Moyer v. Abbey Credit Union, Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 28759 |
| Citation | 2020 Ohio 5410 |
| Parties | JUDA MOYER Plaintiff-Appellee v. ABBEY CREDIT UNION, INC. Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
(Appeal from Probate Court)
OPINIONR. MICHAEL OSBORN, Atty. Reg. No. 0065347, 33 West First Street, Suite 600, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
STEPHEN D. MILES, Atty. Reg. No. 0003716 and VINCENT A. LEWIS, Atty. Reg. No. 0071419, 18 West Monument Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Abbey Credit Union, Inc., ("Abbey") appeals from a judgment on the pleadings rendered in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee, Juda Moyer, executor of the Estate of Shirlee A. Garringer ("Moyer"). According to Abbey, the probate court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings because such a disposition was not permitted under Civ.R. 12(C). Abbey further contends that it was entitled to use the self-help right of setoff against an estate account upon discovering that it had mistakenly transferred funds to the estate, when the estate was not entitled to the funds. Abbey also contends that Moyer failed to sustain any damages and was not entitled to the money that was deposited into the estate account.
{¶ 2} We conclude that the probate court erred in rendering judgment on the pleadings because the damages were not supported by any evidence. Although Abbey incorrectly exercised the right of setoff, Moyer was not legally entitled to the money. Moyer, therefore, had to establish that she detrimentally relied on Abbey's actions and that damages resulted. Since no proof was presented on these points, the probate court had no basis for awarding Moyer the entire amount of money that had been mistakenly transmitted. Accordingly, the judgment of the probate court will be affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this cause will be remanded for further proceedings concerning damages.
{¶ 3} This case arose from Abbey's mistaken payment of funds in a decedent's account to the executor of the decedent's estate. Specifically, the decedent's account designated a payable on death ("POD") beneficiary to whom the funds should have been paid, rather than being paid to the executor.
{¶ 4} According to the facts in the complaint (which Abbey mostly admitted),1 the decedent, Shirlee Garringer, owned a share savings account with Abbey at the time of her death. On June 25, 2018, an attorney representing Juda Moyer (Garringer's executor) sent Abbey a letter, requesting date of death balance for Garringer's account, as well as the " 'name of the beneficiary [listed on the account] if applicable.' " Complaint at ¶ 6.
{¶ 5} On June 29, 2018, Abbey responded, stating that it had closed Garringer's account on June 6, 2018, and had issued a check payable to the Estate of Shirlee A. Garringer. Subsequently, Moyer, as executor, opened a checking and savings accounts for the estate at an Abbey branch location on July 2, 2018; at that time, Moyer deposited Abbey's cashier's check in the amount of $26,239.97 into the estate's accounts. This check was the same one that Abbey had issued to the estate. When the check was deposited, Moyer told Abbey to deposit $10,000 into the estate's checking account, and the rest into the estate's savings account. Id. at ¶ 6-10.
{¶ 6} After the money was deposited, Moyer began administering the estate's financial affairs, including depositing funds received from other banks. She also began writing checks to pay estate expenses. At some point after the cashier's check was initially deposited, Abbey discovered that Garringer's account contained a POD designation. As a result, Abbey executed a "transfer" or "charge back" of $26,239.97 from the estate's checking and savings accounts. Id. at ¶ 11-13.
{¶ 7} On December 7, 2018, Moyer's attorney sent Abbey a demand letter requesting that Abbey return the funds it had debited. However, Abbey did not return the funds. Id. at ¶ 14-17. As a result, Moyer filed a complaint in the Montgomery County probate court in April 2019, seeking relief on four grounds: breach of contract, conversion, failure to exercise ordinary care under R.C. 1304.03, and failure to comply with R.C. 2117.06. Abbey filed an answer on May 5, 2019, denying liability and asserting affirmative defenses.
{¶ 8} On August 7, 2019, Moyer moved for judgment on the pleadings, and Abbey filed a response. In addition, Abbey filed a motion seeking leave to amend its answer to allege the affirmative defenses of extrajudicial setoff and self-help. The probate court granted Abbey's motion to amend on October 29, 2019. The following day, the court granted Moyer's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Abbey then filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment, which was docketed as Montgomery App. No. 28620.
