Moyle v. Y & Y Hyup Shin Corp.
| Citation | 173 P.3d 535 |
| Decision Date | 08 November 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 26582.,26582. |
| Parties | Richard Todd MOYLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Y & Y HYUP SHIN CORP., a Hawaii corporation, and TTJJKK Inc., both doing business as Do Re Mi Karaoke, Defendants-Appellees, John Does 1-10; Jane Does 1-10; Doe Partnerships 1-10; Doe Corporations 1-10; Doe Entities 1-10; and Doe Governmental Units 1-10, Defendants. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Hawai'i |
Gary Victor Dubin, on the briefs, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellant.
Roy F. Hughes and Steven T. Brittain, (Hughes & Taosaka) on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendants-appellees.
Plaintiff-Appellant Roger Scott Moyle (Appellant)1 appeals from the final judgment entered March 5, 2004, in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (circuit court).2 The circuit court entered final judgment pursuant to the jury verdict rendered in favor of Defendants-Appellees Y & Y Hyup Shin, Corp., (Y & Y) and TTJJKK Inc. (TTJJKK) (collectively Appellees), both of whom were doing business as Do Re Mi Karaoke (Do Re Mi). In bringing this appeal, Appellant argues: (1) the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding a set of nine police reports (police reports); (2) the circuit court improperly instructed the jury (a) that under ordinary circumstances "criminal acts are not reasonably to be expected," (b) that "[t]here can be no liability for civil damages against a person at the scene of a crime for failure to obtain assistance from law enforcement or medical personnel[,]" (c) that "[i]ntoxicated liquor consumers may not seek recovery from the establishment which sold them alcohol[,]" and (d) by refusing to give a "mode of operation" instruction; (3) the circuit court erred by including two improper questions in the special verdict form it submitted to the jury; and (4) that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's Hawai`i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 60(b) motion.
Some time after 4:00 a.m. on September 19, 1999, Richard Todd Moyle (Moyle) arrived at the Do Re Mi Club by taxi. Prior to arriving at Do Re Mi, Moyle had spent several hours at another bar.
At around 6:00 a.m., after about two hours of drinking and socializing, Moyle decided to leave Do Re Mi. On his way out the back door, Moyle was assaulted and robbed by Simi Tupuola (Tupuola), causing Moyle to sustain several injuries.
On September 19, 2001, Moyle initiated the underlying suit by filing a complaint against Appellees, as owners of Do Re Mi, in the circuit court. In the complaint, Moyle alleged, in pertinent part, that Appellees had negligently failed to provide adequate security at Do Re Mi, and that they had negligently failed to protect the health and safety of their patrons.
A jury trial began on February 11, 2004. At the conclusion of the trial, Moyle raised several objections to the jury instructions, including what Moyle argued was the absence of an instruction clearly defining foreseeability. The circuit court overruled Moyle's objections and gave the jury instructions without any further explanation of foreseeability.
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Appellees, and the circuit court entered judgment on March 5, 2004. Moyle timely filed his notice of appeal on May 19, 2004.
[D]ifferent standards of review must be applied to trial court decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence, depending on the requirements of the particular rule of evidence at issue. When application of a particular evidentiary rule can yield only one correct result, the proper standard for appellate review is the right/wrong standard. However, the traditional abuse of discretion standard should be applied in the case of those rules of evidence that require a "judgment call" on the part of the trial court.
State v. West, 95 Hawai`i 452, 456-57, 24 P.3d 648, 652-53 (2001) (quoting Kealoha v. County of Hawaii, 74 Haw. 308, 319, 844 P.2d 670, 676 (1993)).
Once the parties have presented all their evidence, "it becomes the court's fundamental duty to properly instruct the jury on the law on the precise issues of fact it is to decide." Montalvo v. Lapez, 77 Hawai`i 282, 291, 884 P.2d 345, 354 (1994). The trial court bears this duty because it is "the sole source of all definitions and statements of law" and as such, it is the trial court's responsibility to "see to it that the case goes to the jury in a clear and intelligent manner, so that they may have a clear and correct understanding of what it is they are to decide[.]" Id. at 291 n. 13, 884 P.2d at 354 n. 13 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To effect this end, the court utilizes jury instructions, the purpose of which is "to inform the jury of its function, which is the independent determination of the facts, and the application of the law, as given by the court, to the facts found by the jury." Lee v. Elbaum, 77 Hawai`i 446, 457, 887 P.2d 656, 667 (App.1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Jury instructions should be a "concise statement of the claims of the parties, the issues of fact that the jury must decide, and the applicable law." Id.
