Bruton v. Ames Community School Dist.
| Decision Date | 23 April 1980 |
| Citation | 291 N.W.2d 351 |
| Parties | Karen BRUTON, Appellant, v. AMES COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Board of Education of Ames Community School District, Appellees. 2-63882. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
James L. Sayre of Dreher, Wilson, Adams, Jensen, Sayre & Gribble, Des Moines, for appellant.
Edgar H. Bittle of Ahlers, Cooney, Dorweiler, Haynie & Smith, Des Moines, for appellees.
John R. Phillips and Kathleen A. Reimer of Rogers, Phillips & Swanger, Des Moines, for Iowa Ass'n of School Boards, Inc., amicus curiae.
Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and LeGRAND, UHLENHOPP, McCORMICK and LARSON, JJ.
This appeal involves the validity of the following clause in a contract of a nonprobationary public-school teacher:
It is mutually agreed that this contract shall be for one year only and shall not continue beyond the 2nd day of June, 1978. On said date this contract shall terminate without notice, hearing, or any other action by the Board. Provided, however, that this provision shall not in any way affect the right of the District, if it so elects, to terminate the contract in accordance with the provisions of Section 279.24, Code of Iowa, 1975, as amended.
The Ames Community School District employed Karen Bruton as a teacher for four consecutive years. No question exists as to her competency or performance; hence the case does not involve a discharge for just cause which is personal to the teacher pursuant to section 279.27 of the Code (section 279.24 in the Code of 1975). Neither does the case involve an agreed settlement of a dispute between a school district and a teacher during the school year, see In re Abramovich v. Board of Education, 46 N.Y.2d 450, 414 N.Y.S.2d 109, 386 N.E.2d 1077 (1979), or a temporary substitute teacher.
At the end of the 1976-1977 school year, which was Bruton's third consecutive year of employment, the district had terminated Bruton's contract in accordance with chapter 279, The Code 1977. The district then employed her to teach on a part-time basis for the 1977-1978 year and, to enable it to plan for staff reduction, staff realignment, and changing program needs, incorporated the quoted one-year-only clause in her contract. The district inserted similar clauses in some of the other teachers' contracts it negotiated that year.
On March 13, 1978, the superintendent of the district notified Bruton in writing he would recommend to the school board that her contract be terminated at the end of the 1977-1978 school year. The reason given in the notice was as follows:
The recommendation to terminate your contract is being made for the reason that it has been mutually agreed that your contract is for one year only and shall not continue beyond the 2nd day of June, 1978. Pursuant to your contract on the aforesaid date, your contract shall terminate without notice, hearing, or any other action of the Board.
The superintendent did in fact so recommend termination of Bruton's employment. The board thereafter held a private meeting with Bruton as a matter of courtesy. The parties stipulated additional facts in the controversy, but those facts are not material to the view we take of the case.
After the private meeting the board rendered its decision stating as the issue, so far as we are now concerned, "Is the contractual provision illegal and against public policy?" and concluding, "(W)e believe that the contract provision in the instant case is valid and so hold." The board therefore determined that Bruton's contract "is hereby terminated effective at the end of the current school year."
Bruton appealed to an adjudicator, who affirmed. She next appealed to district court, which likewise affirmed. She then appealed to this court, and we retained the appeal because of the question of the validity, under present legislation, of the clause in the contract purporting to limit Bruton's employment to one year.
In 1976 the General Assembly enacted a statute which "completely revised the procedure for terminating school teachers' contracts." Board of Education v. Youel, 282 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1979). See 1976 Session, 66th G.A., ch. 1151, §§ 279.13-279.19, The Code 1977 (). That enactment was in effect at the time of these events. The questioned clause in Bruton's contract purports to waive the substantive and procedural provisions of that statute, and the question is whether such a waiver by a teacher or by a school district is valid. Thus the area of contract law in which we find ourselves has to do with the kinds of statutory provisions which may be waived or may not be waived by contracting parties. See 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 173 (1964); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 207 (1963). The enactment which we have here is one variety of what are commonly called teacher-tenure statutes. 68 Am.Jur.2d Schools § 149 (1973); 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts §§ 180, 183, 192 (1952).
