Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. O'Neill

• Decision Date: 04 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13555,13555
• Citation: 212 Conn. 83,561 A.2d 917
• Parties: , 58 USLW 2072 MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF the UNITED STATES, INC., et al. v. William A. O'NEILL et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 917

561 A.2d 917

212 Conn. 83, 58 USLW 2072

MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF the UNITED STATES, INC., et al. v. William A. O'NEILL et al.

No. 13555.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 2, 1989.

Decided July 4, 1989.

Mark R. Kravitz, with whom were Michael K. Brown, New Haven, and, on the brief, William H. Crabtree, Jane Lightfoot Watson, Detroit, Mich., Charles H. Lockwood II and John T. Whatley, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Garry Desjardins, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Robert M. Langer, Asst. Atty. Gen., and, on the brief, Clarine Nardi Riddle, Acting Atty. Gen., and William M. Rubenstein, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees (defendants).

John J. Woodcock III, pro se, appellee (intervening defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, GLASS, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of statutory procedures for the arbitration of motor vehicle disputes that, for manufacturers but not for consumers, severely limit the scope of judicial review for challenges to adverse arbitration determinations. This case is here pursuant to the remand that we ordered in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. of the United States, Inc. v. O'Neill, 203 Conn. 63, 523 A.2d 486 (1987), (Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. I ), to amplify a factual record that we deemed inadequate for consideration of a reservation raising a number of constitutional challenges to the validity of Public Acts 1984, No. 84-338, codified as General Statutes §§ 42-181 through 42-185, both in its initial form and as amended in 1985 (Lemon Law II). ¹ Id., at 80, 523 A.2d 486. Upon remand, and further factual stipulations by the parties, ² the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to establish any violation of their state or federal constitutional rights, and accordingly rendered a judgment denying their request for declaratory or injunctive relief. We find error.

The history of Lemon Law II, which is fully described in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. I, supra, 203 Conn. at 66-73, 523 A.2d 486, may be summarized as follows. In 1982, the legislature enacted General Statutes § 42-179 (Lemon Law I) in order to provide consumers of new motor vehicles additional substantive remedies for the enforcement of express warranties made by the manufacturers of such vehicles. The plaintiffs have not contested the constitutionality of Lemon Law I. Two years later, the legislature enacted Lemon Law II; General Statutes §§ 42-181 through 42-184; to provide such consumers an additional forum for the enforcement of express warranties. The new act authorizes consumers, but not manufacturers, to bring disputes about the performance of new motor vehicles to arbitration panels established by the department of consumer protection. General Statutes § 42-181(a), (b), (c). ³ The act also permits consumers, but not manufacturers, to reject an unfavorable arbitration decision and to institute a de novo civil action. See General Statutes §§ 42-179(i) and 42-181(c). Neither consumers nor manufacturers may pursue Lemon Law claims before a jury.

The plaintiffs, in their third amended complaint filed after our remand in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. I, attacked the constitutionality of Lemon Law II on three grounds. They claimed that the act: (1) deprived them of their right to a trial by jury, in violation of article first, § 19, of the Connecticut constitution; (2) improperly limited the scope of judicial review, in violation of the separation of powers provisions of articles second and fifth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution and the right of access to courts provision of article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution; and (3) denied them due process and equal protection of the laws, in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 8, 10 and 20, of the Connecticut constitution, because the act requires them to pay a $250 filing fee to defend against the claims of consumers.

None of these contentions persuaded the trial court. With respect to the claimed right to a jury trial, the court found, upon an analysis of statistical data contained in a stipulation between the parties, that the proceedings conducted pursuant to Lemon Law II were essentially equitable rather than legal, because the remedies sought from the arbitration panels, and awarded by them, went beyond requests and awards for price refunds. Cf. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. I, supra, 79-80, 523 A.2d 486. On the basis of this finding, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial. The court concluded, furthermore, that the scope of judicial review afforded to arbitration awards under Lemon Law II passed constitutional muster because the act entitled the plaintiffs to the same scope of review presently afforded to the determinations of administrative agencies under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. Finally, the court held that the act was not unconstitutional in requiring the manufacturer to pay the $250 filing fee; General Statutes § 42-181(b); because it included a statutory provision permitting the waiver of any fee upon proof of economic hardship. General Statutes § 42-185. The court accordingly upheld the constitutionality of Lemon Law II.