When jury instructions are reviewed by this court, the standard of review is whether, "when read and considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading." Stanford Carr Dev. Corp. v. Unity House, Inc., 111 Hawai`i 286, 297, 141 P.3d 459, 470 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Generally, instructions that are found to be an erroneous articulation of the law raise a presumption that they were harmful. Turner v. Willis, 59 Haw. 319, 326, 582 P.2d 710, 715 (1978). The presumption can be overcome however, if it "affirmatively appears from the record as a whole that the error was not prejudicial." Id.
In crafting the applicable jury instructions, the trial judge's discretion is bounded by the "obligation to give sufficient instructions and the opposing imperative against cumulative instructions." Tittle v. Hurlbutt, 53 Haw. 526, 530, 497 P.2d 1354, 1357 (1972). Refusing to give an instruction relevant under the evidence which correctly states the law is an error if the point has not been adequately and fully covered by other instructions. Sherry v. Asing, 56 Haw. 135, 144, 531 P.2d 648, 655 (1975) (citations omitted).
Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law to be reviewed de novo under the right/wrong standard.
Our statutory construction is guided by the following well established principles:
our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.
When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists . . . .
In construing an ambiguous statute, "[t]he meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning.["] Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool.
This court may also consider "[t]he reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it . . . to discover its true meaning."
Lingle v. Hawaii Gov't Employees Ass'n, AFSCME, Local 152, AFL-CIO, 107 Hawai`i 178, 183, 111 P.3d 587, 592 (2005) (quoting Guth v. Freeland, 96 Hawai`i 147, 149-50, 28 P.3d 982, 984-85 (2001)) (some brackets added).
In deciding whether to use a special or general verdict form, the trial court is vested with "complete discretion." Montalvo, 77 Hawai`i at 292, 884 P.2d at 355. Additionally, the "form of the verdict[,] as well as the interrogatories submitted to the jury[,]" are left entirely to the discretion of the court, "`provided that the questions asked are adequate to obtain a jury determination of all factual issues essential to judgment.'" Id. (quoting In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 871 F.2d 891, 894 (9th Cir.1989)); see also HRCP Rule 49(a). Despite this wide discretion, it is still possible that the contents of the form "may be so defective that they constitute reversible error." Montalvo, 77 Hawai`i at 292, 884 P.2d at 355. When analyzing special verdict forms on appeal, "the instructions and the interrogatories on the verdict form are considered as a whole." Id.
The circuit court's disposition of Appellant's HRCP Rule 60(b)(3) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Beneficial Hawaii, Inc. v. Casey, 98 Hawai`i 159, 164, 45 P.3d 359, 364 (2002). The trial court abuses its discretion if it has "clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant." Id.; see also State v. Akina, 73 Haw. 75, 78, 828 P.2d 269, 271 (1992).
Appellant argues that the circuit court erred by excluding the police reports. In making this argument, Appellant contends that, contrary to the circuit court's reasoning, it was not necessary to lay a foundation for the police reports as a prerequisite for their use in impeaching a witness's prior testimony. We disagree.
As explained by the circuit court in making its ruling, the police reports were inadmissible because: (1) a proper foundation had not been laid, (2) they had been obtained after the discovery cutoff date, (3) they violated the circuit court's pretrial order that all evidence be marked and submitted to the court...
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Moyle v. Y & Y Hyup Shin, Corp.
...certiorari, urging this court to review the published opinion of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in Moyle v. Y & Y Hyup Shin Corp., 116 Hawai`i 388, 173 P.3d 535 (App.2007). Moyle argues that the ICA gravely erred in affirming the circuit court's March 5, 2004 final judgment, becaus......
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