Mora v. State, 98-244.
Decision Date | 19 July 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98-244.,98-244. |
Citation | 984 P.2d 477 |
Parties | Orlando Elias MORA, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Orlando Elias Mora, Pro Se, Worland, WY, Representing Appellant.
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Representing Appellee.
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.
Appellant Orlando Mora was convicted of misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine and misdemeanor interference with a police officer. Appellant was charged when, after a consensual search, the borrowed automobile driven by him was found to contain drugs and paraphernalia. On appeal, Appellant challenges the district court's admission of the evidence found in the search and claims that there was insufficient evidence at trial to establish his constructive possession of the drugs found in the car.
We affirm.
Appellant presents the following issues:
The State rephrases the issues:
At approximately 4:45 a.m. on June 16, 1997, Officer Motley of the Thermopolis Police Department received a citizen's report that a gold-colored Chrysler LeBaron was seen driving erratically while entering town. Officer Motley eventually located a car matching the description and followed it. Although the officer did not observe any erratic driving, he noted that the left taillight of the car appeared to be inoperative. The officer then turned on his lights, and the vehicle pulled over to the side of the road.
Officer Motley approached the car, informed the driver, Appellant, that the taillight was not working, and asked to see Appellant's driver's license. Appellant told Officer Motley that he had lost his wallet and, therefore, did not have his license with him. When asked for his name and birth date, Appellant stated that his name was Ambrocio Amora, and his date of birth was October 11, 1956. When dispatch informed Officer Motley that there was no record of a license issued to that name and birth date, he approached the female passenger and asked to see her license. The female passenger produced a license, Officer Motley returned to his patrol car to check its status, and found that the passenger's driver's license was valid. Officer Motley returned to the car and asked Appellant to step outside. He told Appellant that he had received a report that a car similar to Appellant's was driving erratically. He then asked Appellant "to blow in his face." Appellant complied, but Officer Motley detected no odor of alcohol. Officer Motley then asked Appellant for permission to search the car. Appellant consented and retrieved the keys so that Officer Motley could gain entry to the vehicle's trunk.
Officer Motley found three pieces of luggage in the trunk. Two apparently matching bags were placed on top of the third bag. All were made of a black leather material. The officer felt a hard object in the outside pocket of one of the top bags and, upon opening the pocket, discovered a "hollowed-out" light bulb with brown residue inside. Law enforcement experience having taught him that such items were often used to ingest methamphetamine, Officer Motley went to his patrol car and returned with a written "consent to search" form. After Officer Motley read the consent form to Appellant, Appellant signed the form as Ambrocio Amora.
Further search of the bag revealed a second light bulb in the same condition as the first. In the second top bag, Officer Motley discovered a set of digital scales, a torch nozzle for a hand-held propane torch, glass pipes containing a brown residue, jewelry-making components, and boxed jewelry. The trunk also contained a humidifier, a cast iron pot, and a bag of laundry products. The third bag, located at the bottom of the trunk, contained diapers and baby clothes. Appellant and the passenger told Officer Motley that they had borrowed the car from a friend, and that the only items that belonged to them were the diaper bag and a camera bag.
Officer Motley then searched the passenger compartment where he found a wallet containing an identification card with a photograph of Appellant and the name Orlando Mora. When asked why he lied about his identity, Appellant stated that his license had been suspended due to unpaid traffic tickets. Motley then transported Appellant, the female passenger, and their two children to the Joint Law Enforcement Center, where the two adults were placed under arrest. During the booking process, police found a tool in Appellant's pocket which he claimed was a jewelry-making tool. The female passenger was found to be holding two small packages which contained methamphetamine and a broken glass ampule in her shoe, which she claimed fell out of the glove compartment when she looked for the car's registration. She later entered a guilty plea to misdemeanor possession.
On February 13, 1998, Appellant's defense counsel filed two motions to dismiss the case against Appellant. Both motions were heard in chambers on the first day of trial, February 19, 1997, and were denied. The motion relevant to this appeal reads in its entirety:
COMES NOW the defendant, and moves the Court to dismiss this matter on the ground that the officer had no probable cause to pull over Defendant's vehicle.
The basis for the probable cause motion was an allegation that the taillight had tape over it but was functional, and there was no other cause to stop Appellant. The district court denied the motion on the basis that the matter had been determined at the preliminary hearing. Trial proceeded, and the jury found Appellant guilty the next day. This appeal followed.
Appellant's first claim of error assumes that a suppression issue was put before the trial court. The record, however, does not demonstrate that that question ever was raised squarely for consideration. Instead, when Appellant's motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause for the stop was denied, no further action was taken regarding suppression of the evidence gained from the allegedly illegal seizure. Because Appellant's counsel offered no pretrial motion to suppress the evidence gained in the search, and lodged no objection to its admission at trial, we consider Appellant's claim under a plain error standard. Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1175 (Wyo.1998); Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo.1996); Lobatos v. State, 875 P.2d 716, 721 (Wyo.1994). Plain error exists when the Appellant shows: (1) clear reflection in the record of the incident alleged as plain error; (2) the violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) the violation of a substantial right causing material prejudice. Id.
The second issue raised by Appellant is that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. He argues that the evidence was not adequate to establish the possession of a controlled substance beyond a reasonable doubt. Our standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is:
The appellate test for sufficiency of evidence is whether a rational trier of fact could have been sufficiently armed by the evidence to find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In assessing that issue, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, affording them the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. It is not our task, let alone our place, to reweigh the evidence or reexamine the credibility of the witnesses.
Rodriguez v. State, 962 P.2d 141, 148 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 375 (Wyo.1995)) (citations omitted); Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 175 (Wyo.1998).
Appellant correctly points out that the preliminary hearing before the justice of the peace did not address his contention that the officer lacked probable cause to stop the vehicle. This is because the motion to dismiss presented prior to trial was premised on alleged facts discovered after the probable cause hearing binding Appellant over to the district court. As the basis for his motion to dismiss, Appellant's counsel stated:
It is clear that the officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle if the taillight was not in working order. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-2-101(a)(iv), 7-2-102(b)(i), 31-5-901(a), 31-5-910, and 31-5-913 (LEXIS 1999). (It is...
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