In their appeal, the plaintiffs renew the same constitutional challenges that they raised at trial. Although we agree with the trial court's resolution of the plaintiffs' claimed right to a jury trial and to relief from filing fees, we disagree with the court's construction of the act's judicial review provisions as satisfying constitutional due process requirements, and hence find Lemon Law II unconstitutional in part.

I

The plaintiffs' first challenge to Lemon Law II asserts that the statutory arbitration procedures contained in § 42-181(c) unconstitutionally deprive them of their right to a trial by jury, in violation of article first, § 19, of the Connecticut constitution. ⁴ In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. I, supra, 68-69, 523 A.2d 486, we described Lemon Law II as a statute that "provides supplemental remedies of repair, replacement and refund to facilitate the enforcement of express warranties made by [automobile] manufacturers...." In determining whether such a statutory cause of action must preserve the litigants' right of access to a jury, this court has regularly applied a historical test: would this cause of action have been triable to a jury prior to the constitution of 1818? Id., 76, 523 A.2d 486, and cases there cited; see also Skinner v. Angliker, 211 Conn. 370, 375-78, 559 A.2d 701 (1989); Bishop v. Kelly, 206 Conn. 608, 618, 539 A.2d 108 (1988); Swanson v. Boschen, 143 Conn. 159, 164-66, 120 A.2d 546 (1956).

If Lemon Law II is accurately to be characterized, in law and in fact, as essentially a restatement of an enhanced cause of action for breach of express warranties, the plaintiffs would be correct in their contention that they cannot be deprived of their right to a trial by jury. "Whether a warranty claim is viewed as a contract action, a tort action, or a hybrid of the two ... such a matter has always been triable to a jury." Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. I, supra, 203 Conn. at 77, 523 A.2d 486. If, however, the statute creates a new cause of action that is essentially an equitable claim for specific performance or rescission and restitution, then, as the defendants contend, there is no right to a jury trial for the enforcement or defense of Lemon Law II claims. ⁵ We agree with the trial court that the record demonstrates the essentially equitable nature of Lemon Law II claims and hence we conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to prove their constitutional claim in this regard.

The trial court made the following findings relying on the records of 521 Lemon Law arbitration decisions rendered from October 1, 1984, to September 30, 1987. "Between 1985 and 1987, 75.58% of consumers requested refunds and 4.42% requested partial refunds.... However, 99.61% of the consumers requested replacement (51.35%), repair (6.54%), incidental expenses (22.31%), consequential damages (2.30%), finance charges (3.46%) or other remedies (13.65%).... Furthermore, between 1985 and 1987, 39.54% of consumers received refunds and .19% received partial refunds.... However, 94.63% of consumers received replacement (7.87%), repair (24.95%), incidental expenses (11.52%), finance charges (20.35%) or other remedies (29.94%)." ⁶

These factual findings, which are not clearly erroneous, do not support the plaintiffs' allegation that the nature of Lemon Law II claims and remedies is essentially legal rather than equitable. In the remand that we ordered in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. I, supra, we asked for precisely this kind of factual exploration of the scope of Lemon Law arbitrations. We agree with the plaintiffs that, to the extent that refunds are central to such proceedings, recharacterizing such refund claims as claims for rescission and restitution would not resolve the question of whether such claims are essentially legal or equitable, particularly when a legal action for revocation of acceptance, under §§ 2-608 and 2-715 of the Uniform Commercial Code; General Statutes §§ 42a-2-608 and 42a-2-715; covers much the same ground. Id., 79, 523 A.2d 486; see also Aubrey's R. V. Center, Inc. v. Tandy Corporation, 46 Wash.App. 595, 600-601, 731 P.2d 1124 (1987). The trial court found, however, that, to a significant extent, consumers sought and received orders for replacement and repair designed to approximate the kind of specific relief that is characteristically equitable. " '[W]hen legal and equitable issues are combined in a single action, whether the right to a jury trial attaches depends upon the relative importance of the two types of claims....' " Texaco, Inc. v. Golart, 206 Conn. 454, 458-59, 538 A.2d 1017 (1988); United States Trust Co. v. Bohart, 197...