Moravek v. Davenport Community School Dist.

• Decision Date: 22 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 60293,60293
• Parties: 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2923 Edward V. MORAVEK, Appellant, v. DAVENPORT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 797

262 N.W.2d 797

98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2923

Edward V. MORAVEK, Appellant, v. DAVENPORT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.

No. 60293.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 22, 1978.

James L. Sayre, and Charles E. Gribble, of Dreher, Wilson, Adams & Jensen, Des Moines, for appellant.

Charles E. Miller, of Lane & Waterman, Davenport, for appellee.

Considered by MOORE, C. J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, REES and UHLENHOPP, JJ.

MASON, Justice.

Plaintiff, Edward V. Moravek, appeals from ruling of the Scott District Court dismissing his petition in equity seeking a declaratory judgment establishing that his continuing teaching contract with the Davenport Community School District (District) was valid and enforceable for the 1975-76 school year and each successive year thereafter until it was properly terminated.

Plaintiff's claim for relief as asserted in his petition filed October 20, 1976, is based on the theory the District's refusal to comply with the grievance procedure provided in a master contract executed by the District and the teacher's representative, the Davenport Education Association, Inc., constituted a breach of the master contract. He further alleged that since the master contract incorporated his individual contract in its terms, a breach of the master contract constituted a breach of his individual contract.

Plaintiff further alleged the breach of the contracts made the District's action terminating his contract pursuant to section 279.13, The Code, 1975, null, void, illegal and, consequently, ineffective. In his prayer for relief plaintiff sought to have the court declare his continuing contract valid and enforceable until such time as it would be properly terminated pursuant to section 279.13, The Code, 1975. He also prayed for such other and further relief as the court might deem equitable and just.

November 9 the District filed a motion to dismiss Moravek's petition because it failed to state a claim upon which any relief could be granted. In support of its motion the District stated:

"1. Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided to him under Iowa Code § 279.13 by failing to request a public hearing to protest his termination.

"2. Plaintiff's Petition admits that all actions required by Iowa Code § 279.13 to terminate a teacher were taken.

"3. The provisions of the contract set forth as Exhibit C to plaintiff's Petition relating to the 'grievance procedure' have no relation to teacher termination, and as applied to the question of teacher termination are ultra vires.

"4. Plaintiff's claim, if any, arose March 25, 1975 and is barred by the doctrine of laches."

After receipt and study of briefs and oral argument in support of and in resistance to the motion, the court dismissed Moravek's petition ruling in pertinent part as follows:

"I find that at the time in question that the exclusive means for terminating teacher contracts was by compliance with § 279.13, Code. I find that to the extent that the grievance procedure of the master contract purports to govern contract termination that such is without statutory authority, contrary to then public policy, and of no legal effect as to the contract between plaintiff and defendant as regards termination thereof. I find that by not demanding a public hearing under § 279.13 the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and accordingly is not entitled to judicial remedies."

Moravek was employed as a teacher by the District for the 1974-75 school year. He had been hired September 30, 1974. One month before he was hired, the District and the teachers' representative, the Davenport Education Association, Inc., had entered into an agreement entitled a master contract.

The master contract, which incorporated by reference each teacher's individual contract, contained a grievance procedure, Article VIII. Section 8-1 of that article provided the definition of a grievance was a " * * * claim by an employee, or the Association, based upon the interpretation, application, or violation of this Agreement." Section 8-2 of the article provided for a four-step grievance procedure. As summarized that procedure was as follows:

Step 1. Written statement of grievance with supervisor and report to the Superintendent;

Step 2. Conference with Director of Personnel or Superintendent;

Step 3. Appeal to Board of Education and hearing before Board; and

Step 4. Binding arbitration including involvement of federal mediation and conciliation service.

March 11, 1975, the District sent Moravek notice, pursuant to section 279.13, The Code, 1975, it was considering termination of his teaching contract. March 14, he requested a private conference and a written statement of specific reasons. March 18, the District sent Moravek notice the conference would be held March 24 and gave him its reasons for considering his termination. March 25, the date after the conference, the District sent Moravek a notice of termination of his contract and informed him he had a right to request a public hearing within 20 days of his receipt of the notice. He never exercised this right.

