Myers v. Lashley

• Decision Date: 26 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. 96,102.,96,102.
• Citation: 44 P.3d 553,2002 OK 14
• Parties: Phyllis MYERS and Steve Myers, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Karen H. LASHLEY, Ph.D., Defendant-Appellee, Rhonda Lynn Thomason, Gilbert Medical Center, Inc., An Oklahoma Professional Corporation, Defendants.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

44 P.3d 553

2002 OK 14

Phyllis MYERS and Steve Myers, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Karen H. LASHLEY, Ph.D., Defendant-Appellee, Rhonda Lynn Thomason, Gilbert Medical Center, Inc., An Oklahoma Professional Corporation, Defendants.

No. 96,102.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

February 26, 2002.

As Amended March 20, 2002.

Garvin A. Isaacs, Nancy A. Zerr, Garvin A. Isaacs, Inc., Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellants.

Robert T. Goolsby, Goolsby, Olson & Proctor, Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellee.

Laura Haag McConnell, Hartzog, Conger, Cason & Neville, Oklahoma City, OK, for Guardian Ad Litem.¹

OPALA, J.

¶ 1 The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the evidentiary materials demonstrate a nonactionable claim because the defendant-psychologist's conduct in contest is within the range of her qualified statutory privilege² for good-faith reporting of child abuse? We answer in the affirmative.

I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

¶ 2 This is an appeal from summary judgment for the defendant Karen H. Lashley, Ph.D. [Dr. Lashley], in an action by Steve Myers [father] and his mother, Phyllis Myers [grandmother] [both plaintiffs named Myers will be referred to as plaintiffs or Myers (in the plural)], to recover for harm occasioned by allegedly substandard evaluative techniques in the treatment of Steve Myers' children (M.D.M. and Melanie Myers, who are neither parties to this appeal nor to the litigation below), which resulted in Myers being wrongly identified as child abusers.

¶ 3 Steve Myers and Rhonda Thomason were married 7 May 1977. The three children born of the marriage are Melissa, Melanie and M.D.M. The parents divorced 11 December 1992 and the custody of their oldest daughter, Melissa (then 14 years), went to the father. The mother received custody of the two younger daughters, Melanie (11 years) and M.D.M. (6 years). During the ten-year period between the filing of the divorce petition and the prosecution of this lawsuit the father and mother have continued to do forensic battle over various domestic problems.³

¶ 4 In November 1993 the mother took Melanie and M.D.M. to the Gilbert Medical Center. There Dr. R. diagnosed Melanie as being depressed and fatigued. He referred her and M.D.M. to Dr. Karen Lashley [Lashley], a licensed clinical psychologist,⁴ who then practiced at the clinic. According to Dr. Lashley's notes, Dr. R based his referral of Melanie on concerns about "anxiety, depression and possible abuse." Dr. Lashley's clinical notes, taken during a 30 January 1994 therapy session, indicate that Melanie made allegations about her father's sexual abuse. M.D.M. also revealed sexual abuse by her paternal grandmother, Phyllis Myers. Dr. Lashley notified the Oklahoma Department of Human Services [DHS] in January 1994 about receiving information of Melanie's sexual abuse.⁵ Rhonda Thomason reported the same allegations to the police department.⁶ After an extensive investigation, the police declined to press charges against Myers.

¶ 5 On 4 January 1996 Myers brought two separate actions against Dr. Lashley, Rhonda Thomason and the Gilbert Medical Center, Inc. (consolidated as joint proceedings for discovery purposes). The plaintiffs initially pressed their claims on three theories of liability: (a) against Rhonda Thomason⁷ for slander per se and (b) against Rhonda Thomason, Dr. Lashley and the medical center for negligent infliction of emotional distress as well as (c) for reckless and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Myers' amended petitions name Dr. Lashley as the sole defendant⁸ and allege only two theories of liability⁹ — professional negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dr. Lashley's answer tenders several affirmative defenses.¹⁰ A guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the interest of the children.

¶ 6 Steve Myers sought damages for loss of income, loss of companionship, love and affection of his daughters, mental anguish and emotional distress (suffered from being called a child molester); Phyllis Myers for harm to her reputation, for lost income from the day care business that she and her son owned, medical expense, mental anguish and emotional distress.

