Muslow v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll.

• Decision Date: 17 August 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 19-11793
• Parties: KATHERINE MUSLOW, et al. v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

KATHERINE MUSLOW, et al. v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE, et al.

Civil Action No. 19-11793

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

August 17, 2022

SECTION M (2)

ORDER & REASONS

BARRY W. ASHE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are three motions: (1) a motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff Meredith Cunningham;^[1] (2) a motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff Katherine Muslow;^[2]and (3) a motion to strike filed by Cunningham and Muslow (together “Plaintiffs”).^[3] Defendants Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (“LSU”), Carlton “Trey” Jones, III, Thomas Skinner, Larry Hollier, and John Harman (collectively, “Defendants”) respond in opposition.^[4] Plaintiffs reply in further support of their motions.^[5] Having considered the parties' memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court denies each motion.^[6]

I. PENDING MOTIONS

This case arises out of an employment dispute. The facts of this case have been discussed at length in the Court's prior Orders & Reasons.^[7] On May 24, 2022, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, dismissing all of Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.^[8] Plaintiffs now move the Court to reconsider its May 24, 2022 Order &amp Reasons (the “May 24, 2022 O&R”).^[9]Because Plaintiffs' motions are filed in the wake of final judgment,^[10] the Court treats them as timely-filed motions under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.^[11]

In their motions, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he Court's [May 24, 2022] decision undermines th[e] fundamental value [of non-discrimination in pay], refuses to consider or engage in any meaningful analysis of Plaintiffs' record evidence overcoming summary judgment, bungles summary-judgment procedure, and improperly elevates form over substance in contravention of the very first rule of civil procedure.”^[12] They contend that the Court committed manifest errors of law and fact when it: (1) inequitably applied procedural rules to Plaintiffs' detriment;^[13] (2) “refused to give weight” to cited evidence;^[14] (3) “improperly” credited Defendants' nonretaliatory reasons;^[15] and (4) “failed to consider other conflicting testimony and evidence of unequal treatment”^[16] and pretext.^[17]

In opposition, Defendants argue that the motions: (1) impermissibly attempt to introduce new arguments and evidence that existed at the time of the summary-judgment submission date;^[18](2) constitute improper rehashing of arguments already rejected in the Court's 84-page order;^[19]and (3) fail to show (a) that the Court's order contains a manifest or obvious error of law or fact, or is manifestly unjust,^[20] (b) new evidence,^[21] or (c) an intervening change in the controlling law since the Court's ruling.^[22]

In reply, Plaintiffs maintain that they have articulated grounds for relief under Rule 59(e): to correct a manifest error of fact or law and to prevent manifest injustice.^[23] They insist that they “only refer to prior arguments and evidence [in their motions] because the Court explains that it did not consider either in reaching its decision.”^[24] Plaintiffs then urge the Court to consider evidence cited for the first time in their untimely surreply, which was not permitted to be filed.^[25]

II. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Rule 59(e) Standard

A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment after its entry calls into question the correctness of the judgment. In re Transtexas Gas Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 581 (5th Cir. 2002). The moving party must show that the motion is necessary to: (1) correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; (2) present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) prevent manifest injustice; or (4) address an intervening change in the controlling law. See, e.g., Branch v. Lobello, 2022 WL 2132039, at *2 (E.D. La. June 14, 2022). “Rule 59(e) permits a court to alter or amend a judgment, but it ‘may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.'” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (quoting 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2810.1, at 127-28 (2d ed. 1995)); see also In re Self, 172 F.Supp.2d 813, 816 (W.D. La. 2001) (“A Rule 59(e) motion should not be used to relitigate prior matters that should have been urged earlier or that simply have been resolved to the movant's dissatisfaction.”). Thus, a Rule 59(e) motion “‘is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.'” Rivera v. Garza, 2022 WL 2752224, at *1 (5th Cir. July 14, 2022) (quoting Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2004)).

In deciding the outcome of a Rule 59(e) motion to upset summary judgment granted on the basis of a party's failure to present evidence, the court must balance “two competing imperatives: (1) finality, and (2) the need to render just decisions on the basis of all the facts.” Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993). Courts consider “the reasons for the moving party's default, the importance of the omitted evidence to the moving party's case, whether the evidence was available to the non-movant before she responded to the summary judgment motion, and the likelihood that the nonmoving party will suffer unfair prejudice if the case is reopened.” Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 174 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Templet, 367 F.3d at 478. And while a district court has considerable discretion to grant or deny a Rule 59(e) motion, see Edward H. Bohlin Co., 6 F.3d at 353, the grant of such a motion is an “extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.” Indep. Coca-Cola Emps.' Union of Lake Charles, No. 1060 v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. United, Inc., 114 Fed.Appx. 137, 143 (5th Cir. 2004).

B. Rule 60(b) Standard

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits ‘a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances.'” Kemp v. United States, 142 S.Ct. 1856, 1861 (2022) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005)). Those limited circumstances are:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “This last option is available only when Rules 60(b)(1) through (b)(5) are inapplicable. Even then, ‘extraordinary circumstances' must justify reopening.” Kemp, 142 S.Ct. at 1861 (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 n.11, 864 (1988)) (internal citation omitted). To that end, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) “‘requires a showing of “manifest injustice” and will not be used to relieve a party from the “free, calculated, and deliberate choices he has made.”'” Rivera, 2022 WL 2752224, at *1 (quoting Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church, 727 F.3d 356, 363 (5th Cir. 2013)).

C. Analysis

After considering Plaintiffs' arguments under these standards, the Court is not persuaded that relief is warranted. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Court's dismissal of their claims rested on any manifest error of law or fact or that reconsideration is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Nor have they shown that any other circumstance warranting relief under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) applies. Rather, Plaintiffs admit that they only offer evidence and arguments that could have been presented at the time they opposed the motions for summary judgment.^[26] See Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 174. Therefore, their Rule 59 and 60 motions must be denied.

1. Manifest Errors of Law

Plaintiffs argue that the Court misapplied its legal analysis as to all claims asserted, thereby committing manifest error of law.^[27] “[A] ‘manifest error' is an obvious error that ‘is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law.'” Wease v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 852 Fed.Appx. 807, 809 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Guy v. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004)). Plaintiffs have not begun to meet this standard. They contend that the Court inequitably applied procedural rules, failed to consider applicable law when conducting its comparator analysis, improperly relied on Defendants' nondiscriminatory reasons and affirmative defenses, and neglected evidence of pretext. In doing so, Plaintiffs inappropriately, and in contravention of the Rule 59 and 60 standards, rehash arguments made in opposition to Defendants' motions for summary judgment (but rejected by the Court) or present arguments that should have been made in opposing summary judgment. They do not show that the Court committed a manifest error of law. a. Application of procedural rules

Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a 61-page omnibus surreply (along with 119 pages of exhibits) approximately two months after the February 10, 2022 submission date for Defendants' motions for summary judgment.^[28] The Court denied the motion for leave to file an omnibus...