Munhall v. Inland Wetlands Com'n of Town of Lebanon

• Decision Date: 28 January 1992
• Docket Number: Nos. 14277,14279,s. 14277
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Robert MUNHALL, Jr., et al. v. INLAND WETLANDS COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF LEBANON et al. Robert MUNHALL, Jr., et al. v. INLAND WETLANDS COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF LEBANON.

Page 566

602 A.2d 566

221 Conn. 46

Robert MUNHALL, Jr., et al. v. INLAND WETLANDS COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF LEBANON et al.

Robert MUNHALL, Jr., et al. v. INLAND WETLANDS COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF LEBANON.

Nos. 14277, 14279.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 3, 1991.

Decided Jan. 28, 1992.

George C. Hastings and Brian R. Smith, with whom was Jill K. Schultz, Hartford, for appellants (plaintiffs in both cases).

Michael A. Zizka, Hartford, for appellees (defendant Kelley Property Development, Inc., in Docket No. 14277, and intervening defendants in Docket No. 14279).

Juri E. Taalman, Norwich, for appellees (named defendant in each case).

Before SHEA, CALLAHAN, COVELLO, BORDEN and BERDON, JJ.

COVELLO, Justice.

These consolidated appeals raise two principal issues: (1) whether the individual members of an administrative agency can be aggrieved so as to entitle them to pursue a statutory appeal from an agency decision in which they cast dissenting votes; and (2) whether the individual members of an administrative agency have standing to pursue a declaratory judgment action against the agency with respect to an agency decision in which they cast dissenting votes. We conclude that such individual members are neither aggrieved so as to entitle them to appeal from an agency action nor do they have standing to sue the agency in circumstances where the gravamen of their complaint is dissatisfaction with the majority's action. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court that so held.

The procedural facts are not in dispute. The plaintiffs, Robert Munhall, Jr., Richard Schleicher and Russell T. Smith, are all members of the Lebanon inland wetlands commission. On July 2, 1990, the commission took up the application of Kelley Property Development, Inc., for the extension of a previously granted wetland permit. The commission voted three to two to deny the application for an extension. The plaintiffs constituted the three member majority that voted to deny the extension.

On August 6, 1990, after the Lebanon town attorney had rendered an opinion that the reasons given for the July 2 decision were invalid, the commission again considered Kelley's application for an extension as a "new" application. On this occasion, the commission voted four to three to grant the application for extension of the wetland permit. The plaintiffs constituted the three member minority that voted to deny the extension. On August 31, 1990, the plaintiffs filed an administrative appeal in the Superior Court, ¹ contesting the commission's August 6 action, and alleging, as the reasons for their appeal, a host of procedural irregularities in connection with the commission's August 6 vote. ²

On September 17, 1990, the commission voted four to three to rescind its earlier action of July 2, 1990, in connection with the wetland permit. Again, the plaintiffs constituted the three member minority that voted not to rescind. On September 18, 1990, the plaintiffs began a declaratory judgment action against the commission and Kelley Property Development, Inc., alleging further procedural irregularities, ³ and seeking a determination that the commission's action of July 2, 1990, was "valid and effective" and that the commission's later actions were "null and void."

On January 31, 1991, the trial court, Axelrod, J., concluded that the plaintiffs were not aggrieved persons within the meaning of General Statutes § 22a-43 ⁴ and, therefore, granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the administrative appeal. On February 1, 1991, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue the declaratory judgment action and, therefore, granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action. The plaintiffs appealed both judgments to the Appellate Court. We thereafter transferred the matter to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.

I

It is fundamental that appellate jurisdiction in administrative appeals is created only by statute and can be acquired and exercised only in the manner prescribed by statute. Charles Holdings, Ltd. v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 208 Conn. 476, 479, 544 A.2d 633 (1988). Pleading and proof that the plaintiffs are aggrieved within the meaning of the statute is a prerequisite to the trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appeal. Beckish v. Manafort, 175 Conn. 415, 419, 399 A.2d 1274 (1978). "The claims of aggrievement by these plaintiffs presented an issue of fact for the determination of the trial court. Hickey v. New London, 153 Conn. 35, 38, 213 A.2d 308 [1965]. The burden of proving that they were aggrieved was on these plaintiffs. London v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 149 Conn. 282, 284, 179 A.2d 614 [1962]." New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 700, 345 A.2d 563 (1974).