For present purposes, the Iowa law on the duration of teachers' contracts involves three stages of statutory development and may be traced back to a case which itself did not involve a teacher, Black v. Consolidated Independent School District, 206 Iowa 1386, 222 N.W. 350 (1928). A school board hired Black as a school-bus driver by written contract containing the clause, "The board of directors reserves the right to terminate this contract at any time." At that time section 4182 of the Code of 1924 required a driver's employment contract to state "the length of time contracted for" but did not specify any period of time. Nor did it provide for automatic renewal of drivers' contracts. Under that statute this court upheld the quoted termination clause in the contract. Id. at 1388, 222 N.W. at 351.
Following Black in the first stage of statutory development came Miner v. Lovilia Independent School District, 212 Iowa 973, 234 N.W. 817 (1931). That case involved a clause in a teacher's contract stating "That either party to this contract on 20 days' written notice to the other may terminate this contract." Section 4229 of the Code of 1928 provided that teachers' contracts should contain several items not now material and also "such other matters as may be agreed upon, which may include employment for a term not exceeding the ensuing school year. . . ." Upholding the quoted termination clause, this court stated, id. at 980, 234 N.W. at 820:
We have no occasion to discuss this question as a matter of first impression. We are committed to the principle involved that such a contractual provision is within the purview of the board's capacity to contract. Black v. Consolidated School District, 206 Iowa, 1386, 222 N.W. 350.
The Black and Miner decisions appear at this later day to be proper applications of the statutes of the time. They embedded in Iowa decisional law the principle that termination clauses of the kinds involved in those cases are valid under the types of statutes then existing.
The next case of significance to the present inquiry, although not involving a teacher, is Independent School District v. Samuelson, 222 Iowa 1063, 270 N.W. 434 (1936). There the contract of a school superintendent, Baker, contained the following clause: "(T)he contract may be terminated at any time by said second party (board), for any reason, by giving thirty days notice, in writing, of such intention to said first party (Baker)." Early in the school year the board discharged Baker under that clause. The statutes were substantially the same as previously; in addition, section 4230 of the Code of 1931 stated with reference to superintendents that boards "shall have power to employ a superintendent of schools for one year." Notwithstanding the statutory reference to one year, this court held neither the county nor state superintendent of schools had jurisdiction to grant Baker relief and upheld the quoted termination clause, stating, id. at 1069, 270 N.W. at 437:
Thus the question involved in this appeal is not one of first impression, having been determined both in the Black case and in the Miner case above referred to. We see no reason for a retreat from the rule announced in those two cases and following such rule we are constrained to hold that an appeal would not lie to the county and state superintendents from the action of the board of the school township in canceling Baker's contract and discharging him, and that neither of the superintendents had jurisdiction or authority to entertain the appeal and determine the questions involved.
Samuelson closed the line of cases under the first stage of statutory development.
The next pertinent case is Ashby v. School Township of Liberty, 250 Iowa 1201, 98 N.W.2d 848 (1959). There a clause in a teacher's contract stated in paragraph g "That in case the enrollment of said school becomes less than six this contract becomes null and void." The enrollment did fall below six, and the board closed the school and discharged the teacher. Quoting from Black, Miner, and Samuelson, this court upheld the quoted clause, stating, id. at 1212, 98 N.W.2d at 856:
It will be observed the contract provisions upheld in the Black, Miner and Samuelson decisions against attacks similar to the one now urged are all broader than paragraph g here in that they reserve unlimited authority to terminate the contract, with or without good cause. Here, however, the right is conditioned upon enrollment becoming less than six. Certainly the present contract provision is the more reasonable and less likely to result in arbitrary action.
Ashby was decided under the teacher-contract statute in its second stage, resulting from 1941 and 1945 amendments to the statute. Section 279.13 of the 1950 Code, embodying the statute as amended, contained these relevant clauses: contracts shall contain, in addition to specified items, "such other matters as may be agreed upon, which may include employment for a term not exceeding the ensuing school year" ...
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