Moore v. Parker, Civil Action No. 1:97cv58-D-D (N.D. Miss. 10/__/1997)

• Decision Date: 01 October 1997
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:97cv58-D-D.
• Parties: JOSIE P. MOORE, PLAINTIFF, v. RAMONA PARKER, individually and as an agent of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., and BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., DEFENDANTS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

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JOSIE P. MOORE, PLAINTIFF, v. RAMONA PARKER, individually and as an agent of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., and BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., DEFENDANTS.

Civil Action No. 1:97cv58-D-D.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division.

October __, 1997.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently before the court is the motion of the defendant Ramona Parker for the entry of summary judgment on her behalf. Finding that the motion is well taken, the court shall grant it and dismiss Ms. Parker from this action.

The plaintiff filed this action on February 21, 1997, charging the defendants Ramona Parker and BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. ("BellSouth") with racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965. In her complaint, the plaintiff names defendant Ramona Parker in both her individual capacity and as an agent for BellSouth. Complaint, unnumbered page 1. Ms. Parker has since filed with the court her motion for the entry of summary judgment on her behalf. Central to Ms. Parker's argument in the motion at bar is that she is not an "employer" within the meaning of Title VII, and therefore cannot be liable to the plaintiff for a violation of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (defining Title VII employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and any agent of that person."); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e conclude that title VII does not permit the imposition of liability upon individuals unless they meet title VII's definition of `employer.'"); Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Under [the Fifth Circuit's] liberal construction [of "any agent" language of Title VII employer definition], immediate supervisors are Employers when delegated the employer's traditional rights, such as hiring and firing."). Without even reaching this argument, however, this court may dispose of the plaintiff's claims against Ms. Parker in her individual capacity.

It is clear that under Fifth Circuit law, Ms. Parker cannot be individually liable under Title VII. See, e.g, Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451 n.2 ("Title VII liability does not attach to individuals acting in their itle VII is premised upon her role as agent of the city, any recovery to be had must be against her in her official, not her individual, capacity."). This court has followed Harvey's directive on several occasions. See, e.g., Cooper v. Drexel, 949 F. Supp. 1275, 1279 (N.D. Miss. 1996); Dandridge v. Chromcraft Corp., 914 F. Supp. 1396, 1403-04 (N.D. Miss. 1996); Jenkins v. City of Grenada, Miss., 813 F. Supp. 443, 447 (N.D. Miss. 1993). In addition, decisions of sister courts following this principle are legion. See, e.g., Wilson v. Sysco Food Services of Dallas, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1003, 1008 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Seaman v. CPSH, 1997 WL 361652 (N.D. Tex.) ("[A]lthough an employer may be held vicariously liable for the actions of an agent sued in his official capacity, the agent cannot be individually liable under Title VII for such actions."); Valle v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1404, 1413 (S.D. Miss. 1996) ("Although an `employer' as defined by Congress includes the employer's agents . . . a manager or supervisor can never be individually liable under Title VII to pay damages for actions taken in his supervisory capacity."); Hughes v. Arveson, 924 F. Supp. 734, 738 (M.D. La. 1996) ("[E]ven if the plaintiffs could show that the individual defendants were agents of DOE, the plaintiff's [Title VII] suit against them would still be in their official capacity."). Indeed, the entire purpose of Title VII's "any agent" provision was to incorporate principles of respondeat superior into the statutory framework of Title VII. Grant, 21 F.3d at 562; Dandridge, 914 F. Supp. at 1403. Her liability will attach, if at all, as to her official capacity as an employee of BellSouth. Harvey, 913 F.2d at 227; Cooper, 949 F. Supp. at 1403-04. As such, all of the plaintiff's claims against Ms. Moore in her individual capacity must be dismissed. Insofar as the defendant's motion seeks dismissal of these claims, the court shall grant the motion.

As already stated, the only liability that may attach to Ms. Parker in this action is official liability as an employee of BellSouth. A suit against her in this capacity is in effect a suit against BellSouth, and BellSouth is already a named defendant in this case. Patton v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1260, 1269 (S.D. Tex. 1995) ("[F]inding an individual employee of a private corporation liable in his `official' capacity is tantamount to finding the corporation liable."). As such, there is no need to maintain Ms. Parker as a separate named defendant in this matter. See, e.g., Grant, 21 F.3d at 652 ("[T]he proper method for a plaintiff to recover under Title VII is to sue the employer, either by naming the supervisory employee as agent of the employer or by naming the employer directly.") (emphasis added) (citing with approval Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991)); Beasley v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, 1997 WL 382056, *2 (E.D. La.) ("The law in this circuit also dictates that a plaintiff cannot maintain Title VII actions against both the employees-as-agents and the employer."); Allen v. Tulane Univ., 1993 WL 459949, *3 (E.D. La. 1993). Insofar as Ms. Parker's motion seeks dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against her in her official capacity as an employee of BellSouth, the motion shall be granted as those claims are redundant of the plaintiff's claims against BellSouth.¹

A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pursuant to a memorandum opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED THAT:

) the motion of the defendant Ramona...