Mississippi Com'n on Judicial Performance v. Chinn, 91-CC-0923

• Decision Date: 05 August 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-CC-0923,91-CC-0923
• Citation: 611 So.2d 849
• Parties: MISSISSIPPI COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE v. Robert (C.O.) CHINN, Jr., Justice Court Judge.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 849

611 So.2d 849

MISSISSIPPI COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE v. Robert (C.O.) CHINN, Jr., Justice Court Judge.

No. 91-CC-0923.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Aug. 5, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 7, 1993.

Opinion of Justice McRae Dissenting to Denial of Rehearing

Jan. 7, 1993.

Luther T. Brantley, III, Jackson, for appellant.

Isaac K. Byrd, Jr., Byrd & Associates, Jackson, for appellee.

En Banc.

ROY NOBLE LEE, Chief Justice, for the Court:

This proceeding comes to this Court pursuant to findings by the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance recommending the removal of Robert (C.O.) Chinn, Jr., Justice Court Judge for the Second District of Madison County. The Commission found that Robert Chinn, Jr.'s conduct constituted willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and recommended his removal.

FACTS

Robert (C.O.) Chinn began serving as a justice court judge in Madison County on December 8, 1988. On November 13, 1990, the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Judge Chinn, alleging numerous violations of judicial misconduct. After answers were served denying the allegations, a hearing was had by a committee appointed by the Commission. This hearing was conducted by Judge James Thomas, Judge Billy Ray Mangum, and Mr. Donald Butler, and took place in Jackson on May 30 and 31, 1991.

After hearing testimony from Judge Chinn, Philip Nelson the County Attorney for Madison County, various clerks of Madison County, two highway patrolmen, and a local attorney, the Committee recommended removal from office, or at minimum, a public reprimand and substantial fine. The Committee's harsh recommendation was based on the multiple instances and type of conduct, the consistent disregard for the law, and the judge's lack of candor in the hearing. The Committee found that Judge Chinn had violated Canons 1, 2 A, 2 B, 3 A(1), 3 A(2), 3 A(3), 3 A(4), and 3 B(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Specifically, it found Judge Chinn had engaged in "ticket fixing", in which a charge would be dismissed without going to trial or notifying the officer who had written the violation. This was done with the use of a "consideration docket", wherein a violator would call up the judge and ask for leniency or give an excuse for the judge's consideration. This included The Committee also found that the judge failed to sentence defendants according to applicable statutes, including several charged with DUI violations. It was found that the judge reduced a DUI violation to reckless driving, and dismissed seven (7) misdemeanor cases without assessing court costs. Judge Chinn also ignored the county attorney's advice in sentencing three defendants, who pled guilty to gambling charges. As a result, the contraband money seized in the arrest was returned to the defendants, rather than forfeited pursuant to statute. It was further shown that Judge Chinn amended three sentences after the defendants had served twenty-eight (28) days in jail. This amendment involved ex parte communication with the father of one of the defendants, as well as the judge writing a letter to another defendant's employer misrepresenting that there were no pending proceedings.

eighteen (18) cases in which the judge himself made the motion to dismiss the charges. It was also determined that the judge engaged in ex parte proceedings with defendants whose violations were still pending.

Further, it was found that Judge Chinn attempted to influence other justice court judges to grant favorable treatment in their adjudication of certain cases. The judge exceeded his authority on twenty-seven (27) occasions when he ordered parties to make partial or scheduled payments, often before the statutory appeal period of ten (10) days had elapsed. Finally it was determined that Judge Chinn abused his contempt power when he had Officer Terry McFarland of the Mississippi Highway Patrol arrested for contempt of court. Officer McFarland was later found not guilty, but these charges resulted in filing a civil suit against Judge Chinn, resulting in a default judgment in the amount of $27,566. That default judgment is currently on appeal.

The Commission, headed by William M. Bost, Jr., adopted the findings of the Committee in whole, and recommended that Judge Chinn be removed from office. Pursuant to Rule 10 of the Rules on Judicial Performance, this Court must consider the following:

I. DID JUDGE CHINN'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTE WILLFUL MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THEREBY BRINGING THE JUDICIAL OFFICE INTO DISREPUTE PURSUANT TO SECTION 177A OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION OF 1890?

