Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein of Minnesota
| Decision Date | 09 January 1920 |
| Docket Number | 21,518 |
| Parties | C. L. MULLINER, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF LAWRENCE GROTTE, DECEASED v. EVANGELISCHER DIAKONNIESSENVEREIN OF THE MINNESOTA DISTRICT OF THE GERMAN EVANGELICAL SYNOD OF NORTH AMERICA |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Rice county to recover $7,500 for the death of plaintiff's intestate. In its answer defendant set up that it was a private charitable corporation, its object and purpose, and that its work was wholly charitable and not for private profit, and expressly denied that the intestate's death was caused by carelessness, negligence or want of care on its part. The case was tried before Childress, J., who at the close of the testimony denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that defendant was a charitable corporation and not liable for the negligence of its agents servants and employees to a patient in its hospital, and a jury which returned a verdict for $6,500. From an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Death -- verdict sustained by the evidence.
1. A pneumonia patient in defendant's hospital, suffering from delirium, was left alone in a second story room. A few minutes later the window was found open and the patient was lying dead on the ground below. This was sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that he was killed by the fall.
Death -- evidence of negligence.
2. There is sufficient evidence that his death was due to negligence of defendant and its employees.
Death -- charitable corporations liable in damages.
3. Defendant is of the class commonly known as charitable corporations. Its hospital was founded and its buildings erected, partly by money donated, and partly by money borrowed. It is not maintained for profit, but most of its patients are pay patients, and the receipts for these patients largely exceed the cost of maintenance. Defendant is liable in damages for decedent's death.
C. D O'Brien and J. W. LeCrone, for appellant.
Moonan & Moonan, for respondent.
1. Defendant operated a hospital in the city of Faribault. On February 27, 1918, Lawrence Grotte, a pneumonia patient, was taken to the hospital. He continued as a patient until about 6 a.m. on March 3 when, in delirium, he jumped from the window of a second story room and was killed. Plaintiff, as administrator of his estate, sued for damages, and recovered a verdict for $6,500. Defendant appeals.
There is sufficient proof of the cause of death. The fact is, deceased was left lying on his hospital bed. He was very ill, but his chances of recovery up to that time were "rather favorable." The nurse in charge left the room, leaving the window slightly open. Five minutes later the window was found wide open and deceased was lying dead on the ground below. The jury might well find that he was killed by the fall. In fact they could not well find otherwise.
2. There is sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of defendant and its employees. Deceased became delirious about one o'clock in the morning of March 1. He became violent and got out of bed. The lady nurses could not control him, so they called a man, the janitor, and with his help put deceased in a restraining sheet. At 8:30 in the evening of March 2 he again broke loose and walked down the hall. At 12:30 a.m. March 3 he again broke loose. The evidence is that the tendency of patients in his condition is to try to escape through the first opening. At about 6 a.m. he was left alone in the room. The window was open five or six inches. The result was as above stated.
The nurse in charge testified that she felt that deceased needed watching; that he was in a dangerous condition where he might commit injury to himself; that if she had had more help she would have thought it proper to watch him closer, and that the only reason she did not watch him closer was that she had so much work that she could not do so. This evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that defendant was negligent in failing to provide a sufficient number of attendants, and that the attendants were negligent in failing to exercise proper care for the patient's safety.
3. If this were a hospital maintained for the profit of the owners, liability for such negligence would be undoubted. When a patient enters such a hospital, knowing that the number of nurses is less than the number of patients, he may not expect constant attendance, but the patient is entitled to such reasonable attention as his safety may require. Meyer v. McNutt Hospital, 173 Cal. 156, 159 P. 436; Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N.C. 594, 83 S.E. 807, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 250; Hogan v. Hospital Co. 63 W.Va. 84, 59 S.E. 943; Fawcett v. Ryder, 23 N.D. 20, 135 N.W. 800; Wetzel v. Omaha M. & G. Hospital, 96 Neb. 636, 148 N.W. 582, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1224; Stanley v. Schumpert, 117 La. 255, 41 So. 565, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 306, 116 Am. St. 202, 8 Ann. Cas. 1044. If the patient is temporarily bereft of reason, and is known by the hospital authorities to be in danger of self destruction, the authorities are in duty bound to use reasonable care to prevent such an act. Broz v. Omaha M. & G. Hospital, 96 Neb. 648, 148 N.W. 575, L.R.A. 1915D, 334.
A more serious question is whether a hospital corporation, constituted as is defendant, is liable to a patient for damages resulting from the negligence proven. Defendant corporation was organized for the maintenance of a private hospital. The ground upon which the hospital building stands was donated. The building was erected partly by money donated and partly by money borrowed. The corporation has no capital stock and pays no dividends. Its funds are used for the maintenance of the hospital. It is not a free hospital. It has a regular schedule of rates which patients are expected to pay. More than 95 per cent pay full rates. The remaining small percentage are free or partly free. The receipts from the pay patients exceed the cost of maintenance, including repairs, by more than $5,000 a year. Deceased was a pay patient.
Defendant comes within the class commonly known as charitable corporations. The fact that its patients pay for their accommodations does not make it otherwise. The distinguishing facts are that it is partly endowed by donation, and that it is not conducted for purposes of gain. 5 R.C.L. p. 373; McInerny v. St. Luke's Hospital Assn. 122 Minn. 10, 141 N.W. 837, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 548; Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N.E. 991, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 556, 4 Ann. Cas. 103.
There are numerous carefully considered decisions holding that such a corporation is not responsible to a patient for the negligence of its employees. 5 R.C.L. 375; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Artist, 60 F. 365, 9 C.C.A. 14, 23 L.R.A. 581; Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 F. 294, 47 C.C.A. 122, 65 L.R.A. 372; Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 A. 595, 31 L.R.A. 224; McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529; Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N.W. 42, 25 L.R.A. 602, 45 Am. St. 427; Duncan v. Nebraska, etc. Assn. 92 Neb. 162, 137 N.W. 1120, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 973, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1127; Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Assn. 85 Oh. St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 427; Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512. There are a less number which sustain the rule of liability. Tucker v. Mobile Inf. Assn. 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, L.R.A. 1915D, 1167; University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 784, 128 Am. St. 355; Galvin v. Rock Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675; Gilbert v. Corp. of Trinity House, L.R. 17 Q.B. Div. 795. See dissenting opinion, Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S.C. 25, 32, 81 S.E. 512.
The precise question is not foreclosed by decisions of this court. We are free to adopt the rule which seems to us the more just. We respect the precedent of decisions of other states for the light which their reasoning may throw upon the question. In our own opinion the rule of liability seems to us best and we adopt it. Briefly stated, these considerations influence us.
The doctrine of respondeat superior, that is, that a person or corporation shall respond for damages caused by the negligence of one of its employees in the course of his employment, is the rule. It is founded on the doctrine that what one does through another, he does himself. Morier v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. 31 Minn. 351, 17 N.W. 952, 47 Am. Rep. 793. In general it is a salutary rule. If exception is to be made, there must appear affirmative ground for the exception.
In McInerny v. St. Luke's Hospital Assn. 122 Minn. 10 141 N.W. 837, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 548, and Maki v. St. Luke's Hospital Assn. 122 Minn. 444, 142 N.W. 705, this court held that, in an action brought by an employee against a charitable hospital association, for damages for injury caused by contact with machinery not guarded as required by statute, the rule of...
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