finding of fact and is not subject to review if supported by any evidence. It must, of course, be conceded that the findings of the commission upon disputed facts are not subject to review by the courts if there is any evidence to support them. In this case, however, there were no disputed facts. The plaintiff, by its appeal, is in no way challenging the correctness of the commission's findings of fact. The error complained of relates to the commission's application of the law to these undisputed facts. This, it seems to me, is clearly subject to review. Any other view would substantially deprive the plaintiff of the right to appeal. I, therefore, overrule this contention.

The decision in this case hinges upon the meaning of the term "available for work." It is conceded that the claimant is no longer available for work on the third shift where she had always been employed, but the commission takes the view that since she could accept work on either the first or second shifts, she is available for work on two of the three shifts now prevailing in the industry and, therefore, is available for work within the purview of the act.

It does not appear that the courts of this State have heretofore had occasion to construe this section of the statute. As a guide to its interpretation and application, the Legislature saw fit to include in the act a declaration of state policy whereby economic insecurity due to unemployment was declared a serious menace to the health, morals and welfare of the people of the State. It further declared involuntary unemployment to be a subject of general interest and concern requiring appropriate action by the General Assembly to prevent its spread and lighten the burden which it entailed.

Involuntary unemployment could obviously result from numerous causes. Sickness, accident, old age and changes in personal conditions and circumstances could result in a person becoming unemployed through no fault of his own as...