Myles v. State
| Decision Date | 07 December 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 32366,32366 |
| Citation | 170 Tex.Crim. 479,341 S.W.2d 913 |
| Parties | Nannle Maude MYLES, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Coleman & Whitten, by Earl L. Coleman, Denton, for appellant.
Robert H. Caldwell, Jr., County Atty., Denton, and Leon B. Douglas, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
The offense is murder, with punishment assessed at eighteen years in the penitentiary.
In view of the disposition of the case, a statement of the facts is not deemed called for further than to say that the state's testimony showed an unprovoked killing.
It is shown by formal bill of exception No. 2 that while deliberating upon their verdict the jury sent a note to the court by the bailiff which read:
While a discussion between the court and appellant's counsel regarding such note was being had in chambers, outside the presence and hearing of the appellant, the jury sent by the bailiff another note to the court which read:
Thereupon over objection by appellant's counsel and in the absence of appellant, the court sent the following note to the jury:
"The answer-to your questions are to be determined by the jury."
Obviously, the learned trial court, in his action, did not comply with the provisions of arts. 676, 677, and 679, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., which require that any communication between the court and the jury must be in open court in the presence of the defendant.
The state recognizes such fact but seeks to avoid reversible error in the matter by urging that the trial court's instruction, or answer, was nothing more or less than a refusal to answer.
To this contention we can not agree. The instruction or answer was obviously one upon a question of law--which was that it was within the province of the jury to determine, as a matter of law, whether a suspended sentence could be awarded in a murder case involving malice aforethought and carrying a penalty of five years in the penitentiary. It was more than a mere refusal to answer.
The trial court had correctly applied the law of suspended sentence in his charge, but this additional instruction tended to nullify that charge and...
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Morehead v. State
...prior conviction question for court, not jury). The jury is never the judge of the law in a criminal proceeding. Myles v. State, 170 Tex.Crim. 479, 341 S.W.2d 913, 915 (1960). In fact, it is error to allow the jury to resolve a legal question. Id. Appellant's requested charges ask the jury ......
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Williamson v. State, 05-88-00523-CR
...of the defendant constitutes reversible error. Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 823, 829 (Tex.Crim.App.1974); see Myles v. State, 170 Tex.Crim. 479, 341 S.W.2d 913, 914 (1960). However, it is incumbent upon a defendant to bring the error to the judge's attention by objection or formal bill of exc......
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Allaben v. State
...Articles that such communication be in open court and in the presence of the defendant constitutes reversible error. Myles v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 341 S.W.2d 913. It has been held though that a refusal to answer the jury question does not constitute additional instructions. Torres v. S......
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Brown v. State, 47126
...requiring such communication to be in open court and in the presence of the defendant constitutes reversible error. Myles v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 479, 341 S.W.2d 913. We have also held that a communication between the court and the jury, although not made in compliance with the provisions o......