¶ 7 The trial court initially denied Dr. Lashley's quest for summary relief. A year later it declared (by order entered 9 March 2001) Myers' claim not actionable. Summary judgment went to Dr. Lashley.¹¹ Myers' joint appeal stands retained for disposition by this court. Today we affirm the nisi prius judgment on a theory different from that on which it was rested below (lack of duty to the plaintiffs). Although we let the judgment for Dr. Lashley stand, we need not examine it on the ground assigned by the trial court. When supported by the record, a legally correct nisi prius judgment must be affirmed although it was anchored to a theory different from that on which it comes to be tested on appellate review.¹²

The Mid-Trial Appellate Controversy

¶ 8 In launching her defense below Dr. Lashley had perceived herself impeded in the discovery of testimony and records relating to her treatment of the girls and in her access to certain medical information about the girls' mental health, which are now under control of other physicians. She sought a writ (of mandamus) to compel the trial judge to aid her in these efforts.¹³ By its January 16, 2001 order this court took original cognizance of the mandamus case and stayed all further proceedings here until the trial court had decided whether Myers had an actionable claim and if so, whether Dr. Lashley would be impeded by legal barriers in pressing her chosen defense theories.¹⁴ Because the reason for the writ stood removed by the summary judgment later entered below in Dr. Lashley's favor, the original proceeding was eventually terminated for mootness.

II

THEORIES AND CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

A. Theories of Myers' Claim Which Stood under Consideration in the Summary Process

¶ 9 Myers argue that a mental health care professional owes a duty to a parent (or grandparent) not to misdiagnose negligently a child's condition, if that misdiagnosis should lead to a false accusation of sexual abuse. They urge that their claim is actionable on the theory that the defendant's negligent therapy and psychiatric care brought about the implanting and reinforcing of false memories (of sexual abuse) in Steve Myers' daughters. By their other theory of liability, Dr. Lashley is alleged to have intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon them "by planting false memories in the minds of the children and making false reports of sexual abuse." Myers insist their claim is not rested on the defendant's submission of a report compelled by Oklahoma's child abuse reporting laws,¹⁵ but rather upon negligent misdiagnosis of Myers' children and the resultant harm to them from therapy-induced suggestions of sexual abuse.

B. Dr. Lashley's Theories of Defense Under Nisi Prius Consideration in the Summary Process

¶ 10 Dr. Lashley argues that in third-party suits (those that are not brought by a patient) she is protected from liability by the shield afforded her through the statutory reporting privilege.¹⁶ According to her, when a psychologist is under compulsion to report the revealed (or discovered) information of child abuse, that professional's actions in the report's submission stand protected by the Act.

III

POST-REPORTING HARM TO THE PLAINTIFFS, WHICH WAS OCCASIONED BY DR. LASHLEY'S ALLEGEDLY IMPROPER EVALUATIVE TECHNIQUES, FALLS WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE REPORTING STATUTE'S QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE

A. Oklahoma's Child Abuse Reporting Laws

¶ 11 Oklahoma's child abuse reporting laws express the State's strong public interest in protecting children from abuse by the policy of mandatory reporting of actual and suspected child abuse or neglect to appropriate authorities and agencies.¹⁷ The statutory scheme imposes upon all health care professionals (teachers as well as all other persons) an obligation to report in good faith all suspected instances of child abuse to the Department of Human Services.¹⁸ No privilege or contract will relieve any person from the legally mandated reporting requirement.¹⁹ The knowing and willful failure to report child abuse (or the making of a false report) is a misdemeanor.²⁰ Any one acting in good faith and exercising due care in reporting child abuse has "immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred."²¹

¶ 12 There is neither ambiguity in, nor conflict between, the various terms of the statutory reporting laws. Their legislative intent can easily be divined from the plain language of the statutes.²²

B. The Statute-conferred Qualified Reporting Privilege Invoked By Dr. Lashley

¶ 13 The statute-conferred privilege²³ is not aimed at shielding the professional from any one identified theory of liability. Rather, it is the harm that may flow from the reporting which is made irredressable.²⁴ The act of reporting and the consequences of a licensed clinical psychologist's lawful compliance with the reporting statute lie at the very base of the privilege conferred. When reporting constitutes the instrument through which the damage is inflicted, as it clearly does in this case,²⁵ it matters not what type of harm flows from reporting or what common-law theory is invoked by those who seek recovery. The broad statutory privilege extends across all cognizable theories of liability. It protects every professional in Dr. Lashley's class from any effort by those who seek to recover for harm occasioned by or through the act of reporting. In short, the act itself as well as all the consequences of compelled reporting stand shielded by the law's privilege.²⁶ Whenever post-reporting harm is the object of one's recovery — and it cannot be connected to a professional's bad-faith reporting of abuse — it falls both explicitly and implicitly within the ambit of the law's conferred privilege.

¶ 14 Because this lawsuit does not seek...