Murff v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n
| Decision Date | 06 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-16-0005WC,1-16-0005WC |
| Citation | 70 N.E.3d 273,2017 IL App (1st) 160005 WC |
| Parties | Anthony MURFF, Appellant, v. The ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (City of Chicago, Appellee). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Joseph J. Spingola, of Oak Brook, for appellant.
Christopher L. Jarchow, of Hennessy & Roach, P.C., of Chicago, for appellee.
¶ 1 The claimant, Anthony Murff, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County which confirmed a decision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission), denying his petition pursuant to section 19(h) of the Workers Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/19(h) (West 2014)) by reason of his failure to present evidence demonstrating a change in his physical or mental condition. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 2 The following factual recitation is taken from the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing conducted on December 27, 2013, and at a section 19(h) (820 ILCS 305/19(h) (West 2014)) hearing conducted by the Commission on December 22, 2014.
¶ 4 On June 8, 2010, the claimant returned to work as a sanitation laborer in the City's rodent control department. His job duties included "baiting" yards and alleys, which required him to carry a 10-pound bucket of poison in his right hand and a scooper in his left hand. He testified that his job title and pay remained the same as when he worked as a garbage man.
¶ 5 On August 7, 2011, the claimant was examined by Dr. Chmell, an orthopedic surgeon, at his attorney's request. In his report, Dr. Chmell opined that the claimant's January 23, 2009, work accident resulted in his C5-C6 disc herniation and left shoulder rotator cuff tendinopathy
and that the medical treatment he received for these injuries was reasonable and necessary. Following his examination, Dr. Chmell concluded that the claimant had reached maximum medical improvement, would always require restrictions, and would never be able to resume working as a garbage collector.
¶ 6 At the original arbitration hearing, the claimant testified that he has good and bad days. He explained that he continues to experience pain in his shoulder, stiffness in his neck, and numbness and tingling in his hands. The claimant also testified that any overhead activities are "extremely hard" and he has difficulty getting dressed and applying deodorant to his left side. He used to be an avid hunter and fisherman, but is no longer able to "sport fish" with a lure. He also struggles with lifting his grandchildren, gripping pens and pencils, and driving for long periods of time. Despite these limitations, the claimant stated that he has learned to live with his condition and is able to function.
¶ 7 Following the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator issued a written decision on January 22, 2014, finding that the claimant suffered an injury to his cervical spine
and left shoulder as a result of the work accident of January 23, 2009, and that the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with the City. The arbitrator awarded the claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits from January 27, 2009, through June 8, 2010, and permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits in the amount of $664.72 per week for 250 weeks because the cervical spine and left shoulder injuries resulted in a 50% loss of use of a person as a whole. Neither party filed for a review of the arbitrator's decision before the Commission. Thus, pursuant to section 19(b) of the Act, the arbitrator's decision became the conclusive decision of the Commission. 820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 2014).
¶ 8 After the hearing, the claimant continued working for the City as a sanitation laborer in rodent control. On June 11, 2014, the claimant's supervisor, George Escavez, told him to report to 39th Street and South Iron Street, which is the City's refuse collection for garbage station. The claimant went to that location the next day and was informed by Gloria, the superintendent, that he was assigned to work as a garbage man. When the claimant told Gloria about his work restrictions, she called and spoke with Escavez in rodent control, and told the claimant that she did not know why they sent him to the sanitation station. Gloria instructed the claimant to return to the office for rodent control, which he did. There, Escavez explained to the claimant that he was supposed to be released to work as a garbage man and, if he could not perform the work, to swipe out and go home or call the union.
¶ 9 On June 20, 2014, the claimant filed a petition pursuant to section 19(h) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(h) (West 2014)), and section 8(a) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2014)), alleging a material increase in his disability and seeking an award of additional benefits, including maintenance and vocational rehabilitation based upon a reduction in his earning power.
¶ 10 On July 16, 2014, the claimant requested reasonable accommodations, but was told that reasonable accommodations could not be made. The claimant was also informed that, because he had permanent restrictions, the City would probably "never bring him back because they are not doing that anymore."
¶ 11 At the section 19(h) hearing held before the Commission on December 22, 2014, the claimant testified that, after he was assigned to work as a garbage man, he contacted his union but learned that it could not help him. The claimant stated that an effort was made to put him back onto workers' compensation, but his request was denied. Instead, he was told he could go on ordinary disability, which he did.
¶ 12 The claimant further testified that he received no medical treatment for his left shoulder following the December 27, 2013, arbitration hearing. He also explained that there is nothing else the doctors can do for his neck, that his condition remains relatively the same, and that his work restrictions have not changed from when his case was tried at arbitration. He admitted that he has not returned to Dr. Phillips since July of 2010, and has not undergone any additional surgery or physical therapy. The claimant also testified that he is not currently working and has not applied for employment with any other employers.
¶ 13 On April 27, 2015, the Commission denied the claimant's section 19(h) petition. The Commission found that the term "disability" as used in section 19(h) refers only to physical and mental disability
, not economic disability. Since the claimant failed to present any evidence demonstrating a material change in his physical or mental condition, the Commission found no basis to reopen or modify the benefits the claimant was previously awarded. The Commission also determined that the doctrine of res judicata barred the claimant from seeking maintenance and vocational rehabilitation benefits because he failed to raise the issue at the arbitration hearing. Alternatively, even if the maintenance and vocational rehabilitation benefits were available, the Commission found that the claimant failed to present sufficient evidence establishing his entitlement to those benefits.
¶ 14 The claimant sought a judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Cook County. On December 17, 2015, the circuit court confirmed the Commission's decision, and this appeal followed.
¶ 15 We first address the claimant's argument that the Commission erred in finding that the term "disability" in section 19(h) of the Act refers only to physical and mental disability
, not economic disability.
¶ 16 Initially, we note that the resolution of this issue requires this court to interpret section 19(h) of the Act, which presents a question of law that we review de novo . R.D. Masonry, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n , 215 Ill.2d 397, 402, 294 Ill.Dec. 172, 830 N.E.2d 584 (2005). In construing the Act, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Beelman Trucking v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n , 233 Ill.2d 364, 370, 330 Ill.Dec. 796, 909 N.E.2d 818 (2009). The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id ."We must construe the statute so that each word, clause, and sentence is given a reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous, avoiding an interpretation that would render any portion of the statute meaningless or void." Cassens Transport Co. v. Industrial Comm'n , 218 Ill.2d 519, 524, 300 Ill.Dec. 416, 844 N.E.2d 414 (2006). In addition to the...
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