Mt. Hermon Boys' School v. Town of Gill

• Decision Date: 20 October 1887
• Parties: MT. HERMON BOYS' SCHOOL v. INHABITANTS OF GILL.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

145 Mass. 139

13 N.E. 354

MT. HERMON BOYS' SCHOOL v. INHABITANTS OF GILL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Franklin.

October 20, 1887

COUNSEL

Conant & Conant, for plaintiff.

The taxes described in the plaintiff's declaration were assessed by defendant's assessors, and paid by the plaintiff after demand and written protest that said taxes had been illegally assessed, and an action of contract is the proper remedy. Pub.St. c. 12, § 84; Dow v. First Parish Church, 5 Metc. 73. The real estate and personal property of the plaintiff, assessed by the defendants, is within the exemption from taxation provided by Pub.St. c. 11, § 5, cl. 3. The plaintiff is duly incorporated under Pub.St. c. 115, for the "education of boys." It is a "literary institution." The plaintiff is also a "scientific" institution as well as literary. The plaintiff is also, to some extent, a "benevolent and charitable" institution. A devise or a bequest for such a purpose would be held to be a good charity. Religious Soc. v. Harriman, 125 Mass. 321; Academy of Arts & Sciences v. College, 12 Gray, 582 Hadley v. Academy, 14 Pick. 240.

The property assessed is occupied by the plaintiff for the purposes of the incorporation, viz., "the education of boys." This purpose has no qualification or limitation. It is broad and comprehensive enough to include literary scientific, mental, moral, and physical education. Agriculture is a branch of learning that may be lawfully taught in the public schools in every town in the commonwealth. Pub.St. c. 44, § 10. See Id. §§ 8, 9 15. The exemption from taxation conferred by the statutes is not limited to such real estate only as may appear to the court necessary for the purposes for which it was incorporated, but applies to all real estate of the corporation occupied by it, and intended and in fact appropriated to those purposes by its officers. Hospital v. Somerville, 101 Mass. 319, 322. See Academy v. Wilbraham, 99 Mass. 599; Pierce v. Cambridge, 2 Cush. 613. The word "occupied" has been construed by this court. Chapel of Good Shepherd v. Boston, 120 Mass. 212; Workingmen's Ass'n v. Lynn, 136 Mass. 285. It is submitted that there is no portion of such estate used for other than literary, educational, benevolent, charitable, scientific, or religious purposes. University v. People, 99 U.S. 323; Monticello Female Seminary v. People, 106 Ill. 398, 46 Amer.Rep. 702.

John A. Aiken, for defendant.

If any portion of the plaintiff's real estate or personal property was liable to taxation, these actions cannot be maintained. The proper remedy is an application for abatement. Pub.St. c. 11, § 69; Bourne v. Boston, 2 Gray, 494, 496; Chapel of Good Shepherd v. Boston, 120 Mass. 212. It certainly requires a very liberal interpretation of the statute to hold that the two tobacco barns, a part of the property for which the plaintiff claims exemption, are property appropriate for a literary, educational, scientific, or religious institution. The defendant seeks to hold subject to taxation only the farm and farming stock. The real estate of every inhabitant of Gill was security for the payment of the debt, and might be taken upon an execution or a judgment against the town on account of this debt. Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 349. Until this debt is paid, the real estate of the plaintiff is a part of the security holden for the town's liability, and it should bear its proportion of the money raised by taxation on account of that debt.

The plaintiff claims exemption from taxation by Pub.St. c. 11, § 5, cl. 3. It is not entitled to avail itself of that exemption, because its property has not been occupied for the purposes for which it was incorporated, and because a portion of its estate has been used for other than literary, educational, benevolent, scientific, or religious purposes. It is immaterial whether the products disposed of from 1884 to 1885 were sold, bartered, or exchanged. At law the nature and effect of the transaction are the same. "The distinction," says BIGELOW, J., in Com. v. Clark, 14 Gray, 367, 373, "between a sale and exchange of property, is rather one of shadow than substance. In both cases the title to the property is absolutely transferred, and the same rules of law are applicable to the transaction, whether the consideration of the contract is by way of sale or barter. It can make no essential difference in the rights and obligations of parties that goods and merchandise are transferred and paid for by other goods and merchandise instead of by money, which is but the representative of value or property." Neither can it make any difference that the other parties to the transfer were in some of the instances a girl's school of similar objects and systems, and clergymen and religious persons. A statute which exempts property from taxation is to be strictly construed. Taxation is the rule, exemption the exception. The burden of proof is upon every party who claims exemption to show that his case comes clearly within the exception. If any doubt arises as to the exemption, it must operate most strongly against the party claiming the exception. Redemptorist Fathers v. Boston, 129 Mass. 178. The plaintiff, besides being a literary, benevolent, charitable, scientific, or religious institution, has been a seller of farm produce for gain. That the sales have been small is no defense; the question is not one of degree. If the plaintiff may dispose of farm produce, at current market rates, to the amount of more than $1,000, during the years in question, why may it not, when the farm's productiveness is increased, dispose of $10,000 worth, or $100,000 worth, in the same way, provided the proceeds are used for the benefit of the school? Why, also, may it not, in furtherance of its project of furnishing an industrial education, establish, in addition to its farm, a woolen-mill to clothe its pupils with wool grown upon the farm, and a shoe-shop to shoe them with hides there produced, and sell the surplus products of such manufactories, and, using the proceeds for the maintenance of its school, claim that such appropriation is for literary, educational, benevolent, scientific, charitable, or religious purposes, and so the plaintiff is exempt? The statute never intended such proceedings, yet such is and such will be the inevitable result, if the plaintiff is allowed to prevail in this action.

The plaintiff will urge that many of the products of the farm are of a perishable nature, like butter, milk, eggs, and apples, and some of them of a nature unavailable for school purposes, as the hides of animals, and that the only way for the school to utilize such products is to sell them or trade them off. The answer to this position is that if the plaintiff chooses in the management of its school to have an annex, like a farm, which obliges it to enter the market as a seller of goods, the plaintiff must bear the same burdens that other sellers bear, i.e., pay taxes. The plaintiff is not obliged to maintain its farm. The case depends upon our statutes and decisions. Adjudications in other states furnish no aid. See Academy v. Wilbraham, 99 Mass. 599, which in some of its details resembles the case at bar, but there is this vital distinction: The plaintiff had a farm and farming stock, but the produce of it was wholly consumed at plaintiff's school. The plaintiff must take the position that, because the things or the money received in exchange for the plaintiff's produce were ultimately applied to the maintenance of the plaintiff's school, there is a compliance with the spirit of the statute. Such a view cannot be maintained. See Chapel of Good Shepherd v. Boston, 120 Mass. 212; Workingmen's Ass'n v. Lynn, 136 Mass. 283; Pierce v. Cambridge, 2 Cush. 611; Meeting-House v. Lowell, 1 Metc. 538. It is not material whether the plaintiff made a profit or not in its dealings. The fact that the produce was sold at the current market rates indicates, however, that there was a profit made. Workingmen's Ass'n v. Lynn, supra. The plaintiff, a corporation chartered for the "education of boys," is authorized to make such purchases as are necessary, but it cannot be a seller or trader of farm produce. If the plaintiff chooses to put produce upon the market it shall pay taxes. To hold otherwise is to give a bounty or subsidy to the plaintiff, enabling it to undersell neighboring producers among the defendants, whose burdens are thereby augmented by having to bear the increased taxation and competition.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

The defendants very properly conceded at the argument that the plaintiff was one of the institutions to which certain exemptions from taxation were granted by Pub.St. c. 11, § 5 cl. 3....