Mina v. Boise Cascade Corp.
| Decision Date | 21 November 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 50661-2,50661-2 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Ezzat MINA and Minerva Mina, Respondents, v. BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION, Defendant, Hofstrand Logging Company, Petitioner. |
Gavin, Robinson, Kendrick, Redman & Mays, Inc., P.S., Robert R. Fedman, Yakima, for petitioner.
Prediletto, Halpin, Cannon, Johnson & Scharnikow, Richard R. Johnson, Yakima, for respondents.
Grange Ins. Ass'n, Andrew C. Borhnsen, Dennis Sweeney, Pasco, Wash., amicus curiae, for respondents.
In a negligence action arising out of a multivehicle collision, a jury found that defendant Hofstrand Logging Company was negligent and that plaintiff Ezzat Mina was 85 percent comparatively negligent. Mina appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict and ordered a new trial. Hofstrand challenges the appellate court's determinations that: (1) the evidence introduced at trial did not support a jury instruction based on the statutory prohibition against parking, stopping, or leaving standing a vehicle on the roadway; and (2) retrial will be limited to a determination of the parties' respective liabilities. We affirm the Court of Appeals, although in part on different grounds.
In the early afternoon of February 4, 1980, Ezzat Mina and his wife were driving north on Interstate 82 to their home in Ellensburg following a doctor's appointment in Yakima. The road surface was dry and the sky was clear and sunny until the Minas were 13 miles south of Ellensburg. Here they came upon a fog bank which intensified as they proceeded down into a valley. According to Mr. Mina's testimony, he reset his cruise control from approximately 55 m.p.h. to approximately 35 m.p.h. in response to the changed weather conditions.
That same afternoon, Gary Graham, driving a Hofstrand log truck with its empty trailer in a "piggyback" position, was returning on Interstate 82 to Ellensburg from a delivery made in Yakima. Graham testified that as he entered the fog bank 13 miles south of Ellensburg he reduced the truck speed to 45 m.p.h. After driving through the fog for approximately 1 mile, Graham suddenly saw that he was rapidly approaching 2 taillights, 6 to 8 car lengths in front of him. His truck began to slide to the left side of the road. When he counter-steered, the front end of the truck struck a snowbank on the left shoulder of the road, causing the truck to spin completely around. The truck then slid backwards into a ditch in the median strip. The taillights that Graham saw belonged to the Mina vehicle. When the Hofstrand truck spun around, its rear end struck the rear end of the Mina vehicle.
At trial, Mr. Mina testified that he was concentrating on the road in front of him and did not see the Hofstrand truck approach from the rear. He recalled that after feeling the impact from the collision he went into a "state of shock." When he saw that the force of the collision was causing his car to head for a guardrail at the edge of the right shoulder of the road, he closed his eyes and gripped the steering wheel. He did not reopen his eyes until the car came to rest. At some point after the impact but before the car had come to rest, the car engine stalled. When Mr. Mina opened his eyes, he tried, but was unable, to restart the engine. He was disoriented and frightened. He opened his door, got out of the car and told his wife to do the same. Mr. Mina had no further recollection of the incident.
Meanwhile, John N. Samuel, driving a flatbed truck for the Palmer G. Lewis Company, was also traveling north on Interstate 82 that afternoon. When he approached the fog bank, he too reduced his speed. Although he did not see the collision between the Mina vehicle and the Hofstrand truck, he arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. When Samuel saw the Hofstrand truck in the median strip, he reduced his speed further. He then saw that the right-hand lane of the roadway was obstructed by what he eventually learned was the Minas' vehicle. The Mina car was almost perpendicular to the roadway, but was facing slightly south. Samuel drove into the left-hand lane, reduced his truck speed to 20 m.p.h. and began to pass the car.
Alfred Johnson, driving a Boise Cascade logging truck, was also proceeding north on Interstate 82 that same afternoon. When he entered into the fog bank, he reduced his speed, saw the Hofstrand truck in the median strip, and slowed his truck further. Johnson testified that he saw a car blocking three-fourths of the right-hand lane, and a truck, apparently adjacent to the car, blocking the left-hand lane. Realizing that he did not have time to stop, Johnson drove to the right shoulder of the road in an attempt to pass the Mina car. Instead, the truck struck the rear portion of the car and continued forward until it struck the guardrail on the right shoulder of the road.
Mr. Mina was out of the car and speaking to his wife when the Boise Cascade truck collided with his car. The force of the collision caused the car to hit Mr. Mina, knocking him unconscious. The car then came to rest against the side of the Palmer G. Lewis truck, which was still in the left lane.
The following illustration shows the position of the Mina car (1) where it was hit by the Hofstrand truck (2) at the point of impact with the guardrail, (3) where it was hit by the Boise Cascade truck. "X" denotes the point of impact by the trucks. The Mina vehicle ultimately came to rest approximately 166 feet north of number 3.
At trial, the Minas and Hofstrand each called upon expert witnesses to reconstruct the sequence of events at issue. John A. Talbott testified on the Minas' behalf. He maintained that the Hofstrand truck was traveling at a speed of 28 m.p.h. immediately prior to impact. The impact exerted the equivalent of 450 pounds of force hitting Mr. Mina's body horizontally. Talbott maintained that nine- tenths of a second elapsed from the time the Mina vehicle was hit by the Hofstrand truck to the vehicle's collision with the guardrail. In describing the movement of the Minas' car during this time period, Talbott stated: (Italics ours.)
Talbott testified that the car's side struck the guardrail and the car then came to rest in the right lane of the freeway. In describing how the car came to rest after the impact with the guardrail, Talbott opined:
[The car] was not braked or didn't skid to the ... position. It didn't wildly gyrate to get to that position ... [s]o probably ... there was ... corrective action ... which suggests ... that the driver was probably ... trying to regain his control and composure. [The] car was driven to this location, steered to that location.
(Italics ours.) Talbott concluded that although the car was mechanically capable of being steered, it was out of control after it hit the guardrail.
John Habberstad, a mechanical engineer, testified on Hofstrand's behalf. He maintained that the force of the impact between the Hofstrand and Mina vehicles did not result in Mr. Mina "violently being thrown." Habberstad also stated that the Mina vehicle approached the guardrail from the 12-foot-wide shoulder at an angle of no more than 10 degrees. Habberstad concluded that a full 2 seconds elapsed between the vehicle's impact with the truck and its impact with the guardrail. The total time between the initial impact and Mina vehicle coming to rest was "in excess of 10 seconds." However, Habberstad admitted that, realistically, Mina did not have time to react before striking the guardrail:
Habberstad also concurred with Talbott's conclusion that after the car struck the guardrail, it was out of control:
Over the Minas' objection, the trial court gave the following jury instruction, which is at the heart of this appeal:
You are instructed that a Washington statute provides:
Outside of incorporated cities and towns no person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the roadway.
The above section shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled in such manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving the vehicle in such position.
In addition, the trial court instructed the jury that a violation of a statute is "negligence as a matter of law" unless "due to some cause beyond the violator's control."
The jury found that Hofstrand was negligent and Mina was 85 percent comparatively negligent. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the evidence introduced at trial did not support giving instruction 11 to the jury. Mina v. Boise Cascade Corp., 37 Wash.App. 445, 681 P.2d 880 (1984). The court also ordered retrial solely on the question of liability. From the Court of Appeals determination, Hofstrand petitioned for review.
The gravamen of Hofstrand's argument...
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