Mobile County Republican Executive Committee v. Mandeville

• Decision Date: 23 October 1978
• Parties: The MOBILE COUNTY REPUBLICAN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE et al. v. John E. MANDEVILLE, as Clerk, etc., et al. 77-789.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 754

363 So.2d 754

The MOBILE COUNTY REPUBLICAN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE et al. v. John E. MANDEVILLE, as Clerk, etc., et al.

77-789.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Oct. 23, 1978.

William W. Stoudenmire, Charles S. White-Spunner, Jr., Michael A. Wermuth, Mobile, J. B. Sessions, III, Russellville, for appellants.

Maury Friedlander of Marr & Friedlander, Mobile, for appellees, John E. Mandeville, as Clerk of the Circuit Court, Mobile County, Ala. and John L. Moore, as Judge of Probate, Mobile County, Ala.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal was taken from a September 13, 1978, order of the circuit court in a declaratory judgment action brought by the Mobile County Republican Executive Committee and its chairman against the appointing board established by § 17-6-1, Code of Alabama 1975. The appointing board consists of the Sheriff, Probate Judge and the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama. As provided in § 17-6-3, Code of Alabama 1975, the defendant, Tom Purvis, Sheriff of Mobile County, was unable to serve as an appointing board member because he was a candidate for renomination to that office in the September 5, 1978, Democratic Primary Election. Jeff C. Mims was named to serve on the appointing board in Sheriff Purvis's absence as provided in § 17-6-4, Code of Alabama 1975, and was made a party defendant in this action.

The Republican Executive Committee contends that it submitted a list of suggested election officers for the primary election as allowed by § 17-16-17, Code of Alabama 1975; and that the appointing board failed, neglected or refused to consider this list in the appointment of election officers. It contends that Alabama law requires the appointing board to name election officers for primary elections from lists provided by the respective political party executive committees and in equal proportion to the number of political parties participating in the primary election.

§ 17-16-17 controls this issue as it relates to the appointment of election officers in primary elections. This statute provides:

"Each candidate for nomination may, at least 25 days before the primary, present to the county executive committee of his party a list of election officers desired by him for any one or more of the districts, wards or precincts, and his county committee shall, so far as practicable, make up, from the list so presented to it, a list of names of election officers, six in number, for each district, ward or precinct, which it will nominate to the appointing board of the county for appointment as officers to conduct the primary election. The county committee shall present the list so made up by it to the appointing board of the county which appoints the election officers to conduct elections for state and county officers in November, or at any other lawful time, which appointing board, from the list so presented to it by the county committee, shall, if there be on said list the names of sufficient persons who are legally eligible, select and appoint the officers to conduct the primary election, observing the above rule as to representation wherever more than one party enters the primary; and, in the latter case, if a county committee has not given a sufficient number of names for a box, then the appointing board shall supply the deficiency from electors of that party. In the event the persons selected as officers fail to appear at the polling place on the day of the primary election at least one hour before the polls are scheduled to open, then their places shall be filled by such of those who have been named by such appointing board as do appear; and, in the event none so named appear by then, the voters present and qualified to participate in such primary election may, from among themselves, select officers to conduct such election in such district or precinct, and such substituted persons shall have the authority to conduct such elections and to be paid for their service in the same manner as if they had been originally appointed. All officers serving in such primary elections shall take the same oath required to be taken by officers of regular state elections and shall be subject to the same restrictions, limitations, penalties and conditions."

The trial court held that § 17-16-17 was directory only and did not require the appointing board to appoint election officers in equal proportions from the lists submitted by the county executive committees. The trial court held, in part, that:

". . . the appointing board, and their successors in office, shall give due consideration to each such list so presented to it, and in choosing the election officials at any primary or general election, exercise its discretion as to the selection of such election officers . . . ."

We affirm, but disagree with the trial court that § 17-16-17 controls the appointment of election officers who serve in general elections.

§ 17-16-17 admonishes the appointing board to appoint the election officers while ". . . observing the above rule as to representation wherever more than one (political) party enters the primary . . . ." The statute, however, is devoid of any rule to which this language can refer, as the trial court observed.

The Republican Executive Committee concedes, in brief, that this statute is ambiguous and subject to a number of interpretations; but asserts that if properly construed, the statute would mandate that appointments of election officers in primary elections be equally divided between candidates submitted by each political party participating in that primary.

Of course, when the plain meaning of a statute can be gleaned from its words, it should be so construed. State v. Commercial Loan Co., 251 Ala. 672, 38 So.2d 571 (1949); Van Houtan v. Black, 191 Ala. 168, 67 So. 1008 (1915). But where, because of ambiguous language or otherwise, the meaning is not clear on the face of the statute, we must determine its meaning. To accomplish this, courts frequently and properly look to the legislative purpose in enacting the legislation. State v. Union Tank Car Co., 281 Ala. 246, 201 So.2d 402 (1967).

One of the stated legislative purposes of § 17-16-17 is ". . . to allow candidates to nominate election officers . . . ." See Preamble, Act No. 1196, 1975 Acts of Alabama, approved October 10, 1975, Vol. IV, page 2349 (predecessor to § 17-16-17).

The legislature's method of accomplishing this purpose is by allowing candidates to nominate prospective election officers through their...