Morrow v. State, 4D03-3771.
Decision Date | 30 November 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 4D03-3771.,4D03-3771. |
Citation | 914 So.2d 1085 |
Parties | Edward MORROW, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Alan T. Lipson, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Morrow appeals the trial court's order to submit to blood testing for DNA analysis. We affirm.
Thirteen years after Morrow pled guilty to false imprisonment with a deadly weapon, and nearing the end of his probation, the Department of Corrections (DOC) filed a motion to compel Morrow to provide blood and saliva samples for DNA testing. Morrow asserts that he should not be subject to DNA testing, pursuant to section 943.325, Florida Statutes, because the tests would be an untimely modification of his sentence and impose a special condition of probation not imposed at sentencing. He also argues that the retroactive application of the statute violates the ex post facto clause because he was without notice that he would be subject to this kind of provision in the future.
Morrow was convicted of one of the offenses enumerated under section (1)(b) of the statute and is on probation in Florida, placing him within the purview of the statute. Morrow is not entitled to relief, as the statute and the DNA testing requirement is an appropriate use of state power.
We conclude that section 943.325 is applicable retroactively. In evaluating whether a law violates the ex post facto clause, a two-prong test must be applied: (1) whether the law is retrospective in its effect and (2) whether the law alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable. See Gwong v. Singletary, 683 So.2d 109, 112 (Fla.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1142, 117 S.Ct. 1018, 136 L.Ed.2d 894 (1997). Although section 943.325 is retrospective in its effect, it does not alter the elements of Morrow's criminal conduct or increase the penalty for his crime and, therefore, the application of the statute is not an ex post facto violation. See Gilbert v. Peters, 55 F.3d 237, 238-39 (7th Cir.1995) ( )(citation omitted); see also Thomas v. State, 662 So.2d 1334, 1336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) ( )(citations omitted).
In Taylor v. State, 821 So.2d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), a defendant challenged the requirement...
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