II. SHOULD JUDGE CHINN BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE PURSUANT TO SECTION 177A OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION?

The appropriate standard of review used in a judicial disciplinary proceeding is derived from Rule 10(E) of the Rules of the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance, which states:

Based upon a review of the entire record, the Supreme Court shall prepare and publish a written opinion and judgment directing such disciplinary action, if any, as it finds just and proper. The Supreme Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendation of the Commission. In the event that more than one (1) recommendation for discipline of the judge is filed, the Supreme Court may render a single decision or impose a single sanction with respect to all recommendations.

Mississippi Judicial Performance Commission v. Hopkins, 590 So.2d 857 (Miss.1991). Although this Court is not being bound by the Commission's findings, they are given great deference when based on clear and convincing evidence. Mississippi Judicial Performance Commission v. Walker, 565 So.2d 1117, 1119 (Miss.1990).

DISCUSSION

I. DID JUDGE CHINN'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTE WILLFUL MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THEREBY BRINGING THE JUDICIAL OFFICE INTO DISREPUTE PURSUANT TO SECTION 177A OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION OF 1890?

Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution allows a judge to be sanctioned for [T]he improper or wrongful use of the power of his office by a judge acting intentionally, or with gross unconcern for his conduct, and generally in bad faith. It involves more than an error in judgment or a mere lack of diligence. Necessarily, the term would encompass conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, and also any knowing misuse of the office, whatever the motive. However, these elements are not necessary to a finding of bad faith. A specific intent to use the powers of the judicial office to accomplish a purpose which the judge knew or should have known was beyond the legitimate exercise of his authority constitutes bad faith....

willful misconduct in office. This Court has defined willful misconduct as:

Willful misconduct in office of necessity is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.

In re Anderson, 412 So.2d 743, 745 (Miss.1982).

In order to answer the question of willful misconduct, a careful inspection must be conducted into the alleged violations by Judge Chinn. The allegations are as follows:

1. Ticket Fixing

It is alleged that Judge Chinn engaged in a practice of fixing tickets, thereby dismissing the charges without a hearing on the merits. This practice was carried out with the use of a "consideration docket." Although this "consideration docket" was already in place when Judge Chinn came to the bench, he continued its use. After a citation was issued, an offender could call the justice court office and give some sort of excuse for getting the ticket. If the clerk or, in a few instances, Judge Chinn himself, felt that the case deserved consideration, it would be put on the consideration docket. The consideration docket was mostly comprised of speeding violations and non-moving violations, i.e., expired inspection stickers or license tags. In many instances, one ticketed for an expired license, inspection sticker, or tag, would be able to present proof to the clerk that the violation was corrected, enabling them to be put on the consideration docket. The result would be that the charge would be dismissed without a trial.

Initially the county attorney, Philip Nelson, would make the motion to dismiss before the court. However, Nelson began to feel that the judge was not performing a sufficient inquiry into the circumstances of each "consideration" ticket and voiced his objection to Judge Chinn. After Judge Chinn disregarded Nelson's standing objection, Nelson found himself saying, "you do what you want to do, judge." On 18 occasions, the judge made the motion to dismiss the charges himself, rather than the county attorney initiating the motion. This procedure was confirmed by the county attorney and several court clerks. No trials were ever conducted before the charges were dropped, and it was customary to write "not guilty" on the ticket instead of "dismissed". This led to much confusion because the ticket was labeled "not guilty", giving the appearance that there had been a hearing, when in fact the judge had dismissed the case.

These dismissals caused confusion and problems with highway patrolmen, because they would appear in court unaware that the charges had been dismissed. Other times, they would not be subpoenaed to appear when other charges were being adjudicated or dismissed. The consideration docket was usually "adjudicated" at the end of the regular court session, after everyone had left except the clerk, judge, and the county attorney. In one instance, Highway Patrolman Hillary Davis, Jr. asked Judge Chinn if any more cases were to be heard that day, as Officer Davis was still expecting to testify as to a speeding ticket he had written to a motorist. Judge Chinn told the patrolman that there were no more cases to be heard that day. Upon the...