"The fundamental test for determining aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, 'the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.' Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43, 51, 347 A.2d 89 [1974]." Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 493, 400 A.2d 726 (1978).

The plaintiffs claim that as individual commission members they have a specific, personal and legal interest in seeing that the properly enacted decision of July 2, 1990, is upheld and that the improperly enacted decision of August 6, 1990, is reversed. The plaintiffs argue that since that interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the commission's subsequent rulings, they are aggrieved and thus entitled to pursue their administrative appeal. We disagree.

In Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 145 A.2d 832 (1958), a zoning board of appeals granted the applicant's request for a variance. The zoning commission, a different administrative body within the same town, and one of its individual members appealed to the Court of Common Pleas. We concluded that there was no authority "for a zoning commission to take an appeal where a ruling or order of its own is not in issue." Id., at 659, 145 A.2d 832. With respect to the individual zoning commission member, we concluded that "[t]he [commission member] ... whose interest is merely that of a resident and taxpayer of the town concerned with the strict enforcement of the zoning regulations for the general welfare of the community, is not entitled to maintain an appeal as an aggrieved person...." Id., at 662, 145 A.2d 832.

We have never concluded that individual commission members are aggrieved for the purpose of appealing the decisions of the very agency upon which they sit. Inherent in such a state of the law is the notion that the legislative function of any agency, by its very nature, involves the interaction of competing ideas that eventually resolve themselves in a decision that may not satisfy all of the agency's members. This is the essence of the legislative process, a process that should not be compromised by ready access to a supplemental forum for those dissenting members who are disappointed in the outcome.

The plaintiffs are unable to cite any authority in support of their claim of aggrievement and our research indicates that none exists. On the contrary, there are holdings to the effect that members of an agency who are in the minority with respect to an agency decision are not aggrieved for the purposes of pursuing an appeal of that decision in court.

In Cohen v. Board of Selectmen, 376 A.2d 853 (Me.1977), a majority of the selectmen of the town of Kennebunk granted the plaintiff's application for a license to build a wharf in the tidewaters within the limits of the town. Two selectmen, who voted against the plaintiff's application, appealed to the Superior Court. The trial court dismissed the appeal. While the trial court's ruling was reversed on other grounds, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court determined that the dissenting members of the board of selectmen could not "be considered ... aggrieved" and that the trial court "was correct in dismissing the appeal as to them." Id., at 856, 376 A.2d 853.

In McTaggart v. Public Service Commission, 168 Mont. 155, 541 P.2d 778 (1975), a dissenting member of the public service commission filed an action in court to vacate a rate order adopted by a majority of the commission. The Montana Supreme Court determined that the dissenting member had no standing to pursue such an action concluding that "[c]haos would result if any dissenting member of a state board or agency had standing to appeal from any board or agency decision." Id., at 158, 541 P.2d 778.

In Ohio ex rel. Basista v. Melcher, 118 Ohio App. 37, 188 N.E.2d 293 (1963), a dissenting member of the board of zoning appeals appealed to the city council the majority's decision to issue a building permit. The city council vacated the decision. The applicant appealed to court alleging, inter alia, that the dissenting member was not an aggrieved person within the meaning of the board's regulations. While deciding unfavorably to the applicant on other grounds, the Ohio Court of Appeals determined: "The right of a member of a board exercising quasi-judicial powers to appeal the decision of the board rendered in the exercise of such power ... is nonexistent. If a member of the board attempts to exercise the right of appeal as an interested party or as a person aggrieved, then he should not be a trier of the facts in a case in which he is interested." Id., at 47, 188 N.E.2d 293.

The plaintiffs here are claiming an interest in the strict enforcement of the Lebanon inland wetlands and watercourses regulations as...