{¶ 9} In January 2020, we issued a show cause order which asked the parties to explain why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final appealable order. We then dismissed the appeal on that basis, because the probate court's judgment had not addressed the issue of damages. See Moyer v. Abbey Credit Union, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28620, p. 2 (Decision and Final Judgment Entry, Feb. 13, 2020).
{¶ 10} After the appeal was dismissed, the probate court filed an entry and order on February 24, 2020, ordering Abbey to deposit and/or return the sum of $26,239.97 (the amount of the cashier's check made payable to the Estate of Shirlee Garringer) into the estate's checking and/or savings accounts at Abbey Credit Union within 30 days. Abbey then appealed from both judgments on March 19, 2020.
{¶ 11} Abbey's sole assignment of error states that:
The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
{¶ 12} Abbey raises several issues under this assignment of error. For purposes of clarity, we will discuss the issues separately, beginning first with the procedural posture of the case.
{¶ 13} Abbey's first argument is that the probate court should not have decided this matter based on the pleadings because Civ.R. 12(C) motions are to be used offensively, not defensively. In response, Moyer argues that Abbey failed to raise this point below. Moyer further notes that Civ.R. 12(C) allows "any party" to move for judgment on the pleadings, not just defendants.
{¶ 14} As an initial point, we agree that Abbey failed to challenge the process used by the probate court. In responding to Moyer's Civ.R.12(C) motion, Abbey did note that Civ.R.12(C) is typically invoked by defendants. Memorandum Opposing Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Memo Opposing Judgment on the Pleadings"), p. 4. However, Abbey did not object to having the court consider the merits of the case; instead, Abbey argued that the standard (of construing the facts most favorably to the nonmovant) "cuts the other way" when the plaintiff is the movant. Id.
{¶ 15} The parties' agreement to a particular procedure does not mean that a court is correct in following their lead if the parties' analysis is, in fact, incorrect. Therefore, we look to Civ.R. 12(C) and caselaw to decide this point. Civ.R. 12(C) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Although defendants typically file these motions, that is not always the case.
{¶ 16} In Portfolio Recovery Assocs., L.L.C. v. VanLeeuwen, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26692, 2016-Ohio-2962, we considered a situation in which the plaintiff, an assignee of a credit card issuer, brought suit against a defendant and was then granted judgment on the pleadings. Id. at ¶ 2. In discussing the plaintiff's motion, we commented that:
"In the determination of a Civ.R. 12(C) motion, the nonmoving party is entitled to have all of the material allegations in the pleading, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, construed in his favor as true." Am. Tax Funding L.L.C. v. Miamisburg, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24494, 2011-Ohio-4161, ¶ 31. In the review of a motion for judgment on the pleadings to dismiss a complaint, the Supreme Court of Ohio has declared that, "entry of judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) is only appropriate 'where a court (1) construes the material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as true, and (2) finds beyond doubt, that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.' " Hester v. Dwivedi, 89 Ohio St.3d 575, 577-78, 733 N.E.2d 1161 (2000), citing State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996). This high burden is not lessened when a motion for a judgment on the pleadings is filed to obtain judgment, as the movant must prove, beyond a doubt, the absence of any genuine issue of fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We have held that a summary judgment "is to be awarded only with great caution, with all doubts resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, because it deprives the nonmoving party of his day in court." Smith v. Five Rivers MetroParks, 134 Ohio App.3d 754, 764, 732 N.E.2d 422 (2d Dist.1999), citing Norris v. Ohio Std. Oil Co. 70 Ohio St.2d 1, 2, 433 N.E.2d 615 (1982). The same degree of caution must be exercised when considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
{¶ 17} As Moyer notes, Civ.R. 12(C) refers to "any" party, not just to plaintiffs. Thus, while granting a plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is somewhat rare, it is not inappropriate. With that in mind, we will consider the next point that Abbey has raised.
{¶ 18} Abbey's second argument is that it was entitled to use its right of setoff...
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