Mitcheltree v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 21 May 1971
• Citation: 17 Cal.App.3d 791,95 Cal.Rptr. 76
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: J. MICHELTREE and Palisades Del Rey Property Owners Association, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal Corporation, and Los Angeles City Planning Commission, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 36491.

Page 76

95 Cal.Rptr. 76

17 Cal.App.3d 791

J. MICHELTREE and Palisades Del Rey Property Owners Association, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal Corporation, and Los Angeles City Planning Commission, Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 36491.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

May 21, 1971.

Hearing Denied Aug. 18, 1971.

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., James A. Doherty and Claude E. Hilker, Asst. City Attys., and Jerome Montgomery, Deputy City Atty., for appellants.

Thorpe, Sullivan, Clinnin & Workman and Vincent W. Thorpe, Los Angeles, for respondents.

LILLIE, Associate Justice.

In June of 1968 defendant City, through its Department of Airports, filed with defendant Planning Commission an application for a conditional use permit pursuant to the provisions of section 12.24, Los Angeles Municipal Code, which would authorize the construction of hangars (assertedly 10 stories in height to accommodate jet planes) and other commercial buildings on residentially zoned hand adjacent to plaintiffs' homes. After a hearing, defendant Commission approved the conditional use, and plaintiffs thereafter exhausted their administrative remedies; they then sought a peremptory writ of mandate commanding defendant Commission to set aside its decision in the proceeding. The trial court ordered the writ to issue, and defendants have appealed from the judgment.

The basis of the court's decision was that defendant Commission had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and failed to proceed in the manner required by law (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5(b)); more specifically, at the time of the approval of the conditional use there was no approved land use plan for the property involved and, therefore, no adequate legislative standard which the Commission could, and did, consider as required by section 12.24--B.1 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC). ¹ In that regard the court found that 'An essential element of the 'various elements and objectives of the Master Plan' * * * is a community or other land use plan element setting forth proposed land uses.' (No. 5.) It also made the following findings (Nos. 8, 9): 'As there was, at the time of the approval of this conditional use no adopted land use plan, for the property involved, there existed no adequate legislative standard to guide the actions of the City Planning Commission, when acting in its administrative capacity.' And, 'By virtue of the absence of an approved land use plan for the property subject to this conditional use application, Respondent Commission failed to proceed in the manner required by law, i.e., Respondent Commission at the time of its decision, did not have and consider sufficient standards as required by Los Angeles Municipal Code § 12.24--B.1 and by the Constitutions of the State of California and the United States.' ²

Preliminarily, we dispose of respondents' first contention that since the foregoing findings (Nos. 8, 9) were 'proposed' by defendants and adopted by the court, they now have no standing to assign error thereto. Cited is Smith v. Royal Mfg. Co., 185 Cal.App.2d 315, 8 Cal.Rptr. 417, which holds that a party cannot challenge a finding of fact which he himself proposed; in such circumstances the party must abide by the consequences of his own act and may not seek a reversal of his own error, committed or invited. Accordingly, the doctrine of invited error was there applied despite appellants' argument (referred to in the opinion) that to do so penalizes a party unjustly if given strict application. In the instant case the two instructions were not 'proposed' by the defendants in the fashion found in Smith. Rather, it appears that the trial court was aware of the necessity of 'spelling out' the basis of its decision; that thereafter defendants submitted as 'counterfindings' the two findings hereinabove quoted 'without waiving the objection that in some respects they are not supported by the evidence'; that in due course they were incorporated with other findings (and conclusions of law) signed by the court and constituting, in final form, the exact grounds upon which the judgment was based. Further corroborative of the conclusion that defendants did not invite the error asserted on appeal is this signed notation (limited in scope) at the bottom of the last page of the several findings and conclusions: 'APPROVED AS TO FORM: Jerome Montgomery, Deputy City Attorney.' The procedure here followed is not novel but almost commonplace in litigation demanding considerable exactitude of language involving complex problems. Certainly it cannot be properly urged that defendants, having thus assisted the court in 'spelling out' the reasons for its decisions, should be foreclosed from asserting that such reasons were erroneously formulated.

Further on the subject of findings, we also preliminarily point out that except for the narrow issue raised by this appeal, the trial court found against plaintiffs on the several other contentions alleged in their pleadings and litigated below. Thus, there were findings that the petitioning property owners received reasonable notice, as required by law, of the hearing thereafter held by defendant Commission; that except for its failure to follow any established standards, defendant Commission accorded plaintiffs a fair hearing; that the administrative record (received in evidence) contains substantial evidence that the proposed location will be desirable to the public convenience or welfare; that except for the lack of any adequate standards referred to in findings Nos. 8 and 9, Supra, the standards established by section 12.24--B.1 for conditional use are not unconstitutionally vague, uncertain or arbitrary; that except as found in Nos. 8 and 9, defendant Commission's findings are adequate.

At the threshold, both sides point out that the permit was for a conditional use, not a variance. 'A conditional use may be permitted if it is shown that its use is essential or desirable to the public convenience or welfare and at the same time that it will not impair the integrity and character of the zoned district.' (Tustin Heights Assn. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 170 Cal.App.2d 619, 626, 339 P.2d 914, 919.) In other words, say respondents, a conditional use should be compatible with the zoned district; accordingly, they argue, there is no compatibility between a 10-story Boeing hanger and a single-family neighborhood the inherent beauty of which is not challenged. While other areas of the city had comprehensive land use plans, absent a land use element in the Master Plan (referred to in LAMC as 'General Plan') governing the particular area here involved, it assertedly follows (and the court so found) that the commission acted in excess of its authority. Inherent in such claims and determination is a reliance upon the settled proposition that a Legislature cannot validly delegate to an administrative agency unbridled authority and, to avoid such result, the delegating statute necessarily must establish an ascertainable standard to guide the administrative body. In the present case the court rendered its judgment in December of 1969; two months later (February of 1970) another division of this court filed its opinion in Stoddard v. Edelman, 4 Cal.App.3d 544, 84 Cal.Rptr. 443, and the Supreme Court thereafter denied a hearing. Since it likewise involved (almost contemporaneously) ³ the same ordinance and, therefore, the same issues here raised, Stoddard must be deemed dispositive of the instant appeal. (Though discussed in appellants' brief, significantly respondents make no mention thereof in their reply thereto.)

The conditional use permit in Stoddard was for the construction and use of a...