Moody v. Peyton

• Citation: 36 S.W. 621,135 Mo. 482
• Parties: Moody et al. v. Peyton et al., Appellants
• Decision Date: 07 October 1896
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

36 S.W. 621

135 Mo. 482

Moody et al. v. Peyton et al., Appellants

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

October 7, 1896

Appeal from Cass Circuit Court. -- Hon. W. W. Wood, Judge.

Affirmed.

Burney & Burney and Noah M. Givan for appellants.

(1) The probate court has not equitable or chancery jurisdiction, and could not, and did not, adjudicate the question of plaintiffs' right to enforce a vendor's lien to the property in controversy. Ross v. Julian, 70 Mo. 209; Church v. McElhinney, 61 Mo. 540; Church v Roberson, 71 Mo. 326; Patterson v. Booth, 103 Mo. 402; Boston v. Murray, 94 Mo. 175; In re Elliott v. Wilson, 27 Mo.App. 218; Butler v Lawson, 72 Mo. 244; State ex rel. v. Jones, 53 Mo.App. 207; Owens v. Link, 48 Mo.App. 534; 1 Woerner's Law of Administration, sec. 149. (2) Plaintiffs' plea of res adjudicata is not good, in that it does not allege that the judgment of the probate court was rendered upon the same identical matters now in litigation. Dickey v. Heim, 48 Mo.App. 114; 3 Chitty's Pleading, 929; 2 Van Fleet's Former Adjudications, p 1327; Cutler v. Cox, 2 Blackf. 178; 18 Am. Dec. 152; State ex rel. v. Page, 63 Ind. 209; Secor v. Sturgis, 16 N.Y. 548; Smith v. Sherwood, 4 Conn. 276; Abbey v. Goodwin, 7 Conn. 377. Nor that the court had jurisdiction of the matters involved in this suit. Judgment does not conclude matters over which no jurisdiction existed. 1 Van Fleet's Former Adj., p. 95; 1 Van Fleet's Coll. Attack, secs. 58-69; Embury v. Conner, 3 N.Y. 511; 55 Am. Dec. 325; State to use v. Brooke, 29 Mo.App. 286; authorities under point 1. Nor that the parties to the suit were identical. Wright v. Griffey, 147 Ill. 496; 37 Am. St. Rep. 228; Jones v. Vert, 121 Ind. 140; 16 Am. St. Rep. 379. (3) It is well settled that if the merits of the matters in dispute were not passed upon, the judgment is no bar to another action, and when the record does not affirmatively or positively show what was in issue, and also what was passed upon and determined, parol evidence may be resorted to. Even if the record shows what was in issue, but does not show what was passed upon and determined, parol evidence should be heard. Spradling v. Conway, 51 Mo. 54; Wells v. Moore, 49 Mo. 229; Wright v. Salisbury, 46 Mo. 26; Hickerson v. Mexico, 58 Mo. 65; St. Joseph v. Railroad, 116 Mo. 645; Snorgrass v. Moore, 30 Mo.App. 238; Welch v. Phillips, 16 Neb. 515; Althorp v. Beckwith, 14 Ill.App. 628; Kidd v. Laird, 15 Cal. 161; Carter v. Hannah, 2 Ind. 45; Smith v. Sherwood, 4 Conn. 276; Howard v. Kimbal, 65 Me. 308; Watts v. Watts, 160 Mass. 464. (4) The defendants, except administrators Blevins and Dolan, were not parties to the proceeding in the probate court; they are not privies to the administrators, and did not bear such a relation to them as to be bound by the result. 12 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 91; 21 same, pp. 142, 154; State v. Lineberger, 59 Pa. St. 313; Garnett v. Macon, 6 Call (Va.), 308, and citations; Armstrong v. Poppenheimer, 19 S.W. 520; Freeman on Judgments [3 Ed.], sec. 163; Cornwell v. Orton, 126 Mo. 355; Woerner on Administration, secs. 466, 579; Watts v. Taylor, 80 Va. 627; Curry v. Peebles, 83 Ala. 225; Platt v. Platt, 105 N.Y. 488; Ross v. Julian, 70 Mo. 209. (5) In order to bind a party on the score of privity, he must claim through or under a party to the action, and this claim must accrue by succession and after the institution of the action. Freeman on Judgments [3 Ed.], sec. 162; Henry v. Woods, 77 Mo. 281; Koontz v. Kauffman, 31 Mo.App. 397; 2 Black on Judgments, sec. 549.

