Muthler v. Ann Arbor Machine, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-70711.,97-70711.
• Parties: Merle MUTHLER, Plaintiff, v. ANN ARBOR MACHINE, INC. et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

18 F.Supp.2d 722

Merle MUTHLER, Plaintiff, v. ANN ARBOR MACHINE, INC. et al., Defendants.

No. 97-70711.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

July 31, 1998.

Lawrence J. Leib, Southfield, MI, for Plaintiff.

Robert A. Boonin, Ann Arbor, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROSEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 24, 1997, Plaintiff Merle Muthler filed this wrongful termination claim against Defendants Robert Betzig, James Briening, and Ann Arbor Machine, Inc. alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") because of a heart condition which limited his ability to work long hours. Muthler also alleges Defendants breached his employment contract by terminating him without just cause. On June 1, 1998, Defendants filed the motion for summary judgment now before the Court, to which Plaintiff responded on July 28, 1998, just two days before the hearing on this matter.¹

II. FACTS

Plaintiff Merle Muthler was co-owner, along with William Ryzi, of Ace Broach & Machine, Inc. ("Ace"), a corporation whose expertise was building, fabrication and installation of broach machines. In April of 1994, Defendant Ann Arbor Machine, Inc. ("Ann Arbor Machine"), purchased the assets of Ace for $12,000, the terms of which where memorialized in an asset purchase agreement. (Defendants' Ex. 2).² At the time of the sale, Defendants hired Plaintiff as its Broach Machine Assembly Manager of the plant in Warren, Michigan. Plaintiff's duties were to oversee the actual assembly and construction operations of the broach machines. While the asset purchase agreement makes no mention of Plaintiff's employment with Ann Arbor Machine, Plaintiff claims that the employment of himself and Mr. Ryzi in "positions of authority" with "substantial salaries" was part of the package negotiated by the parties. (Plaintiff's Brief, p. 3).

Plaintiff testified that when he began working at Ann Arbor Machine, he worked approximately 70-84 hours per week in order to complete the broach machine work in process. In March of 1995, Plaintiff suffered a heart attack at his home. As a result of the attack, Plaintiff was forced to take a three-month paid leave of absence. When Plaintiff returned to work, the jobs on which he had been working were completed and the Warren plant was closed. All broach division operations were relocated to Chelsea, Michigan, where Plaintiff began working. Upon his return to work, Plaintiff's physicians placed him under a medical restriction, requiring that he work no more than 32 hours per week. (Defendant's Ex. 4). Plaintiff worked 32 hours a week for one month, after which time his restrictions were modified allowing him to work 40 hours per week. After Plaintiff began working 40 hours a week, his supervisors, Defendants' Betzig and Briening, inquired every four to six weeks when his restrictions would be lifted, allegedly unhappy about Plaintiff's inability to work overtime. (Plaintiff's deposition, p. 70). Plaintiff's cardiologist, however, refused to raise or eliminate the restriction.

In March of 1996, Plaintiff was laid-off and later terminated. Defendants' stated reason for the termination was the lack of orders to be filled. Plaintiff alleges that this statement is false, and that there was substantial work which needed to be finished, as well as new orders from Chrysler Corporation. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission contending that his termination was in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. On November 25, 1996, the EEOC issued a "right to sue" letter and Plaintiff filed this suit. In his statement to the EEOC, Plaintiff stated he was the only employee laid off. As of this date, Plaintiff's former position has not been filled.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff's complaint consists of two counts. In the first count, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") by wrongfully terminating him for his inability to work overtime and by refusing to reasonably accommodate his inability to work more than 40 hours a week pursuant to his physician's medical restrictions. In his second count, Plaintiff contends that Defendants breached a "just-cause" employment contract by terminating him without just cause.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff was not "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA, and that Plaintiff was actually an "at-will" employee that they had a right to terminate without cause.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgement is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Three 1986 Supreme Court cases—Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) — ushered in a "new era" in the standards of review for a summary judgment motion. These cases, in the aggregate, lowered the movant's burden on a summary judgment motion.³ According to the Celotex Court:

In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

After reviewing the above trilogy, the Sixth Circuit established a series of principles to be applied to motions for summary judgment. They are summarized as follows:

*Cases involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgement.

*The movant must meet the initial burden of showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" as to an essential element of the non-movant's case. This burden may be met by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.

*The respondent cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must "present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment."

*The trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.

*The trial court has more discretion than in the "old era" in evaluating the respondent's evidence. The respondent must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Further, "[W]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find" for the respondent, the motion should be granted. The trial court has at least some discretion to determine whether the respondent's claim is plausible.

Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co. 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir.1989). See also, Nernberg v. Pearce, 35 F.3d 247, 249 (6th Cir.1994).

V. ANALYSIS

A. Breach of Contract Claim

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he entered into an agreement with Defendants whereby he was "entitled to be classified as an employee who could only be terminated for cause," and that Defendants breached that agreement by terminating him without cause. (Plaintiff's complaint p. 4). Plaintiff asserts that being classified as a "just cause" employee was part of the consideration for the sale of Ace. Plaintiff states he and his partner, William Ryzi, were given $12,000 cash and guaranteed "positions of authority ... at substantial salaries." (Plaintiff's brief, p. 3). Plaintiff further argues that to classify his employment as "at will" would mean that he and Mr. Ryzi sold the company for only $12,000, a sum alleged to be less than the company's worth. Although Plaintiff may well have had a subjective belief that his employment was "just cause," the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that Plaintiff was actually an "at-will" employee.

Under Michigan law, "either party to an at-will employment contract for an indefinite term may terminate it at any time and for any reason...." Sepanske v. Bendix Corporation, 147 Mich.App. 819, 826, 384 N.W.2d 54, 58 (1985). Indeed, under Michigan law, employment relationships are presumed to be "at will" in the absence of a specific contractual provision to the contrary. Valentine v. General American Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256, 258-59, 362 N.W.2d 628 (1984). Thus, unless Plaintiff comes forward with record evidence establishing that he had a legitimate expectation that he could only be terminated for just cause, Plaintiff's employment relationship is "at will" and he can be terminated without proof of cause.

Here, the evidence actually proves to the contrary. Indeed, the most persuasive evidence that Plaintiff was classified as an "at-will" employee is his own testimony. During his deposition, Plaintiff stated:

(Mr. Leib): What was your understanding of the nature of your employment, at-will or just cause?

* * * * * *

(Plaintiff): My understanding was very clear based on the, one of the final meetings where we were signing documents that specifically we were told that we were, after negotiating the sale and the salaries, we were then told that we were at-will employees. So we, in fact, were told that we were at-will employees.

(Mr. Lieb): This was after the sale?

(Plaintiff): The documents were not signed, but we were at the meeting where they were signed.

(Plaintiff's dep., p. 143) (emphasis added). In addition to admitting in his deposition that he was an at-will employee, ...