Money v. Krall
Decision Date | 01 February 1982 |
Docket Number | Cr. 5742,Nos. C,s. C |
Citation | 128 Cal.App.3d 378,180 Cal.Rptr. 376 |
Parties | Christopher G. MONEY, as District Attorney, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. Keith Clayton KRALL, Objector and Appellant. In re Keith Clayton Krall on Habeas Corpus. iv. 6096 and |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Appellant Keith Clayton Krall was civilly committed to the Department of Developmental Services on November 3, 1980, pursuant to a court finding that he was mentally retarded and dangerous to others. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 6500 et seq.) At the hearing in superior court, appellant's counsel stipulated that appellant was dangerous to others but denied that appellant was mentally retarded within the meaning of the statutes. In this proceeding, appellant argues that Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500 1 is unconstitutionally vague for failure to define "mentally retarded" persons, and that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that he is mentally retarded. After careful consideration of appellant's arguments and the record, we uphold the constitutionality of the statute and the finding of the trial court.
On September 25, 1980, the district attorney of San Luis Obispo County filed a petition to commit appellant to the Department of Developmental Services. The petition incorporated several medical reports and requested judicial notice of all other reports in superior court action numbers 15867 and 2869; the petition also requested appointment of the public defender to represent appellant pursuant to section 6500.
On October 15, 1980, a letter was filed by Mr. James R. Teigen of the Tri-Counties Regional Center for the Developmentally Disabled in response to the trial court's request under section 6504.5. Letters from Doctors Mosman and Bramwell, appointed under section 6507 and Evidence Code section 730, were received on October 20. Appellant appeared with the public defender at the hearing on the petition on October 21, 1980, and opposed the commitment. At the hearing, counsel for appellant stipulated that appellant is a danger to others; Doctors Bramwell, Mosman and Sharpe testified on the issue of mental retardation. After hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, the court found true beyond a reasonable doubt the allegations of the petition that appellant was a mentally retarded person and a danger to himself or others within section 6500; findings of fact and conclusions of law, and a formal order committing appellant to the Department of Developmental Services were filed.
According to the medical reports filed with the superior court and the testimony of Doctors Bramwell, Mosman and Sharpe, Keith Clayton Krall was 23 years old at the time of the instant commitment and had been confined continuously in state hospitals since March 1971. The September 15, 1980, report of Craig C. Rath, Ph.D., staff psychologist at Patton State Hospital, provides this background information:
Further details of appellant's prior behavior are provided in the written report of Dr. Bill E. Mosman, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist who interviewed appellant on October 10, 1980:
As indicated in the report of Dr. Rath, appellant, first committed under section 6500 in September 1979, was initially placed at Camarillo State Hospital. Thereafter, appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus requesting a less restrictive placement and, by agreement of the court, appellant and the Department of Developmental Services, appellant was transferred to Patton State Hospital in January 1980. Hospital records from both Camarillo and Patton indicate that appellant continued on many occasions to be verbally, physically and sexually assaultive.
Appellant has been the subject of psychological tests and evaluations for 18 years. Dr. Mosman noted that appellant's IQ has generally been in the 69 to 81 range, depending on his age and the test given. Dr. Mosman wrote: "There appears to be consistent agreement that his full-scale intelligence has been in the area of 80 to 83, that he has had some splinter skills higher than that, and certainly has had some splinter skills much lower than that."
However, there has been no "consistent agreement" regarding the proper diagnosis of appellant's mental condition, as illustrated by Dr. Rath's summary:
"8-66--Chronic Brain Syndrome with Behavioral Reaction (19.43)
6-71--Unsocialized Aggressive Reaction of Childhood (308.4) with Borderline Mental Retardation (310.4)
6-71--Paranoid Schizophrenia (295.30) with Organic Brain Syndrome and Mild Mental Retardation.
4-72--Paranoid personality (301.07) with [non] Psychotic Organic Brain Syndrome and Ganser Syndrome.
10-74--Paranoid Schizophrenia (295.30) with Organic Brain Syndrome and mental retardation.
6-75--Paranoid Personality (301.07); Non-psychotic Organic Brain Syndrome (309.20); Pedophilia (302.20[)] and Aggressive Sexuality (302.80).
2-76--Paranoid Personality (301.07); Non-psychotic Organic Brain Syndrome (309.20); Pedophilia (302.20); Aggressive Sexuality (302.80[)] and Chronic Undifferentiated Schizophrenia (295.90).
1-77--Paranoid Schizophrenia (295.30) with borderline I.Q.
12-77--Mental Retardation (789.00); Pedophilia (302.20) and Aggressive Sexuality (302.80).
10-79--Mental Retardation, not further...
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...such appeals due to technical mootness so that the important issues presented do not evade review. (E.g., Money v. Krall (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 378, 392, 180 Cal.Rptr. 376.) 5. As noted in part 2A, both documents were initially submitted as confidential. On appeal, both sides cite to the rep......
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