Monigold, In re

• Decision Date: 14 November 1988
• Docket Number: No. G006375,G006375
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re Roger J. MONIGOLD, on Habeas Corpus.

Page 120

253 Cal.Rptr. 120

205 Cal.App.3d 1224

In re Roger J. MONIGOLD, on Habeas Corpus.

No. G006375.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.

Nov. 14, 1988.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 13, 1988.

Review Denied Feb. 16, 1989.

[205 Cal.App.3d 1225] Harley & McDermott and Robison D. Harley, Santa Ana, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for petitioner.

[205 Cal.App.3d 1226] John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert B. Shaw and Keith I. Motley, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

OPINION

CROSBY, Associate Justice.

Petitioner Roger Monigold is a state prison inmate serving an indeterminate term of 15 years to life for second degree murder, plus a determinate term of two years for use of a firearm. He seeks relief from the Board of Prison Terms' order recalculating and postponing his Minimum Eligible Parole Date (MEPD) when the board determined four years after the fact that he was ineligible for day-for-day worktime credit.

I

Monigold was sentenced in 1980, and his original MEPD was set in 1992. It was later reduced somewhat when the Court of Appeal held he was entitled to credit on the determinate enhancement as well as the indeterminate life sentence. (In re Monigold (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 485, 188 Cal.Rptr. 698.) In January 1983, Penal Code section 2933 ¹ was enacted, allowing day-for-day worktime credits. The Department of Corrections advised Monigold of his eligibility for the program. He was already in a work program, and he signed a waiver form giving up his right to continue to be treated under a considerably less restrictive one day-for-two days conduct credit scheme in order to obtain day-for-day credit. Monigold's application was formally accepted by the department. His MEPD was recalculated accordingly, reflecting a cut of some 26 months; and his first parole hearing date was scheduled for 1988.

In April 1987, after accumulating one-for-one worktime credits for more than four years, Monigold was informed the department erred in allowing his participation in the worktime credit program. The Attorney General concluded in March 1987 that state prisoners serving indeterminate sentences of 15 years to life, 25 years to life, or life with the possibility of parole are ineligible for worktime credits under Penal Code section 2933. (70 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 49 (1987).)

The Attorney General's opinion required reversal of the department's earlier directive allowing petitioner and other "lifers" the opportunity to earn one-for-one worktime credits. After revocation of his earned worktime credits and recalculation of his MEPD with good behavior credits under Penal Code section 2933, Monigold's first parole hearing was rescheduled for 1990. His MEPD had been April 8, 1989; it is now June 6, 1991. We issued an order to show cause to review the merits of the Attorney General's opinion and to determine whether the state should be equitably estopped from reversing its earlier directive and recalculating Monigold's MEPD and rescheduling his first parole hearing.

II

As the Attorney General's opinion explained, "In 1982 the Legislature substantially revised the system of credits to reduce prison sentences. (Statutes of 1982, ch. 1234.) Sections 2930 and 2931 were amended to phase out the use of good behavior and participation credits not to exceed one-third the sentence by limiting its application to those whose crimes were committed prior to January 1, 1983. Section 2933 was added to provide 'worktime credits' for a prisoner's performance in work assignments and educational programs. The sentence is reduced one day for each day of such performance." (70 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 49, supra.) Section 2933, however, is expressly applicable only to those prisoners sentenced to determinate terms under Penal Code section 1170. (Id., at p. 50.) It does not cover persons such as Monigold who are serving indeterminate terms and were not sentenced under Penal Code section 1170. (Id., at p. 57.) ²

The Attorney General's opinion is entitled to great weight (Stockton Newspapers, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 95, 101, fn. 2, 214 Cal.Rptr. 561), and we concur with his analysis. It is supported by the plain language of Penal Code section 2933: Monigold was not, and is not, eligible for worktime credits per that section. Monigold's argument that life prisoners are denied equal protection of the law is meritless (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530, 159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549 [alleged impermissible "classification [must] affect[ ] two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner"] ), as is his claim that he is somehow serving a determinate sentence. (In re Quinn (1945) 25 Cal.2d 799, 800-801, 154 P.2d 875.) Monigold raises several other contentions of the same sort in his traverse. Because they are beyond the scope of our order to show cause, we decline to address them.

