Moulton v. State

• Decision Date: 26 December 2013
• Citation: 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 08557,114 A.D.3d 115,977 N.Y.S.2d 797
• Parties: Francis MOULTON, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

114 A.D.3d 115

977 N.Y.S.2d 797

2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 08557

Francis MOULTON, Appellant,

v.STATE of New York, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Dec. 26, 2013.

Francis Moulton, Gowanda, appellant pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Arnold of counsel), for respondent.

Before: ROSE, J.P., STEIN, SPAIN and GARRY, JJ.

SPAIN, J.

Appeal from an order of the Court of Claims (Hard, J.), entered July 18, 2012, which, among other things, granted defendant's motion to dismiss the claim.

Claimant was sentenced in 2000 to a prison term of 3 1/2 years upon his guilty plea to the crime of robbery in the first degree. While the sentencing court did not impose or address the mandatory postrelease supervision (hereinafter PRS) ( seePenal Law § 70.45 former [1] ), a five-year term of PRS was administratively added by the then-Department of Correctional Services (hereinafter DOCS) ¹ upon his release in 2003. Thereafter, claimant was arrested and reincarcerated several times for violating the terms of the administratively imposed PRS and, at issue here, on April 18, 2008, he was again arrested, reportedly on a parole warrant, for violating his PRS and detained pending a parole revocation hearing. Claimant was still in custody on April 29, 2008 when the Court of Appeals issued the companion seminal state law decisions in Matter of Garner v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 10 N.Y.3d 358, 859 N.Y.S.2d 590, 889 N.E.2d 467 [2008] and People v. Sparber, 10 N.Y.3d 457, 859 N.Y.S.2d 582, 889 N.E.2d 459 [2008], ruling that only a sentencing court has the authority to impose the PRS component of a defendant's sentence and that DOCS acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it administratively imposed a period of PRS. The Court made clear in Sparber that the “sole remedy” for this procedural error “is to vacate the sentence and remit for a resentencing hearing so that the trial judge can make the required [PRS] pronouncement” ( People v. Sparber, 10 N.Y.3d at 471, 859 N.Y.S.2d 582, 889 N.E.2d 459). Notably, the Court of Appeals expressly declined to pass on the applicability of Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71 [2d Cir.2006], in which the Second Circuit ruled that DOCS' administrative imposition of a term of PRS violated clearly established federal due process principles as articulated in United States Supreme Court precedent and was, as such, a nullity ( Matter of Garner v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 10 N.Y.3d at 363, 859 N.Y.S.2d 590, 889 N.E.2d 467; People v. Sparber, 10 N.Y.3d at 471 n. 5, 859 N.Y.S.2d 582, 889 N.E.2d 459). More recently, the Second Circuit held that, as of its 2006 decision in Earley, it was clearly established, for purposes of qualified immunity, that administrative imposition of PRS violated federal due process guarantees ( see Vincent v. Yelich, 718 F.3d 157, 167–170 [2d Cir.2013]; see also Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100, 105–107 [2d Cir.2010] ). While federal law rulings of Circuit Courts of Appeals are not binding on the New York Court of Appeals, they are persuasive authority ( see People v. Kin Kan, 78 N.Y.2d 54, 59–60, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 574 N.E.2d 1042 [1991] ). Given that claimant here addresses federal law rulings ² in the context of his state law claims, we will discuss them in limited fashion, recognizing that the Court of Appeals has not, to date, spoken to those federal law interpretations.

Almost two weeks after Garner, a parole revocation hearing was reportedly held in this matter on May 12, 2008, after which claimant's parole was revoked based upon a finding that he had violated his DOCS-imposed PRS, notwithstanding claims raised by his counsel at the hearing that the administratively imposed PRS was a nullity under Garner.³ He was then sentenced to prison for the remaining 11 months of his term, where he remained until his release in October 2008 by order of Supreme Court, Cayuga County (Leone, J.) on a successful petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Claimant commenced this action alleging, as relevant here, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution stemming from his imprisonment between April 2008 and October 2008.⁴ The gravamen of claimant's action and request for damages is not founded upon DOCS' administrative imposition of a period of PRS but, rather, it centers upon his incarceration after Garner for violating PRS, when defendant knew or should have known that DOCS-imposed PRS was invalid. The Court of Claims granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state valid causes of action and denied claimant's cross motion for summary judgment. Claimant, pro se, now appeals, challenging the decision on both motions.

