Moran v. Village of Philmont

• Decision Date: 22 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 1,1,2
• Citation: 147 A.D.2d 230,542 N.Y.S.2d 873
• Parties: Louis MORAN, Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF PHILMONT et al., Respondents. (Action) VILLAGE OF PHILMONT, Respondent, v. Louis MORAN, Appellant, et al., Defendant. (Action)
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 873

542 N.Y.S.2d 873

147 A.D.2d 230

Louis MORAN, Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF PHILMONT et al., Respondents.

(Action No. 1.)

VILLAGE OF PHILMONT, Respondent, v. Louis MORAN, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

(Action No. 2.)

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

June 22, 1989.

Reisch, Simoni, Bythewood & Gleason (David A. Bythewood, of counsel), Garden City, for appellant.

Connor, Curran & Schram (John G. Connor, Jr., of counsel), Hudson, for respondents.

Before MAHONEY, P.J., and WEISS, MIKOLL, YESAWICH and LEVINE, JJ.

WEISS, Justice.

In July 1988, the Board of Trustees of the Village of Philmont, Columbia County (hereinafter Board), enacted Local Laws, 1988, No. 2 (hereinafter Local Law No. 2) prohibiting the operation of private landfills within the municipal limits of the Village. Our primary inquiry is whether Supreme Court properly upheld the constitutionality of this ordinance and enjoined Louis Moran from dumping or permitting others to dump debris on property he owns within the Village. A brief history is in order.

Moran's 12-acre parcel of land is divided by a ravine comprising approximately eight acres. ^* In September 1987, Moran advised the Board of his plan to reclaim the ravine by filling same with construction and demolition debris. The Board acknowledged that there was no prohibition against such an operation. On April 19, 1988, Moran commenced the project, authorizing New York Demolition Company, Inc. to deposit construction and demolition debris in the ravine. Moran ostensibly gave advance notice to the Department of Environmental Conservation and received a temporary exemption (see, 6 NYCRR 360.1[f][1][x]. Following the enactment of Local Law No. 2, the Village served a notice of violation on Moran in August 1988. In the interim, Moran commenced an action against the Village seeking, insofar as here pertinent, to declare Local Law No. 2 constitutionally invalid (action No. 1). After joinder of issue, Moran moved for partial summary judgment to invalidate the ordinance due to the Village's failure to comply with the State Environmental Quality Review Act (hereinafter SEQRA). The Village cross-moved for summary judgment seeking to have the ordinance declared valid. Additionally, the Village commenced a second action to permanently enjoin Moran from violating the ordinance (action No. 2). Supreme Court granted the Village's cross motion for summary judgment and enjoined Moran from any further dumping operations. When the dumping persisted, the Village successfully obtained an order of contempt against Moran, who was directed to pay a $250 fine and $500 in expenses, and to further remove 1,750 tons of debris from the site. Moran has appealed both orders.

Initially, we disagree with Supreme Court's assessment that Moran lacked standing to question the Village's compliance with SEQRA. Although we agree that Moran merely demonstrated economic and not environmental harm, SEQRA speaks to both consequences (see, ECL 8-0109[1]; cf., Matter of New York State Bldrs. Assn. v. State of New York, 98 Misc.2d 1045, 1049, 414 N.Y.S.2d 956; Weinberg, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 17 1/2, ECL 8-0109, at 79). Since Moran clearly has standing to challenge the subject ordinance, that authority includes a full review of the procedures underlying its enactment. Nonetheless, we perceive no error in the Village's issuance of a negative declaration. An environmental impact statement is only required where an action may have a significant effect on the environment (ECL 8-0109[2]; see, Chinese Staff & Workers Assn. v. City of New York, 68 N.Y.2d 359, 364-365, 509 N.Y.S.2d 499, 502 N.E.2d 176). Here, the record confirms that the Village took a "hard look" at the potential environmental effects and rationally determined that no adverse consequences would flow from the ordinance (see, Matter of New Scotland Ave. Neighborhood Assn. v. Planning Bd. of City of Albany, 142 A.D.2d 257, 263, 535 N.Y.S.2d 645). Consequently, our SEQRA inquiry is concluded (see, id.).

Moran essentially challenges the ordinance as unconstitutionally confiscatory in that it retroactively invalidates a previously authorized dumping operation (see, e.g., Niagara Recycling v. Town of Niagara, 83 A.D.2d 316, 443 N.Y.S.2d 939; 1 Anderson, New York Zoning Law & Practice § 6.05, at 203 [3d ed]. The contention is not persuasive. Our analysis begins with the premise that a zoning ordinance enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality (see, de St. Aubin v. Flacke, 68 N.Y.2d 66, 76, 505 N.Y.S.2d 859, 496 N.E.2d 879). The fact that an ordinance effectively reduces the value of a parcel does not render it confiscatory (id., at 77, 505 N.Y.S.2d 859, 496 N.E.2d 879; Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 142 A.D.2d 72, 84-86, 534 N.Y.S.2d 958). Moreover, local governments enjoy broad police powers to advance the public health, safety and welfare (see, Matter of Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 550- 51, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139, 540 N.E.2d 215 [1989]. In today's society, it can hardly be doubted that municipalities may regulate the disposal of refuse materials (see, ECL 27-0711; Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill v. Caledonia, 51 NY2d 679, 435 N.Y.S.2d 966, 417 N.E.2d 78). In an instance, as here, where solid waste materials are being deposited within a residential community, the potential hazards are obvious. While we recognize that Local Law No. 2 effects a complete prohibition of private landfills, we find that the ordinance constitutes a valid health and safety measure within the scope of the Village's police powers (see, Town of La Grange v. Giovenetti Enters., 123 A.D.2d 688, 689, 507 N.Y.S.2d 54; Town of Plattekill v. Dutchess Sanitation, 56 A.D.2d 150, 391 N.Y.S.2d 750; affd. 43 N.Y.2d 662, 400 N.Y.S.2d 816, 371 N.E.2d 534; see also, Town of Hempstead v. Goldblatt, 9 N.Y.2d 101, 211 N.Y.S.2d 185, 172 N.E.2d 562). This holds true notwithstanding the impact on Moran's existing operation (see, id.). Although Moran claims otherwise, we do not perceive a substantial vested interest in the dumping operation (cf., Niagara Recycling v. Town of Niagara, 83 A.D.2d 316, 327-328, 443 N.Y.S.2d 939, supra ). No showing was made of any expenditures on his part. Also, a very serious question is raised as to whether a valid...