Stoddard v. Edelman

• Decision Date: 18 February 1970
• Citation: 4 Cal.App.3d 544,84 Cal.Rptr. 443
• Parties: Thomas STODDARD, et al., Petitioners and Appellants, v. Edmund D. EDELMAN, et al., Defendants and Respondents; CALIFORNIA FIRST NATIONAL REALTY AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, a corporation, et al., Real Parties in Interest. Civ. 33790.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 443

84 Cal.Rptr. 443

4 Cal.App.3d 544

Thomas STODDARD, et al., Petitioners and Appellants, v. Edmund D. EDELMAN, et al., Defendants and Respondents CALIFORNIA FIRST NATIONAL REALTY AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, a corporation, et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Civ. 33790.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Feb. 18, 1970.

Hearing Denied April 15, 1970.

Martin & Flandrick, San Marino, for appellants.

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones, Claude E. Hilker, Asst. City Attys., Jerome Montgomery, Deputy City Atty., for respondents.

Macfarlane, Schaefer & Haun, and Jeremy V. Wisot, Los Angeles, for real parties in interest.

KAUS, Presiding Justice.

This is an appeal from a superior court judgment denying a writ of mandate (Code Civ.Proc. § 1094.5) by which petitioners sought to obtain a judgment ordering rescission of a zoning resolution adopted by the City Council of Los Angeles. The resolution granted California First National Realty and Construction Corporation (First National) a conditional use permit for the contruction and use of a religious synagogue in West Los Angeles. Petitioners are a group of persons owing parcels of real property near the site proposed for the synagogue. Respondents consist of First National, the City of Los Angeles, the fifteen members of the city council as that body was constituted when it adopted the subject resolution, and Sephardic Temple Tiferth Israel (the Temple). First National and the Temple are the real parties in interest.

The facts precipitating the controversy are stipulated and can be recounted briefly. Before June 1967, First National contracted to sell certain property to the Temple. A condition precedent to the closing of escrow was the issuance of a conditional use permit allowing construction and use of a religious synagogue on the property. In order to satisfy the condition First National, on June 29, 1967, applied to the city zoning administrator for the permit. After a hearing the administrator, on August 17, denied the application. An appeal was taken to the city board of zoning adjustments. On October 3 the board affirmed the decision of the administrator. First National filed a second appeal on October 11, 1967, this time to the city council. The council referred the matter to its planning committee, which conducted a hearing and advised the council to grant the permit subject to certain conditions which it recommended. On January 3, 1968, the council held its own hearing, at which spokesmen from both points of view were heard. It 'granted' the appeal, subject to the recommended conditions. The vote adopting the resolution was 12 to 1. ¹

On March 13, 1968, the Temple acquired title to the property from First National.

On appeal petitioners advance eight reasons why the action of the city council should be set aside. We have found none of them persuasive.

I. STANDARDS.

Petitioners argue in the alternative that the standards of the Los Angeles Municipal Code ('LAMC'), governing the issuance of conditional use permits, are either so vague as to constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, or should be judicially construed to be more exacting than a literal reading of the zoning ordinance would indicate.

With respect to the first prong of petitioners' contention, it is true that a Legislature's delegation of unbridled discretion to an administrative agency is invalid, and that to avoid such a result it is necessary that the delegating statute establish an ascertainable standard to guide the administrative body. (State Board of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 436, 448, 254 P.2d 29; Kugler v. Yocum (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371, 375--377, 71 Cal.Rptr. 687, 445 P.2d 303.) We recognize also that the doctrine applies where the legislative body of a city attempts to delegate its lawmaking functions. (Kugler v. Yocum, Supra, 69 Cal.2d 371, 375, 71 Cal.Rptr. 687, 445 P.2d 303; cf. City of Redwood City v. Moore (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 563, 576, 42 Cal.Rptr. 72.) Furthermore, as a matter of state statutory law, the zoning administrator and board of zoning adjustment can issue conditional use permits only if the local zoning ordinance has established 'criteria for determining such matters.' (Gov.Code, § 65901.) But standards for issuing conditional use permits which, under the ordinances of California cities, vary from general to specific, have almost uniformly been judicially approved. (California Zoning Practice, §§ 7.67--7.71, pp. 302--307, (CalC.E.B. (1969).) The standard set by the Los Angeles Municipal Code is a 'general welfare standard.' (Id., § 7.70, pp. 305--306.) The code provides that the zoning administrator may issue a conditional use permit '* * * if he finds that the proposed location will be desirable to the public convenience or welfare and will be in harmony with the various elements and objectives of the Master Plan.' (LAMC § 12.24--C.1.5.) At least two courts have squarely held that this ordinance is not too vague to be valid. (Case v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 36, 42, 32 Cal.Rptr. 271; Wheeler v. Gregg (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 348, 362--363, 203 P.2d 37.) The Supreme Court sustained an even broader standard in a case involving San Francisco's building permit ordinance. (City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal2d 236, 249--250, 1 Cal.Rptr. 158, 347 P.2d 294.) ² Against this background it is clear that petitioners' argument must fail. Since we hold that the criteria for determining an application for a conditional use permit are constitutionally adequate, it is unnecessary to consider the additional standards--and thus the further required findings--proposed by petitioners for the purpose of 'saving' the ordinance from the opprobrium of unconstitutionality. The only ultimate finding which the ordinance required the city council to make, therefore, is that the proposed use of the subject property satisfy the standards established by Los Angeles Municipal Code section 12.24--C.1.5.

