Miracle v. Peyton

• Decision Date: 04 September 1970
• Citation: 211 Va. 123,176 S.E.2d 339
• Parties: Archie Lee MIRACLE v. C. C. PEYTON, Supt., etc.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 339

176 S.E.2d 339

211 Va. 123

Archie Lee MIRACLE v. C. C. PEYTON, Supt., etc.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Sept. 4, 1970.

James L. Berry, Winchester (Kuykendall & Whiting, Winchester, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

Edward J. White, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Robert Y. Button, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for defendant in error.

Before SNEAD, C.J., and I'ANSON, CARRICO, GORDON, HARRISON, COCHRAN and HARMAN, JJ.

SNEAD, Chief Justice.

Archie Lee Miracle, petitioner, appeals from a judgment entered on December 15, 1967, denying and dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

On November 15, 1965 petitioner was indicted by the grand jury of the Circuit Court of Frederick County for the robbery and attempted murder of Frank J. Damron. On the same day the trial court appointed James T. Tate, Jr. as counsel for Miracle ¹ and he was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to both charges. The trial was set for January 27, 1966. Prior thereto a motion was made by petitioner's counsel for a continuance and the commitment of petitioner for psychiatric evaluation. This motion was granted.

On April 8, 1966 petitioner, after having been found competent to stand trial, appeared before the court with his attorney and withdrew his pleas of not guilty. He was then rearraigned and pleaded guilty to both charges. On May 16, 1966, after hearing the testimony of trooper D. A. Sheetz and considering a pre-sentence report and argument of counsel, the court found petitioner guilty on his pleas of guilty and sentenced him to confinement in the State penitentiary for a term of twenty years on each charge, such sentences to run concurrently.

On March 6, 1967, Miracle filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of the County of Powhatan. That court issued a writ returnable to the Circuit Court of Frederick County. The latter court, after a plenary hearing, found that 'petitioner was adequately and effectively represented by counsel during and prior to the course of his trials' and dismissed the petition for a writ. We granted petitioner a writ of error to that judgment.

In his assignments of error, petitioner first claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He bases this contention on the failure of his court-appointed counsel to object to certain hearsay evidence given by the police officer at the trial on May 16, 1966, at which time he was sentenced. Also, he asserts that his pleas of guilty were 'urged' by his attorney, and that his attorney failed to petition the court for a rehearing after the Commonwealth nol-prossed the charges against an alleged accomplice, Delph. Secondly, petitioner says that the evidence adduced was 'so insufficient as to constitute a denial of due process'. Finally, he contends that he was denied his right of appeal.

However, the basic question in this appeal is the validity of petitioner's pleas of guilty. We believe petitioner's pleas and the actions of the trial judge comply with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). In Boykin the Supreme Court held that it was error for the trial judge to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative showing on the record that the plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered.

In the case at bar the transcript of proceecdings in the criminal trials was made a part of the record in the habeas corpus proceeding. The record shows that before the trial judge accepted petitioner's guilty pleas at the hearing on April 8, 1966, he discussed with petitioner and his attorney the proposed pleas of guilty. The trial judge asked petitioner if he had conferred with his attorney about the advisability of withdrawing his not guilty pleas, and if he had decided of his own free will the course of action in withdrawing his pleas of not guilty. The petitioner replied in the affirmative.

The trial judge also questioned Tate, petitioner's counsel, in the presence of the accused about the proposed plea change. Petitioner's counsel informed the court that he had had six long conferences with petitioner at the jail, and the last conference was the day before (April 7, 1966). He also told the court that petitioner was fully aware of the possible results of the pleas of guilty, and that petitioner understood the maximum punishment for the offenses charged. The court was further advised by Tate, '(W)e have negotiated with the Commonwealth's Attorney as to a recommenced sentence in these case, and that has affected our present course.'

At the habeas corpus hearing Miracle testified that he changed his pleas of not guilty to guilty because he was 'urged' to do so by his attorney. He said that he 'understood the nature of the plea' and that Tate told him if he did not plead guilty he 'would receive (a) severe amount of time in the state penitentiary'.

Tate testified that Miracle was never 'urged by me or coerced' to change his pleas to guilty. Tate stated that the victim 'positively identified' Miracle at the preliminary hearing and he considered it his...