April 8, Moravek filed a grievance in which he stated:

" * * *Mor

"Please accept this communication as my written appeal of that decision on dismissal as per the procedure provided for in Article 8-2 of the master contract * * *.

"With this grievance I am alleging that Articles 12-3 (requiring a written statement of his rating as a teacher be placed in his personnel file, that he be given a copy of it and that he be given an opportunity to give his reaction to the evaluation), 11-1 (stating an employee shall not be dismissed without just cause and without procedural due process), 11-2 (requiring that any disciplinary action against any employee shall be appropriate to the act which precipitated the discipline) and 3-1 (providing the Board will not interfere with, restrain, or coerce teachers covered by the master contract because of membership in the Association or lawful activity on behalf of the Association), were violated by the administration and Board of Education of the Davenport Community School District in the handling of the termination of my continuing contract."

April 9, the District informed Moravek it had scheduled a meeting as provided by step 2 of section 8-2. This meeting resulted in a finding by the District's director of personnel the grievance was not justified. April 24, Moravek responded by seeking from the District a time and place for step 3. He also advised the District he would be willing to waive step 3 and proceed immediately to step 4.

At a regularly scheduled board meeting on May 12, the Board of Education, pursuant to advice from its attorneys, voted to refuse to submit the matter to arbitration since it was the board's view the arbitrator would not have jurisdiction over the matter.

Moravek apparently did nothing further to thwart the District's attempt to terminate his contract until he filed his petition in this action.

The primary question presented by this appeal is whether the trial court erred in sustaining the District's motion to dismiss plaintiff's petition for failure to state a claim upon which any relief could be granted.

The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss does not rest in the discretion of the trial court; it must be determined upon legal grounds and is subject to review by this court. See Ambrose v. Harrison Mutual Insurance Association, 206 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Iowa 1973) and Symmonds v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 242 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Iowa 1976).

" * * * (A) motion to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a cause of action is sustainable only when it appears to a certainty the pleader has failed to state a claim upon which any relief may be granted under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim asserted. In making this determination the pleading should be construed in the light most favorable to the pleader with doubts resolved in his favor and the challenged allegations accepted as true. * * * (citing authority).

"A motion to dismiss is a waiver of any ambiguity and uncertainty in the pleading. * * * (citing authorities)." Murphy v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 228 N.W.2d 372, 375 (Iowa 1975). See also Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 192-193 (Iowa 1977).

Grounds of a motion to dismiss a pleading because it does not state a cause of action must be based on the contents of the pleading assailed. Facts not so appearing, except those of which judicial notice must be taken, must be ignored. Such motions must specify wherein the pleading they attack is claimed to be insufficient. See Ke-Wash Company v. Stauffer Chemical Company, 177 N.W.2d 5, 9 (Iowa 1970); Osbekoff v. Mallory, 188 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Iowa 1971); Wheeler v. Waller, 197 N.W.2d 585, 586 (Iowa 1972); Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W.2d 576, 579 (Iowa 1973).

The parties contend that resolution of the principal question presented by this appeal requires determination of the following issues which we have framed in somewhat different language from that employed by the parties:

1. Does a teacher fail to exhaust his administrative remedies when he does not request a public hearing pursuant to section 279.13, The Code, 1975?

2. Did section 279.13, The Code, 1975, provide the exclusive method of termination of teacher contracts?

3. Were the contractual grievance procedures here a valid method to resolve disputes over termination of a teacher's continuing contract?

In an equitable action, as here, our review is de novo. Rule 4, Rules of Appellate Procedure.

I. At one point in his argument in support of his contention the trial court erred in sustaining the District's motion to dismiss Moravek maintains the court relied upon a statement of facts the District included in its motion to dismiss. He insists this inclusion of facts other than those appearing in his petition made the motion the equivalent of a "speaking demurrer." For...