J. H. Kyle and R. T. Railey for respondents.

(1) Upon this state of the record we insist that the judgment of the probate court was absolutely conclusive against these appellants as to the validity of respondents' claim against the said estate. The heirs, if dissatisfied with the allowance, had the right, under section 285 of the Revised Statutes of 1889, to appeal from said judgment of the probate court. That portion of the statute applicable to the heirs is as follows: "And the right of appeal herein provided for shall extend to any heir, devisee, legatee, creditor, or other person having an interest in the estate under administration." It is therefore contended that, as the same issues were presented in the probate court, which are presented here, not only are the administrators, but the heirs likewise, concluded by said judgment. Especially is this so, as the judgment of the probate court recites affirmatively upon its face that the evidence was heard as to the defenses set up by defendants' answer. Again we insist, that not only are the heirs and administrators bound by the proceeding, but as the real estate only descends to the heirs subject to the payment of debts, and as it stands admitted upon the face of this record that the estate is insolvent, outside of respondents' claim, the heirs can have no interest to be affected by this litigation. (2) Under the constitution and statutes of this state, original jurisdiction is conferred upon the probate court to hear and determine all demands against the estates of decedents. The probate court is a court of record under the laws of this state. Its proceedings, so far as the validity of allowance and classification of demands is concerned, are just as conclusive as that of the circuit court or supreme court. It is an elementary rule of law that everything is presumed to be within the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction, and wherever jurisdiction affirmatively appears upon the face of the record of an inferior court, the proceedings of the latter are just as conclusive as the judgment and proceedings of the circuit court or supreme court. State v. Evans, 83 Mo. 322, and cases cited; Jeffries v. Wright, 51 Mo. 215; Williams v. Mitchell, 112 Mo. 309; Lingo v. Burford, 112 Mo. 155; Leonard v. Sparks, 117 Mo. 116; Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 264; Noland v. Barrett, 112 Mo. 189; Macey v. Stark, 116 Mo. 494; Camden v. Plain, 91 Mo. 120; Colvin v. Six, 79 Mo. 200; Rogers v. Johnson, 125 Mo. 213. (3) Not only are the administrators, Dolan and Blevins, conclusively bound by the judgment of the probate court but the other defendants are equally bound. If the heirs were dissatisfied with the allowance, they had the right to appeal from the judgment of allowance to the circuit court, and there have the cause tried de novo. R. S. 1889, secs. 285, 286, 287, 288, and 292. The right of appeal on the part of the heirs, appears for the first time in the revisions of 1889, supra. See R. S. 1879, sec. 292. (4) The law is well settled in this state that the probate court in respect to the allowance and classification of demands against the estate of a decedent has ample jurisdiction, and its judgments thereon, in collateral proceedings, import the same absolute verity as do judgments of the circuit court. R. S. 1889, secs. 191, 3397; In re Estate of Elliott, 98 Mo. 384; Cooper v. Duncan, 20 Mo.App. 359, and cases cited; see, also, authorities cited under proposition 2 of this brief. Hoffman v. Hoffman's Ex'r, 126 Mo. 439.

OPINION

Sherwood, J.

Proceeding to enforce vendor's lien, on the following described property in Harrisonville, Missouri, to wit: The east half of blocks number 185 and 186, and ten feet off the north side of block number 193.

Plaintiff, as the guardian and curator of his son, by order of the probate court, and on his own behalf, sold the land aforesaid to Sarah E. Peyton for $ 4,000, $ 100 of which she paid down, and for the balance gave her promissory note, receiving in return a title bond and was placed in possession of the land, which she continued to occupy from June 1, 1891, till August of that year, when she died, and since that time the premises have been occupied by her children up to 1893, and since then her administrators have rented the same, such premises having been inventoried by such administrators as the property of Sarah E. Peyton's estate.

In 1892 the note aforesaid was allowed in the probate court of Cass county. On its presentation, however, for allowance, resistance thereto was made by the administrators, who filed a formal answer to the effect that Mrs. Peyton was, by reason of sickness and otherwise, incapable of making a contract at the time she contracted for the premises and gave her note therefor; that the adult plaintiff took advantage of her weakness and diseased condition and induced her to purchase the land and to sign the note therefor, and that the title to the land was invalid, etc.

To this answer a reply was filed and the probate court found the issues for the plaintiff in that suit, and allowed the note as already stated.

From this judgment of allowance the administrators appealed to the circuit court, where they dismissed their appeal in December, 1892, when the judgment of allowance was affirmed.

The answer of the administrators in the present proceeding is substantially the same as that filed in the probate court, and the children and heirs of Sarah E. Peyton also joined in said answer, in which defendants offered to rescind the contract and to surrender possession of the premises, etc.

The reply of plaintiffs to this answer was in substance the same as their former reply, and also pleaded as res judicata the judgment of allowance on the note in the probate court.

From the records of the probate court offered in evidence herein the following appeared: "The hour of 9 o'clock a. m. arrived, and come also plaintiffs and defendants by their attorneys, and the trial of this cause is resumed. The court having heard the evidence on behalf of defendants, introduced to sustain the issues in their answer; and considered plaintiffs' demurrer to the same, doth sustain said demurrer and order that demand of plaintiffs be allowed,...