II. FINDINGS.

Petitioners claim that the findings contained in the city council's resolution were inadequate to support the issuance of the conditional use permit.

There is some authority for holding that no particularized findings are necessary at all, since the court will imply from the council's action that it found the requisite facts to support its action. (Wheeler v. Gregg, supra, 90 Cal.App.2d 348, 360, 203 P.2d 37.) However, the municipal code requires that a city council resolution which reverses or modifies a determination of the board of zoning adjustments must '* * * contain a finding of fact showing wherein the proposed Conditional Use meets or fails to meet the requirements of Section 12.24. * * *' (LAMC, § 12.28--A9(c).) Further, the recent decision of our Supreme Court in Broadway, Laguna, etc. Assn. v. Board of Permit Appeals (1967) 66 Cal.2d 767, 773, 59 Cal.Rptr. 146, 427 P.2d 810, teaches that we may not rely upon the presumption that an administrative agency made sufficient factual findings to support its action where, as here, an ordinance enjoins the agency to state those findings expressly. (See also Robison v. City of Oakland (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 269, 273--274, 74 Cal.Rptr. 17.) Therefore, this court must examine the city council resolution to determine if the reasons given for issuing the conditional use permit are relevant and adequate. (Cf. Broadway, Laguna, etc. Assn. v. Board of Permit Appeals, supra, 66 Cal.2d 767, 773--781, 59 Cal.Rptr. 146, 427 P.2d 810; Hamilton v. Board of Supervisors (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 64, 67--68, 75 Cal.Rptr. 106.)

The council resolution contains several specific findings, ³ from which the counsel concluded '* * * that the location of the property for the herein authorized purposes will be desirable to the public convenience and welfare and such will be in harmony with the various elements and objectives of the City's Master Plan * * *.' As noted above this is the standard established by the municipal code. (LAMC, § 12.24--C.1.5.) The question is whether the findings support the conclusion. We think they do. The council found that a religious institution best serves a community when it is located where its patrons are likely to reside. This can be seen as a reason for concluding that the location of the temple in the contemplated residential area is 'desirable to the public convenience or welfare.' Also supporting the public convenience and welfare criterion is the finding that the frontage facade will be 'more attractive in appearance than that which presently exists in the R3 developed surrounding lots.' In addition, several of the findings demonstrate that the grant will be 'in harmony with the various * * * objectives of the Master Plan,' as these are set forth in section 12.02 of the Municipal Code. ⁴ At least two findings are to the effect that property values in the area will not be jeopardized by the conditional use. The council resolution notes that the board of zoning adjustment refused to grant the permit mainly because it feared the conditional use would create a precedent for more intensive use of property in the area. The council determined that no such danger existed. It found that numerous churches, schools and other conditional uses have been established in residential areas without creating any such precedent. Another finding was that the modest height of the temple--only three stories--would preserve adequate open space for light and air in the neighborhood. Finally, there is a determination that less traffic congestion will be caused by the temple than would be generated by residential uses permitted as a matter of right, since the temple would be in use primarily during weekends and because the parking facilities far exceed those required by ordinance.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

Our inquiry at this point is limited, as it was in the trial court (Code Civ.Proc. §...