Moore v. City of Easley

Decision Date05 October 1995
Docket NumberNo. 24455,24455
Citation472 S.E.2d 626,322 S.C. 455
PartiesJames Terry MOORE, Petitioner, v. CITY OF EASLEY, and State Workers' Compensation Fund, Respondents. . Heard
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

G. Edward Welmaker, of Acker, Welmaker & Johnson, Pickens, for Petitioner.

Amy V. Cofield, of Cofield and Pruitt, Anderson, Rose Mary McGregor, of State Workers' Compensation Fund, Columbia, for Respondents.

TOAL, Justice.

We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision reversing the circuit court's grant of workers' compensation benefits to Appellant James Terry Moore, who suffered an on-the-job attack of angina. See Moore v. City of Easley, Op. No. 94-UP-135 (filed April 26, 1994). Moore asks us to recognize angina as a compensable injury under South Carolina workers' compensation law. We hold that angina may be compensable when there exists a causal relationship between the angina and the claimant's subsequent inability to work, i.e., claimant's disability. However, because Moore's angina did not cause his disability, workers' compensation is inappropriate in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Claimant Moore was a police officer with the City of Easley. In November 1989, he suffered a massive myocardial infarct (heart attack) unrelated to his job. After the infarct, he had coronary double bypass surgery. He returned to work in February 1990.

On September 1, 1990, Moore was involved in a high-speed chase and arrest of robbery suspects. In the course of the arrest , he had to wrestle with one of the suspects in order to restrain him. 1 During this chain of events, Moore began experiencing serious chest pain. After reinforcements arrived and the situation was under control, Moore was taken to the hospital.

Ultimately, Moore's cardiologist, Dr. Ross, determined that Moore had suffered an episode of angina caused by his exertion during the high-speed chase and arrest. Importantly, however, Dr. Ross found that Moore suffered no "additional damage or insult to his heart or the heart muscle by reason of the events which occurred in September of 1990." Dr. Ross further testified that the attack of angina unmasked, rather than aggravated The evidence reveals that Moore developed clinical depression sometime after September 1, 1990. This depression became so severe that Moore was hospitalized for several days in December 1990. Dr. Cole, Moore's clinical psychologist, testified that the depression was brought on by a number of factors, including Moore's being told that he should never work as a police officer again, a sudden fear of death brought on by the September 1, 1990 incident, and his breakup with a girlfriend. A report from Marshall Pickens Hospital, where Moore had been hospitalized, stated Moore had endured several stressors recently: Specifically, Moore was "forced to retire due to this health problem and then found out that the woman he planned to marry backed out of the marriage."

Moore's heart condition. Dr. Ross advised Moore to retire from the police force.

When Moore filed for workers' compensation, the Hearing Officer denied benefits. The Hearing Officer found:

[A]lthough the Claimant appears to be disabled by reason of his heart condition with possible contributing psychological factors, ... his heart suffered no permanent injury or further insult as a result of the events alleged to have occurred on September 1, 1990, and ... his psychological problems did not result from the events of that night.

The entire Commission affirmed the decision of the hearing officer.

On appeal, the circuit court judge reversed the Commission's decision, relying on Nashville Livestock Commission v. Cox, 302 Ark. 69, 787 S.W.2d 664 (1990), a case in which the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that work-related angina constitutes a compensable injury under Arkansas workers' compensation law. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court in an unpublished opinion. See Moore v. City of Easley, Op. No. 94-UP-135 (filed April 26, 1994).

This Court granted Moore's petition for writ of certiorari.

LAW/ANALYSIS
A. ANGINA AS COMPENSABLE INJURY

The Commission found that Moore's heart suffered no permanent injury or further insult as a result of the events alleged to have occurred on September 1, 1990. Any review of this finding is governed by the substantial evidence standard. Smith v. Squires Timber Co., 311 S.C. 321, 428 S.E.2d 878 (1993). The "possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an Administrative Agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence." Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. South Carolina Public Serv. Comm'n, 282 S.C. 430, 432, 319 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1984). Rather, this Court need only find, considering the record as a whole, evidence that "would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached." Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 281 S.C. 201, 203, 314 S.E.2d 327, 328 (1984) (citations omitted). Furthermore, neither this Court nor the circuit court may substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florence Country Club, 282 S.C. 384, 318 S.E.2d 365 (1984).

As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, the Record in this case is replete with evidence that Moore did not suffer additional damage to his heart as a result of the arrest episode on September 1, 1990. Specifically, Dr. Ross found that Moore suffered no "additional damage or insult to his heart or the heart muscle by reason of the events which occurred in September of 1990." Dr. Ross further testified that the attack of angina unmasked, rather than aggravated, Moore's heart condition. According to the medical testimony in this case, by definition angina does not accelerate or aggravate an underlying heart disease. Angina merely constitutes a symptom of the underlying condition. This testimony constitutes substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings.

Moore argues, however, that there is no question that the angina itself (as opposed to any permanent damage to his heart) was caused by the events of September 1, 1990. He suggests that South Carolina should adopt the position taken by many jurisdictions that work-related angina should be considered In Crum v. General Adjustment Bureau, 738 F.2d 474, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit construed the federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, to allow compensation for disabilities caused by work-related angina. The claimant in Crum, an insurance claims adjuster with the General Adjustment Bureau, suffered chest pains while working. Over time, these pains increased in frequency, and his doctor advised him to quit his job if the chest pain did not cease. When the General Adjustment Bureau refused to move him into a position with less stress and fewer hours, the claimant retired. He then filed for compensation under the LHWCA. Crum, 738 F.2d at 476.

a compensable injury. See, e.g., Crum v. General Adjustment Bureau, 738 F.2d 474 (D.C.Cir.1984) (work-related angina constitutes "injury" under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); Nashville Livestock Comm'n v. Cox, 302 Ark. 69, 787 S.W.2d 664 (1990) (attack of angina pectoris may constitute an injury giving rise to compensation under the workers' compensation act); Allison v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 520 So.2d 1063 (La.Ct.App.1987) (angina pectoris can constitute "accident" under Louisiana's workers' compensation law); Borough of Folcroft v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 167 Pa.Cmwlth. 290, 647 A.2d 994 (1994) (affirming finding that claimant's disability was caused by work-related angina, notwithstanding pre-existing heart condition). But see American Bakeries Co. v. Hatzell, 771 S.W.2d 333 (Ky.1989) (angina pectoris held not compensable as a work-related injury when the underlying heart disease is not work-related). In order to understand the position taken by these jurisdictions, some examination of the seminal cases is necessary.

The General Adjustment Bureau contested the claim, arguing that angina was not a compensable injury under the LHWCA. Its rationale was that "because angina is not a disease, but merely a manifestation or symptom of coronary artery disease, and since claimant's employment concededly did not cause his disease, he has suffered no compensable injury within the meaning of the Act." Id. at 477.

The federal court of appeals disagreed. Instead, it adopted the holding of the Administrative Law Judge that "symptoms or manifestations of disease, to...

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