The Court of Claims erred in dismissing claimant's false imprisonment cause of action because his parole violation prosecution and confinement after Garner were not privileged; defendant is not entitled to immunity for incarcerating claimant on a parole violation premised upon an administratively-imposed PRS that was known to be a nullity under controlling law. On defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, “the [claim] is liberally construed, the facts alleged [in the claim and any submission submitted in opposition to the dismissal motions] are accepted as true, [claimant is] accorded every favorable inference and the court determines only whether the facts alleged in the [claim] ‘fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Lazic v. Currier, 69 A.D.3d 1213, 1213–1214, 893 N.Y.S.2d 373 [2010], quoting Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87–88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 [1994] ).

To establish a claim for false imprisonment, claimant needs to show that defendant intended to confine him, that he was conscious of the confinement, that he did not consent to it, and that “the confinement was not otherwise privileged” (Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310 [1975], cert. denied sub nom. Schanbarger v. Kellogg, 423 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 277, 46 L.Ed.2d 257 [1975]; see Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 97 N.Y.2d 78, 85, 735 N.Y.S.2d 868, 761 N.E.2d 560 [2001] ). Only the last issue—whether the confinement was privileged—is in dispute and, significantly, the burden rested on defendant to establish that the detention was privileged ( see Hollender v. Trump Vil. Coop., 58 N.Y.2d 420, 425, 461 N.Y.S.2d 765, 448 N.E.2d 432 [1983] ). Under settled law, an otherwise unlawful detention “is privileged where the confinement was by arrest under a valid process [warrant] issued by a court having jurisdiction” (Collins v. State of New York, 69 A.D.3d 46, 51, 887 N.Y.S.2d 400 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Davis v. City of Syracuse, 66 N.Y.2d 840, 842, 498 N.Y.S.2d 355, 489 N.E.2d 242 [1985]; Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d at 457–458, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310; Nazario v. State of New York, 75 A.D.3d 715, 718, 905 N.Y.S.2d 328 [2010], lv. denied15 N.Y.3d 712, 2010 WL 4117001 [2010] ). “An arrest made extrajudicially—that is, without a warrant—is presumptively unlawful, but the existence of probable cause serves as a legal justification for the arrest and an affirmative defense to the claim” (Guntlow v. Barbera, 76 A.D.3d 760, 762, 907 N.Y.S.2d 86 [2010], appeal dismissed15 N.Y.3d 906, 912 N.Y.S.2d 572, 938 N.E.2d 1007 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ). Defendant contends that claimant did not challenge the validity of the arrest warrant or the jurisdiction of the issuing court, thereby failing to preserve any issue about its privilege to detain him. We disagree.

To begin, claimant sufficiently alleged that his confinement was not privileged and it was defendant's burden to establish that its confinement of claimant after Garner was privileged; defendant failed in the Court of Claims to produce a Division of Parole arrest warrant or a court order so as to demonstrate their validity or that the arrest or confinement of claimant was privileged ( see Hollender v. Trump Vil. Coop., 58 N.Y.2d at 425, 461 N.Y.S.2d 765, 448 N.E.2d 432; Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d at 457–458, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310; cf. Donald v. State of New York, 17 N.Y.3d 389, 394–395, 929 N.Y.S.2d 552, 953 N.E.2d 790 [2011]; Standsblack v. State of New York, 79 A.D.3d 1242, 1243, 911 N.Y.S.2d 678 [2010]; Holmberg v. County of Albany, 291 A.D.2d 610, 612–613, 738 N.Y.S.2d 701 [2002], lv. denied98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278, 773 N.E.2d 1016 [2002] ).⁵ Further, to clarify, claimant does not challenge his arrest prior to Garner but, rather, premises his claims on his continued detention and reincarceration—after Garner—for a parole violation based upon an administratively-imposed PRS term that Garner clearly held was invalid, i.e., he raises a claim for false imprisonment and not for false arrest. Thus, even if the arrest warrant were lawful on April 18, 2008 based upon a violation of DOCS-imposed PRS (the underlying merits of which violation claimant does not contest), the validity and lawfulness of that detention evaporated in the wake of Garner. When claimant's post- Garner parole revocation hearing was held nearly two weeks after DOCS-imposed PRS was categorically declared invalid in this state, defendant did not have the “ privilege” to ignore that mandate, or to find him to be in violation of any invalid PRS term or to resentence him to the remainder of his term.⁶ That is, after Garner, claimant was held without justification.

While defendant suggests that when Garner was issued, the remedy was not clear for invalid DOCS-imposed PRS, we note that Sparber very clearly indicated that, where the sentencing court failed to pronounce a period of PRS as statutorily required, “the sole remedy” for this error was not expungement of all PRS but, rather, “to vacate the sentence and remit for a resentencing hearing so that the trial judge can make the required...