III

Despite our agreement with the Attorney General's opinion that prisoners serving indeterminate sentences are not entitled to the benefits of Penal Code section 2933, we are concerned with the fairness of its retroactive application to petitioner, who participated in a worktime credit program for more than four years with the express understanding that such participation would guarantee an earlier MEPD and parole hearing. Consequently, we invited the parties to brief the question of whether the government ought to be equitably estopped from recalculating petitioner's MEPD and initial parole hearing date.

The parties agree that three of the four elements of equitable estoppel are present: ³ The government was apprised of the facts; it intended petitioner to enter the worktime credit program when it was offered to him; and petitioner was ignorant of his ineligibility for that program. However, the Attorney General asserts petitioner cannot estop the state from revoking earned worktime credits because he did not rely upon its misrepresentations to his injury. (See generally Strong v. County of Santa Cruz (1975) 15 Cal.3d 720, 725, 125 Cal.Rptr. 896, 543 P.2d 264; City of Long Beach v. Mansell, supra, 3 Cal.3d 462, 489, 91 Cal.Rptr. 23, 476 P.2d 423.)

Thus, the sole question we must resolve is whether Monigold suffered a detriment in reliance on the work credits offered to him. The standard to be applied is the following: "Is the injustice which would result from a failure to raise an equitable estoppel against the [government] ... of sufficient dimension to justify the effect upon public interest or policy which will result from the raising of such an estoppel?" (City of Long Beach v. Mansell, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 499, 91 Cal.Rptr. 23, 476 P.2d 423.) It is also the rule that "[e]stoppel will not ordinarily lie against a governmental agency if the result will be the frustration of a strong public policy. [Citations.]" (Bib'le v. Committee of Bar Examiners (1980) 26 Cal.3d 548, 553, 162 Cal.Rptr. 426, 606 P.2d 733.)

Monigold contends several facts support his claim of injury and injustice. Most importantly, he complains recomputation of his MEPD delayed his initial hearing date and minimum potential parole date more than two years. The Attorney General replies those computations have little to do with petitioner's actual probable release date. He tells us that of the 54 inmates who improperly received early parole consideration under the erroneous interpretation of Penal Code section 2933, only four obtained parole dates at their respective hearings. And none was given a term, which after application of credits, would have caused release before the 10-year minimum release date for second degree murder. (Pen.Code, §§ 190, 2931.) In effect, the Attorney General contends petitioner cannot demonstrate he would be released earlier even if he were given the Penal Code section 2933 worktime credits. He is eligible for release at the discretion of the Board of Prison Terms, although his participation in the section 2933 program, with or without a guarantee of credits, will undoubtedly help him in his bid for parole.

Parenthetically, we note Monigold does not contend he would not have worked but for the promise of worktime credits. Indeed, he worked before enrolling in the Penal Code section 2933 program in 1983 in anticipation of one-for-two conduct credit and apparently continues to work. But the terms and conditions of the two programs are considerably different. In his traverse Monigold emphasizes this point: Specific rules which accompany the worktime program have caused him injury. For example, the Penal Code section 2933 program involves more rigid working hours and a requirement of full-time work, less time off for personal reasons, fewer opportunities to see visitors and make telephone calls, reduced canteen privileges, and a greater maximum credit loss in the event of a rule violation.

The Attorney General complains of the lateness of these factual assertions, disputes the accuracy of some, and downplays the importance of others. We believe alleged differences in the two credit programs were adequately raised in Monigold's original petition, but will not find it necessary to consider in any detail whether they alone demonstrate detriment sufficient to invoke the application of equitable estoppel.

In our view, the loss of an earlier MEPD and an earlier first parole hearing, without more, amounts to sufficient detriment when balanced against the competing potential harm to the public interest; and estoppel should be applied. We might possibly agree in other contexts that a showing of detrimental reliance comparable to what Monigold produced would be inadequate. But prisoner cases are somewhat unique: Of all persons, perhaps, society is less justified in breaking faith with those it has deprived of their freedom. We treat here with an incarcerated individual whose life must be lived under demanding circumstances in precise conformance with the rules...