Muhammad v. State
| Decision Date | 04 April 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 34513,34513 |
| Citation | 254 S.E.2d 356,243 Ga. 404 |
| Parties | MUHAMMAD v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Randy Bacote, Atlanta, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Victor Alexander, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Susan V. Boleyn, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Mujahid Jerabbabl Muhammad, a/k/a Nicky Lee Goar, was convicted of murdering Fulton County Marshal Larry Folds and committing an aggravated assault upon Deputy Fulton County Marshal James Broadwell. He received a life sentence for the murder conviction and a 10-year sentence for the aggravated assault conviction. These offenses were committed by the appellant while officers from the Fulton County Marshal's office and members of the SWAT team of the Atlanta Police Department were attempting to evict the appellant and Mahamium Jashua, a/k/a Lee Anderson from their residence at 1483 Westwood Avenue, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia.
Trouble was anticipated in evicting the appellant and Anderson, and the SWAT team was posted in the vicinity of the house in case the Fulton County Marshal's office needed assistance. Deputy Fulton County Marshals Broadwell and Aubrey Lockridge went to the door of the house to serve the appellant and Anderson with notice that they were being evicted. Anderson met them at the door, but he refused to leave. As Anderson was closing the door, Broadwell reached inside and attempted to restrain him. Almost immediately thereafter, several gunshots were fired from inside of the house toward the doorway. One of these gunshots hit Broadwell in the abdomen, wounding him. In the ensuing exchange of gunfire, Anderson was shot and killed, also. As law enforcement officials moved to surround the house, Fulton County Marshal Folds was fatally shot in the chest by a gunshot fired from the interior of the house.
The house was later tear-gassed, and the appellant surrendered, handing over to the police a .357 magnum. Police searched the premises for other persons and weapons. No other persons were found, but the police did find a .38 revolver and a shotgun on the premises.
Expert witnesses testifying on behalf of the state testified that an unusually large amount of gunshot residue was found on the appellant's hands, which is caused by a higher caliber gun, such as a .357 magnum. Another expert witness testifying on behalf of the state testified that Fulton County Marshal Folds had been shot by a .357 magnum.
The police testified that the appellant had told them that he and Anderson were the only people in the house. The police also testified that the appellant had admitted shooting Marshal Folds, stating, "They grabbed my leader and I shot."
However, at trial, the appellant denied making these statements to the police. At trial, the appellant testified that there had been a third person in the house, a Brother Rashid, and the appellant claimed that he had remained in the attic and that Brother Rashid had done the shooting.
On appeal, the appellant enumerates four alleged errors.
1. In Enumeration of error 1, he argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury, upon request, that, "If you find from the evidence presented in this case that the defendant . . . was merely present at the scene of the crime and did nothing, you should acquit the defendant."
It is, of course, true that mere proof of the accused's presence at the scene of the crime, without any evidence to show further participation in the commission of the crime, is insufficient to authorize a conviction. See, e. g., O'Neal v. State, 239 Ga. 532, 238 S.E.2d 73 (1977); Reese v. State, 157 Ga. 766, 122 S.E. 195 (1924); Thornton v. State, 119 Ga. 437, 46 S.E. 640 (1903); Johnson v. State, 143 Ga.App. 160, 237 S.E.2d 605 (1977); Blankenship v. State, 135 Ga.App. 482, 218 S.E.2d 157 (1975); Greeson v. State, 90 Ga.App. 57, 81 S.E.2d 839 (1954); Butler v. State, 11 Ga.App. 815, 76 S.E. 368 (1912). However, in the present case, the state's evidence showed more than the mere presence of the appellant at the scene of the crime. The evidence that was presented, although it was circumstantial, clearly authorized the jury in finding that the appellant had fired the gun shots wounding Broadwell and killing Folds.
The appellant argues that "mere presence" was his sole defense. Citing cases which hold that the trial court errs in failing to instruct the jury on the sole defense of the accused, even in the absence of a request, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on "mere presence" in this case.
Mere presence at the scene of the crime is not a recognized defense to a criminal charge. Rather, the rule that mere presence without more is insufficient to convict is really a corollary to the requirement that the state prove each element of the offense charged.
In the present case, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the duty of the state to prove each and every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court further instructed the jury that to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts must exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt. In addition, the trial court instructed the jury that if all the evidence and circumstances of the case and all reasonable deductions therefrom present two theories, one of innocence and one of guilt, the jury must acquit.
The foregoing jury charges were full and fair...
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...253 Ga. at 783(1), 325 S.E.2d 362. 36. Walton v. State, 272 Ga. 73, 74-75(4), 526 S.E.2d 333 (2000) (citing Muhammad v. State, 243 Ga. 404, 405(1), 254 S.E.2d 356 (1979)). 37. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687(III), 104 S.Ct. 2052; Smith, 253 Ga. at 783(1), 325 S.E.2d 362. 38. Wilson, 271 Ga. at ......
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...court " ‘may ... inquire how the jury stands numerically.’ " Gibson, 272 Ga. at 802(2), 537 S.E.2d 72, quoting Muhammad v. State, 243 Ga. 404, 407(4), 254 S.E.2d 356 (1979). But the law is equally clear that a trial court may not inquire into "the ‘nature of a jury's numerical division,’ " ......
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