Murphy v. Boston & M.R.R.
| Decision Date | 30 December 1954 |
| Citation | 123 N.E.2d 378,332 Mass. 123 |
| Parties | Elizabeth J. MURPHY v. BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Herbert S. Avery, Boston, for plaintiff.
George W. McLaughlin, Boston, for defendant.
Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, WILKINS, WILLIAMS and COUNIHAN, JJ.
In this action of tort for personal injuries sustained by a fall on High Street in Medford where that street crosses the tracks of the defendant, the only question before us is the sufficiency of a notice given by the plaintiff.
By G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 84, § 18, as it appears in St.1933, c. 114, § 1, the plaintiff was required within thirty days to give to the 'person' obliged by law to keep the way in repair notice, among other things, of the 'cause' of her injury. The defendant corporation was a 'person' entitled to notice under that section. Dickie v. Boston & Albany R. Co., 131 Mass. 516; Hurburt v. Town of Great Barrington 300 Mass. 524, 526, 16 N.E.2d 71. The purpose of requiring notice is to enable the defendant to investigate the occurrence and to determine whether it is liable. Miller v. City of Springfield, 177 Mass. 373, 376, 58 N.E. 1013; Carey v. Malley, 327 Mass. 189, 193, 97 N.E.2d 645; Rooney v. Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Social & Athletic Club, Inc., 330 Mass. 340, 342, 113 N.E.2d 838.
Within the prescribed time, the plaintiff gave a notice to the defendant with respect to her injury sustained on April 2, 1949. The only statement of cause was as follows: Nothing in the notice indicated any defect in the crossing.
In Carey v. Malley, 327 Mass. 189, 192-193, 97 N.E.2d 645, 647, it was said that 'There is no merit in the defendant's contention, for which no authority is cited, that the cause set forth in the notice must show not only the actual physical cause of the injury but also that this cause is one which will support in law a cause of action.' In the present case the cause of the injury was stated in the following words: We think that the cause was sufficiently stated, that the plaintiff caught her heel in the rail and fell. It was not necessary that the notice contain a claim for damages or threat of action. Laskowski v. Manning, 325 Mass. 393, 400, 91 N.E.2d 231.
In Merrill v. Paige, 229 Mass. 511, 118 N.E. 862, 863, a notice that the plaintiff fell because of 'the icy condition of...
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...the specific statutes involved in Dickie that imposed liability on the railroad for the way. See, e.g., Murphy v. Boston & Me. R.R., 332 Mass. 123, 123, 123 N.E.2d 378 (1954) (railroad corporation entitled to notice under statute, where injury occurred on its train tracks crossing public ro......
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...to notice within thirty days when a defect in a way under their control is alleged under G.L. c. 84, § 15. See Murphy v. Boston & Me. R.R., 332 Mass. 123, 123 N.E.2d 378 (1954); Dobbins v. West End St. Ry., 168 Mass. 556, 47 N.E. 428 (1897). Likewise, because G.L. c. 81, § 18, applies only ......
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